HOW SOON IS SAFE? IRAQI FORCE DEVELOPMENT AND ―CONDITIONS-BASED‖ US WITHDRAWALS Final Review Draft: February 5, 2009 Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy And Adam Mausner [email protected] [email protected] Cordesman: Iraqi Forces and US Withdrawals 4/22/09 Page ii The Authors would like to thank the men and women of the Multinational Force–Iraq and Multinational Security Transition Command - Iraq for their generous contribution to our work. The Authors would also like to thank David Kasten for his research assistance. Cordesman: Iraqi Forces and US Withdrawals 4/22/09 Page iii Executive Summary The US and Iraq now face a transition period that may well be as challenging as defeating Al Qa‘ida in Iraq, the other elements of the insurgency, and the threat from militias like the Mahdi Army. Iraq has made progress in political accommodation and in improving security. No one, however, can yet be certain that Iraq will achieve a enough political accommodation to deal with its remaining internal problems, whether there will be a new surge of civil violence, or whether Iraq will face problems with its neighbors. Iran seeks to expand its influence, and Turkey will not tolerate a sanctuary for hostile Kurdish movements like the PKK. Arab support for Iraq remains weak, and Iraq‘s Arab neighbors fear both Shi‘ite and Iranian dominance of Iraq as well as a ―Shi‘ite crescent‖ that includes Syria and Lebanon.. Much will depend on the capabilities of Iraqi security forces (ISF) and their ability to deal with internal conflicts and external pressures. A combination of US politics, Iraq‘s internal politics, and outside pressure from nations like Iran is reducing the timeframe of US withdrawal. Iraqi politics reflect the fact that public opinion generally sees the US as an occupation force and wants US and other Coalition forces to leave as soon as possible. Iraq's Kurds are the only group in Iraq where polls have shown showed a consistent desire for the US to stay. As a result, the recent debate over the US-Iraqi status of force agreement focused on the timing and conditions for US withdrawal, increasing Iraqi jurisdiction over US military personnel and contractors, basing rights, and limiting US ability to conduct operations without Iraqi approval. The Security Agreement and Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that have emerged from these negotiations paid far less attention to the need to create effective Iraqi security forces, despite the fact that speeding the rate of US withdrawal inevitably reduces the timeframe for developing Iraqi forces that can stand on their own. Iraqi and US leaders agreed on possible timelines for US withdrawal without any public agreement on a plan to ensure that Iraqi forces can and will be ready to operate without US support and security guarantees. Moreover, the divisive Iraqi internal political debate over US withdrawals, the Security Agreement, and the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) has opened up a Pandora‘s box of problems in ensuring that US trainers and embeds can be effective in bringing Iraqi security forces to full strength and combat capability. The end result could be to force the US to hand over responsibility to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) before they are fully able to do the job or to prematurely withdraw trainers and partner units that the ISF needs to secure the country and defend it from its neighbors. It is uncertain whether the US can maintain its influence and advisory role in Iraq as it reemerges as a fully independent state. If the US can, these issues will be a critical and immediate priority for the new US Administration throughout its first term. The ISF must be brought to an adequate level of readiness as quickly as possible if a 2011 deadline for withdrawal is to involve minimal risk. This means dealing with a range of remaining barriers to rapid progress, including eliminating most of the 6 month delay in US processing of arms sales and deliveries – and the 12 month Iraqi delay in planning Cordesman: Iraqi Forces and US Withdrawals 4/22/09 Page iv and executing them. Unless these problems are solved, they will place important limits on ISF force expansion and improvements in force quality. Iraq and the US also need need to look beyond the withdrawal of US combat forces and 2011. Iraq may well need several years of additional aid from the US to create an effective army, air force, and navy that can defend Iraq against any outside threat without US reinforcement. The would require continuing support from US trainers, and possibly some form of US guarantees to provide air support and other ―enablers‖ until Iraqi forces are fully ready. Forming such a transition plan, and obtaining an Iraqi-US agreement on its shape, timing, and funding will be a critical step in ensuring Iraq‘s long-term security and sovereignty. The issue will not be whether all US combat forces fully withdraw; this is a now almost inevitable. The US wants to leave Iraq as soon as this is feasible, and most Iraqis want US forces to leave as quickly as Iraq can achieve security on its own. It is rather, but how the US can do so in ways that best ensure the ISF can take over all of the missions Iraq must assume Both the Iraqi and US governments agree that that US combat forces should not remain a day longer in Iraq than is necessary to develop effective Iraqi security forces as a replacement, help Iraq achieve stable political accommodation, and secure Iraq from its neighbors . The present timetable is extremely demanding, given Iraq‘s internal divisions, the pressures from its neighbors, and present limitations of its security forces. Article 24 of the Agreement Between the United States of America the Republic of Iraq On the Withdrawal of US Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities During Their Temporary Presence in Iraq which President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki signed on December 14, 2008, calls for the US combat forces to withdraw from all Iraqi cities, villages, and localities no later than June 30, 2009, at which time Iraqi forces shall assume responsibility in each province.i The agreement calls for US forces to be stationed outside these areas before than time, and for all US forces – combat or other – to be withdrawn by December 31, 2011. It also recognizes the right of the Iraqi government to call for total US withdrawal at any time. Deadlines like 2011 may prove practical – if all goes well in Iraq -- particularly if such deadlines do not preclude keeping a large number of US military advisors. The US ―occupation‖ is so controversial and unpopular that the cost of staying long enough to do every job right could be higher in terms of Iraqi resentment and political backlash than the security benefits would be worth. Nevertheless, both sides need to be realistic about the speed with which they can act. It is not a good idea to bet a country -- and the outcome of a war -- on the strategic equivalent of filling an inside straight. There are good reasons to extend the US military and advisory presence at steadily diminishing levels until Iraq has developed security forces that are fully ready to take over key missions without US support, and Iraq has achieved a greater degree of stability. Here it is important to note that the agreements that Iraq and the US signed in December 2008 do encourage future cooperation in precisely the areas where it is most needed. Article 27 of the Agreement Between the United States of America the Republic of Iraq Cordesman: Iraqi Forces and US Withdrawals 4/22/09 Page v On the Withdrawal of US Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities During Their Temporary Presence in Iraq (also sometimes called the Status of Forces Agreement or SOFA), states that the Iraqi and US governments should react to any outside threat to Iraqi territory, air space, or waters – or to any threat to its sovereignty or political independence – ―by immediately initiating deliberations and, as may be mutually agreed, the United States may take appropriate measures, including diplomatic, economic, and military measures, or any other appropriate measure, to deter such a threat.‖ ii Iraq and the US also agree in Article 27 to ―continue close cooperation in strengthening military and security institutions, and democratic political institutions in Iraq, including, as may be mutually agreed upon, cooperation in training, equipping, and arming the Iraqi security forces, in order to combat domestic and international terrorism and outlaw groups upon the request of the government of Iraq.‖ These provisions are reinforced by Section I of the Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States of America that was signed and agreed to at the same time. This section states that, ―a strong Iraq is essential for achieving stability in the region.‖ Section II calls for Political and Diplomatic Cooperation, and Section III calls for Defense and Security Cooperation. Section III states that, ―the Parties shall continue to foster close cooperation concerning defense and security arrangements without prejudice to Iraqi sovereignty over its land, sea, and air territory.‖ The Need for Continued Partnership in Developing Effective Iraqi Forces: The Strengths and Weaknesses of Iraqi Forces Creating effective Iraqi security forces that can defeat the insurgency, provide national defense, and serve the nation - not sectarian or ethnic interests -- is critical to Iraq‘s future. The key to success will be realistic and fully resourced plans for the development of the Iraqi Security Forces, developing realistic measures of ISF capability, and carefully reviewing plans for US withdrawals to make sure they reflect the progress various elements of the ISF have actually made and the level of overall security, stability, and political accommodation in Iraq.