University of Calgary PRISM: University of Calgary's Digital Repository Graduate Studies Legacy Theses 1997 Interest groups and Supreme Court of Canada Brodie, Ian Brodie, I. (1997). Interest groups and Supreme Court of Canada (Unpublished doctoral thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. doi:10.11575/PRISM/17910 http://hdl.handle.net/1880/26950 doctoral thesis University of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission. Downloaded from PRISM: https://prism.ucalgary.ca THE UMWRWIY OF CALGARY Interest Groups and Supreme Court ofcanada by Ian Brodie A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL E;ULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL, SCIENCE CALGARY,ALBERTA FEBRUARY, 1997 O Tan Brodie 1997 Acquisii and Acquisitions et BbliographE Senkes setvices biùiibgraphiques The author has granted a non- L'aateur a acwrdé une licence non exclusive licence allowing the National Li'brary of Canada to Bibliothèque dodedu Canada de reproduce, lom, disûi'bute or sel1 reprodime, prêter, distribuer ou copies of Mer thesis by any meam venQedescopiesdesathèse& and in any form or format, making cpelque manière et sous 9ue1que this thesis aW1eto interested forme que a soit pour mettre des persons. exemplaires de cette thèse à la disposition des personnes intéressées. The author retains ownership of the L'auteur coaserve la propriété du copyright in Merthesis. Neithek &oit d'auteur qui protège sa thèse. Ni the thesis nor substantiai extracts la thése ni des eraraits substdeîs de nom it may be printed or othbse celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou reproduced with the author's autrementreppoduits sans son permission. autorisation. Abstract Since the Charter of Rights was added to Canada's constitutional law in 1982, Canada's courts have gaineci influence as political institutions. Cartndian poIitical sàentists have started to study the courts wah the varbus tools of social science aiid while this first generation research bas noted that interest groups are paying new attention to the courts, most of it bas been sporadicYunsystdc and anecdotal. This dissertation investigates two principai research questions. First, to what extent have interest groups taken advantage ofthe shiA of politicai duence towards the judiciaqt? Secondly, to what extent am the groups that have taken advmtage of the judiciary's new influence be considered "poiiticaliy disadvantaged"? The first chapter reviews how the "political disadvantage theory" of interest group litigation emerged in the US aad Canada. Since 1980, American scholars have concluded the theory is too aaorow, and 1demonstrate that it never did descri'be the Canadian expenence. Interest groups litigate to take advantage of the institutioaal structure of the courts. The second chapter traces the history of interest group intervention in the Canadian Supreme Court. During the 1980s, interest groups and legal commentators urged the Court to hear from more interest group intemeners. The Court responded by openiag its door to an unprecedented nwber of groups. Chapter three shows how the federal goverament used the Court Challenges Program to encourage interest group litigation. The fourth chapter argues that interest group litigation under the Charter's equaiity rigbts section creates a politics of status-seeking, and elaborates a mode1 to explain equality rigbts litigatïon. Chapter five proposes a theory of the Charter's impact on the institutional hmework of poiicy-makmg in Canada. It suggests how judicial review altas the influence of interest groups in poiicy- making. Finallyychapter six considers the Supreme Court's justifications for hearhg iii interest groups in the light of modem coILStitllfionalismls conani for checks and balances. Although the politicai didvantage theory bas been used to legitimate the Court's actMsm under the Charter ofRights, the disertation concludes that it is a poor empirical explanation of the reality of hterest group Litigation. Aclmowledgements Fifst, 1thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Councii of Canada (Doctoral Feiiowship 752-94-1495), the Alberta Heritage Scholarshïp Fund, the Külam Trust and the Department of Politid Science for th& generous support ovathe past four years. Some of the data used here were collectecl with research gants fiom the Department of Justice and the University of Calgary Research Grants Cornmittee. The staff of the Process CSce and the Court Records mce at the Supreme Court of Canaâa graoted me access to th& archives and patieutly accornrnodated my research needs. W~thoutth& help 1could not bave Wriffen key paris of this dissertation. Sonya Nerlund assisted me during my first visit to the Court's archives. The access to uiformation statfs of the Department of Canadian Heritage, the Department of Justice, the Department of the Secretary of State aml the Privy Cod Office courteously processed my mmy access requests. Chapter 4 is reprinted by hdpermission of the Editor of Comoarative Politics. 1 thank the Honourable Mi. Justice John C. Major, W. Ivan Whitehall, Daniel Themen, Awy Go, and a fonner senior federal cabinet minister for geaerously aîlowing me to inte~ewthem Their invaluable insights infomed the entire dissertaiion- Many outstanding political scientists pve me wondemil guidance and comments, particuiarly Drs. Rainer Knopff, Nd Nevitte, Roger Giibins, Thomas Flanagan, Leslie Pd, Anthony Perl, Stan Drabek, James Keeley, Christopher IMia&ecîi, Michael Lusztig, Patrick James, Roy Flemming, Charles Epp and Keith Brownsey. They have ali earned my respect and admiration. Many fiends have helped me in many ways, includbg Fred Wall, Marco Navamo-Genie, Dominique Navarro-Fournier, Mebs Kmji Butch Kamena, Chrissy Carbeny and Lori Hausegger. Prof, PbckMonahan and Judy Karwacki helped with certain chapters. Jane Waish first piqued my interest in intemeners- Tbanlt you ail. 1 must th& my Neil Brodie, Chaud Soaraq Sujit Choudbty and Mathew Englander in partïcular for their fneodship. Tbey helped in more ways than they know. 1 owe a great debt to Dr. Ted Morton. Over the past six years I have corne to know him as a supervisor, advisor, collaborator and niend. By balancing tme scholarship, active citizenship and bis private üfe he has set a good example for me to emulate. 1 hope that this dissertation is oniy the first of many projects we will work on together. Finally, I thank my dearest Lynn She was patient when 1was cranky- understanding when 1worked long hours, and supportive and loving throughout. Ifwe can make it through a dissertation we can deit through anything. Dedication For Mom and Dad, who always aicourageci me. Table of Contents Cbapter 1: Intertst Groups in Court: Tbe Poütid Disadviatige Theoy and .,....,..,..o...........o...................o....oo.o........o...o...................o..o.ooe......e..... Beyond .,....,..,..o...........o...................o....oo.o........o...o...................o..o.ooe......e..... 7 The Emergence of the Politicai Disadvantage Theory ............................................. 8 The Dernise of the Political Disadvantage Theory .................................................. 11 The Po liticai Disadvantage Theory in Canada.. ....................................................... 16 "Beyond the Politicai Disadvamage Theory" ......................................................... 20 The Institutional Dimension to Interest Group Litigation .......................... .... 21 The Institutional Dimension in Practice .................................................................. 24 . -. Litigation as Political Partmpation............... .. .......**...-........................................28 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 3 5 Cbapter 2: Interest Groups, the Supreme Court and htervention ............. ........... 36 . The Onguis of Inte~ention..... ... ..................................................................... -37 Early Caiiadian Intemeners .................................................................................... 38 An American Legai Export: From NAACP and ACLU to LEAF and CCLA .......... 39 Institutional Retoohg and Intemeners at the Supreme Court .............. .. ............ 48 Intemeners a. the Supreme Court since the Charter. ............................................... 50 Applications for Leave to Intervene: 19854990 .................................................... 55 Interveners at the Supreme Coiut: 1984 to 1993 .................................................... 64 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 71 Chapter 3: haterest Gmup LitSgation and StatoSocitty Relations.......* ..... ........ .... 73 The State-Society Distinction in the Charter Literature .......................................... 74 Statecentrd Theories ..................... ...... .............................................................. 76 The Private and Public Spoasorship of Interest Groups ..........................................80 The Secretary of State and Interest Groups ........................................................... 86 Govenunent