THE ARTS This PDF document was made available CHILD POLICY from www.rand.org as a public service of CIVIL JUSTICE the RAND Corporation. EDUCATION ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT Jump down to document6 HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit NATIONAL SECURITY research organization providing POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY objective analysis and effective SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY solutions that address the challenges SUBSTANCE ABUSE facing the public and private sectors TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY around the world. TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE Support RAND WORKFORCE AND WORKPLACE Purchase this document Browse Books & Publications Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore RAND National Defense Research Institute View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. RAND COUNTERINSURGENCY STUDY • FINAL REPORT War by Other Means BUILDING COMPLETE AND BALANCED CAPABILITIES FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY David C. Gompert and John Gordon IV With Adam Grissom, David R. Frelinger, Seth G. Jones, Martin C. Libicki, Edward O'Connell, Brooke K. Stearns, Robert E. Hunter Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense Approved for public release; distribution unlimited NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE The research described in this report was prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The research was conducted in the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the OSD, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community under Contract W74V8H-06-C-0002. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Gompert, David C. War by other means : building complete and balanced capabilities for counterinsurgency / David C. Gompert, John Gordon IV. p. cm. — (Rand counterinsurgency study final report) Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-0-8330-4309-2 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Counterinsurgency—United States. 2. Insurgency. 3. Terrorism—Prevention. 4. Institution building—Government policy—United States. 5. United States— Foreign relations—2001– 6. Islamic fundamentalism—Political aspects. 7. United States—Military policy—21st century. 8. Security, International—21st century. 9. Strategy. I. Gordon, John, 1956– II. Title. III. Title: Building complete and balanced capabilities for counterinsurgency. U241.M485 2007 355.02'180973—dc22 2008001580 DoD photo by Staff Sgt. Stacy L. Pearsall, U.S. Air Force The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. R® is a registered trademark. Cover Design by Stephen Bloodsworth © Copyright 2008 RAND Corporation All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from RAND. Published 2008 by the RAND Corporation 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: [email protected] Preface In early 2006, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) asked RAND’s National Defense Research Institute to conduct a compre- hensive study of insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN), with a view toward how the United States should improve its capabilities for such conflicts in the 21st century. This is the capstone report of that study, drawing from a dozen RAND research papers on specific cases, issues, and aspects of insurgency and COIN. The study included an examination of 89 insurgencies since World War II to learn why and how insurgencies begin, grow, and are resolved. It also analyzed the current challenge of what is becoming known as global insurgency, exemplified by the global jihadist movement, as well as lessons about both insurgency and COIN from a number of cases, including Iraq and Afghanistan. The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan provide the current policy context for this study. To be clear, however, the study is concerned with deficiencies in U.S. capabilities revealed in those conflicts, not with how to end them satisfactorily. Most new investments to improve U.S. COIN capabilities would not yield capabilities of immediate use. That said, to the extent that the findings can help the United States tackle the problems it faces in Iraq and Afghanistan, this would be a bonus. Regardless of how Iraq and Afghanistan turn out in the short term, the United States and its international partners will not have seen the last of this sort of challenge, and they must become better prepared than they have been for today’s insurgencies. It is a mistake to regard COIN as just another form of warfare. Insurgencies are movements in which opponents of established govern- iii iv War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced COIN Capabilities ing authorities use violence and other means to wrest the support of the population away from those authorities. Military force is but one instrument of COIN available for use in such contests, and it ought to be subordinate to a political strategy of offering the people a govern- ment deserving of their support. Improvements in local governance, legal systems, public services, and economic conditions may be at least as important as military operations, though the former often depend on the success of the latter. Even in providing security, the military is not the only agency involved: Law enforcement and information shar- ing are at least as important as combat forces in countering most insur- gencies. Accordingly, this report addresses not only military capabili- ties but all important security capabilities and civil instruments that must be strengthened for effective COIN. Thus, with the encourage- ment of its sponsor, the study’s findings are not confined to the domain of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). Success of COIN depends on the quality and performance of the government that is directly threatened by insurgency—a lesson relearned the hard way in Iraq and Afghanistan. If a government is seen by its people as illegitimate, sectarian, inept, or otherwise unre- sponsive to their needs, it is unlikely that the United States can save it from insurgency, perhaps not even from its own people. At the same time, the United States may be able to buy time, create “political space,” and offer assistance for the threatened government to make the reforms that are required to overcome the appeal or fear of the insurgents and thus to win the competition for the population’s confidence and alle- giance. Indeed, U.S backing must be contingent on such reforms or it will not work. Of course, the United States is not alone in its ability to help: U.S. global and regional allies, ad hoc collaborators, and interna- tional organizations have considerable capacity to do so. Therefore, this report will address security and civil COIN capabilities of three actors: local states, the United States, and U.S. partners. The history of insurgencies and the particular challenges of COIN in this era of globalization and Islamic militancy demand humility and realism regarding COIN. Theory is easier than practice; plans more impressive than execution. As enemies go, insurgents tend to be highly dedicated, resourceful, and aware of the terrain, especially the “human Preface v terrain,” in which they challenge the state’s control. COIN is messier, riskier, less predictable, and often nastier than intended. Mistakes are inevitable and, given the political essence of the conflict, often conse- quential. For these reasons, while it is obviously important to have the best possible U.S. capabilities for COIN, there is no assurance that these will produce the outcomes we seek at the costs and losses we might expect. Again, defective local government and deficient local security services can cancel out the advantages of even superior U.S. forces and massive assistance. This reality argues for hedging against disappointment both in the capabilities that the United States builds and in the COIN cam- paigns that it enters. Thus, capabilities should be adequate both to carry out plans and to recover from plans gone awry, as they often do. This study comes at a moment of anxiety about the ability of the United States to counter 21st-century insurgency, especially the Islamic-extremist sort. Given this, this study is meant to be objective, systematic, comprehensive, and accessible—all hallmarks of RAND work. The report has three parts: (I) the challenge of insurgency in the 21st century, (II) the capabilities needed to meet this challenge, and (III) the investments and other measures required to create these capabilities. Some of the recommendations in Part III pertain to mili- tary capabilities, including recommendations for training, techno- logical innovation, material investment, and organizational change.