Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs October 9, 2014 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL30588 Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Summary Afghan security forces have lead security responsibility throughout the country, and the United States and its partner countries are in the process of transitioning to a smaller post-2014 mission consisting mostly of training the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF). The number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, which peaked at about 100,000 in June 2011, has been reduced to about 30,000. President Obama announced in May 2014 that the United States plans to keep 9,800 U.S. forces in Afghanistan during 2015, shrinking to 4,900 mostly in Kabul and at Bagram Airfield during 2016. The post-2016 force is to be several hundred military personnel, under U.S. Embassy authority. The post-2014 force was contingent on Afghanistan’s signing a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the United States. All candidates in the April 5, 2014, presidential election publicly support the agreement, including Dr. Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani, who garnered enough votes to proceed to a runoff on June 14. A dispute over alleged fraud in that runoff resulted in a U.S.-brokered solution under which Ghani was declared the winner and Abdullah was appointed to a new position of Chief Executive Officer of the government. Ghani and Abdullah took office on September 29, and the U.S.-Afghan BSA was signed on September 30. A similar document was also signed between Afghanistan and NATO. Even though the election dispute has been resolved, at least for now, experts remain concerned that Afghan stability is at risk from weak and corrupt Afghan governance and insurgent safe havens in Pakistan. U.S. and partner country anti-corruption efforts in Afghanistan have yielded few concrete results, although the new President, Ghani, has taken steps to prioritize anti- corruption issues. An unexpected potential benefit to stability could come from a negotiated settlement between the Afghan government and the Taliban and other insurgent groups. Negotiations have been sporadic, but in May 2014 produced an exchange of prisoners that included the return of U.S. prisoner of war Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl. Afghanistan’s minorities and women’s groups fear that a settlement might produce compromises with the Taliban that erode human rights. The United States and other donors continue to fund development projects, but increasingly delegate implementation to the Afghan government. U.S. officials assert that Afghanistan might be able to exploit vast mineral resources to prevent a major recession as international donors scale back their involvement. U.S. officials also seek greater Afghan integration into regional trade and investment patterns as part of a “New Silk Road.” Persuading Afghanistan’s neighbors, particularly Pakistan, to support Afghanistan’s stability has shown some modest success. Even if economic development and investment continue, Afghanistan will remain dependent on foreign aid for many years. Through the end of FY2013, the United States provided nearly $93 billion in assistance to Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, of which more than $56 billion has been to equip and train Afghan forces. The appropriated U.S. aid for FY2014 is over $6.1 billion, including $4.7 billion to train and equip the ANSF, and the FY2015 request is about $5.7 billion. These figures do not include funds for U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. Administration officials have pledged to Afghanistan that economic aid requests for Afghanistan are likely to continue roughly at recent levels (about $1.5 billion per year) through at least FY2017. See CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance, by Kenneth Katzman. Congressional Research Service Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Contents Background ...................................................................................................................................... 1 th From Early History to the 19 Century ..................................................................................... 1 th Early 20 Century and Cold War Era ........................................................................................ 1 Soviet Invasion and Occupation Period ..................................................................................... 2 The Seven Major “Mujahedin” Parties and Their Activities ............................................... 3 Geneva Accords (1988) and Soviet Withdrawal ........................................................................ 3 The Mujahedin Government and Rise of the Taliban ................................................................ 4 Taliban Rule (September 1996-November 2001) ...................................................................... 5 U.S. Policy Toward the Taliban During Its Rule/Bin Laden Presence ................................ 5 The “Northern Alliance” Congeals...................................................................................... 6 Bush Administration Afghanistan Policy Before September 11 ................................................ 7 September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom.......................................................... 7 U.N. and Congressional Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) ....................... 8 Major Combat Operations ................................................................................................... 8 Post-Taliban Governance Established ................................................................................. 9 U.S. and International Civilian Policy Structure ............................................................... 11 Security Policy: Transition, and Beyond ....................................................................................... 12 Who Is “The Enemy”? Taliban, Haqqani, Al Qaeda, and Others ............................................ 13 The Taliban ........................................................................................................................ 13 Al Qaeda ............................................................................................................................ 13 Hikmatyar Faction (HIG) .................................................................................................. 14 Haqqani Faction ................................................................................................................ 15 Pakistani Groups ............................................................................................................... 16 Insurgent Tactics ................................................................................................................ 17 Insurgent Financing: Narcotics Trafficking and Other Methods ....................................... 17 The U.S.-Led Military Effort: 2001-2008 ............................................................................... 18 Obama Administration Policy: “Surge” and Transition ........................................................... 19 McChrystal Assessment and December 1, 2009, Surge Announcement ........................... 19 Transition and Drawdown: Afghans in the Lead ..................................................................... 20 Afghan Forces Assume Lead Operational Role in June 2013 ........................................... 21 Post-2014 Residual Force and 2016 Planned Exit ................................................................... 22 Debate Over Post-2014 Security Outcomes ...................................................................... 23 Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) ................................................................................. 24 Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) ............................................................................ 25 Building Afghan Forces and Establishing Rule of Law .......................................................... 27 Current and Post-2014 Size of the ANSF .......................................................................... 27 ANSF Top Leadership and Ethnic Issues .......................................................................... 28 ANSF Funding .................................................................................................................. 28 The Afghan National Army (ANA) ................................................................................... 30 Afghan Air Force ............................................................................................................... 30 Afghan National Police (ANP) ......................................................................................... 31 Rule of Law/Criminal Justice Sector................................................................................. 34 Policy Component: Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) ................................................ 34 Cooperation With Allies .......................................................................................................... 35 Reintegration and Potential Reconciliation With Insurgents ................................................... 36 Regional Dimension ...................................................................................................................... 40 Congressional Research Service Afghanistan: Post-Taliban