Existent Terrorism in Indonesia and the Opportunities for the Growth of Radical Islam and ISIS September, 2016

ISS Risk Special Report: Existent Terrorism in Indonesia and the Opportunities for the Growth of Radical Islam and ISIS September, 2016 Intelligent Security Solutions Holding Limited Room 501, 5/f, Chung Ying Building 20 Connaught Road West Sheung Wan Hong Kong Phone: +852 5619 7008 China Phone: +861 3910 9907 39 <a href="/goto?url=http://www.issrisk.com/" target="_blank">www.issrisk.com </a>Copyright  Intelligent Security Solutions Limited. All rights reserved. Neither this publication nor any part of it may be reproduced, photocopied, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted without the express prior consent of Intelligent Security Solutions Limited. <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">Intelligent Security Solutions Limited </li><li style="flex:1">Frontier & Emerging Markets Analysis </li></ul>Table of Contents <a href="#3_0">Abstract ..................................................................................................................................................</a><a href="#3_0">.</a><a href="#3_0">2 </a><a href="#3_1">Introduction.............................................................................................................................................</a><a href="#3_1">.</a><a href="#3_1">2 </a><a href="#5_0">Contextualisation....................................................................................................................................</a><a href="#5_0">.</a><a href="#5_0">4 </a> <a href="#5_1">1. Political backdrop to today‟s terrorist landscape</a><a href="#5_1">............................................................................</a><a href="#5_1">.</a><a href="#5_1">4 </a><a href="#6_0">2. The consequences brought by globalisation of jihad to local groups ............................................</a><a href="#6_0">.</a><a href="#6_0">5 </a><a href="#7_0">a) Jemaah Islamiyah (JI</a><a href="#7_0">)</a><a href="#7_0">.</a><a href="#7_0">...............................................................................................................</a><a href="#7_0">.</a><a href="#7_0">6 </a><a href="#9_0">b) Free Aceh Movement (GAM</a><a href="#9_0">)</a><a href="#9_0">.</a><a href="#9_0">....................................................................................................</a><a href="#9_0">.</a><a href="#9_0">8 </a><a href="#10_0">c) Laskar Jihad (LJ)........................................................................................................................</a><a href="#10_0">.</a><a href="#10_0">9 </a> <a href="#10_1">The 5th wave: A new international influence .........................................................................................</a><a href="#10_1">.</a><a href="#10_1">9 </a> <a href="#10_2">1. From al-Qaeda to Islamic State .....................................................................................................</a><a href="#10_2">.</a><a href="#10_2">9 </a><a href="#12_0">2. Camp Bucca.................................................................................................................................</a><a href="#12_0">.</a><a href="#12_0">1</a><a href="#12_0">1 </a><a href="#13_0">3. Al-Qaeda in Indonesia..................................................................................................................</a><a href="#13_0">.</a><a href="#13_0">1</a><a href="#13_0">2 </a><a href="#16_0">4. Abu Bakar Ba‟asyir</a><a href="#16_0">.......................................................................................................................</a><a href="#16_0">.</a><a href="#16_0">1</a><a href="#16_0">5 </a><a href="#17_0">5. Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid, JAT ....................................................................................................</a><a href="#17_0">.</a><a href="#17_0">1</a><a href="#17_0">6 </a> <a href="#0_0">Government counter-actions and response</a><a href="#0_0">s</a><a href="#0_0">.</a><a href="#0_0">......................................................................................</a><a href="#0_0">.</a><a href="#0_0">2</a><a href="#0_0">3 </a><a href="#0_1">SYRIA: Catalysts to the journey and the results of the connectivit</a><a href="#0_1">y</a><a href="#0_1">.</a><a href="#0_1">...................................................</a><a href="#0_1">.</a><a href="#0_1">2</a><a href="#0_1">7 </a> <a href="#0_2">Channels to Syri</a><a href="#0_2">a</a><a href="#0_2">.</a><a href="#0_2">............................................................................................................................</a><a href="#0_2">.</a><a href="#0_2">2</a><a href="#0_2">9 </a> <a href="#0_3">Chronology of ISIS related events .......................................................................................................</a><a href="#0_3">.</a><a href="#0_3">3</a><a href="#0_3">2 </a> <a href="#0_4">The medium to long term risks.........................................................................................................</a><a href="#0_4">.</a><a href="#0_4">4</a><a href="#0_4">4 </a><ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">©ISS Risk 2016 </li><li style="flex:1">Page | 1 </li></ul><ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">Intelligent Security Solutions Limited </li><li style="flex:1">Frontier & Emerging Markets Analysis </li></ul>Abstract In contrast to several countries with large Muslim populations within Asia and further afar, the Republic of Indonesia has remained a country relatively free of a religiously motivated radical militant population. The environmental conditions that prevented such a significant shift towards radicalism – as have also been seen in other Islamic nations – included, but were not limited to, an authoritarian government and strong Asian ethos and influence upon the practice of religion within the country. Both these pillars are helping in curtailing the growth of radical or extreme Islamic ideological fundamentalism to date. The challenge facing Indonesia, as it is for many countries across the globe, is squarely one of the growth of jihadism. Jihadism has experienced an evolution over the past four decades, not unlike many facets of globalisation under the auspices of modernity. Specific waves of radicalisation have occurred during this forty year period, these elements what they mean for the evolution of radical Islam in Indonesia, are identified in this report. The terrorist campaigns waged by what were historically „Islamist separatist groups‟ and the now growing and disruptive presence of „Pan-Islamism‟ extremism generally, has altered the fabric of radical islamification over this period. The key strand of DNA connecting the evolution of global jihadism is undoubtedly the evolving connectivity of the ideology. Introduction Most certainly the strength of governmental authoritarianism has waned over recent decades within Indonesia as it modernises and liberalises; these „forces‟ in turn contribute, to a degree, to the tempering of interpretations of Islam within Indonesia. Yet many of the changes have also helped to ensure that extremists remain on the margins of both its religious and social society, they have also „allowed‟ for this sub-culture to germinate at its fringes, to inhabit an existence in the shadow of mainstream society and from there potentially thrive. This ostracised, largely excluded element – albeit at its own behest – has existed for a long time in Indonesia. It has been carried along by the undercurrent of radicalism found growing not just within Indonesia but currently across much of Southeast Asia. This phenomenon is what poses the newest and most challenging security threat to the Indonesian people, their government, their sovereign integrity and the country‟s international investment profile. The nascent existence of this undercurrent of radicalism has spawned groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which grew from a national level threat to a serious transnational regional threat by capitalising significantly on their relationship with al-Qaeda (AQ) into the <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">©ISS Risk 2016 </li><li style="flex:1">Page | 2 </li></ul><ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">Intelligent Security Solutions Limited </li><li style="flex:1">Frontier & Emerging Markets Analysis </li></ul>mid-2000‟s. Despite the contraction of JI, the country‟s then most potent terrorist group, and the parallel simultaneous contraction of AQ in Southeast Asia in the late 2000s, the resiliency and continuous reinvention of Islamic fundamentalism poses a vexing question for the government in the past two decades. It is a question that has yet to be properly answered outside of attempted de-radicalisation programs. As well intended as the treating of its symptoms has been to date by the Indonesian government and several NGOs, the root causes and inspirations remain and are resurfacing in a turbulent period of Islam‟s modern history. The government has attempted to resolve this problem at the grassroots level – the granting and the implementation of Sharia Law within the Ache region for example – but religious radicalism remains a persistent and growing issue faced by the country. It is the exponential risk of latent growth borne of this impasse that ISIS seeks to exploit, feed and capitalise upon. As has been witnessed elsewhere in the region, once ISIS establish their local footprint, this is then converted into a springboard or platform to grow their attempts to establish their global Caliphate aspirations. ISIS, as they have made repeatedly clear, has the end goal of establishing and maintaining a global caliphate. In 2014, the terrorist organisation circulated a map illustrating the areas which they planned to have acquired within the next five years, a veritable Five Year Plan. This map includes the entire Middle East, North Africa, large areas of Asia including India and extending to Kazakhstan, and even large parts of Europe such as Spain, Greece, and Austria. It is important to recognise however that ISIS‟ current operations are not solely tied to these purported plans. In the name of the Caliphate, the group is also actively recruiting sympathisers and aligning local extremist groups across the Southeast Asia region. Having already established formal links to Bangladesh, Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia, it is clear that ISIS is fully seizing operational opportunities across the region. To this end, ISS Risk is currently in the process of producing reports on terrorism for each of the individual countries throughout Asia. This report is a segment of this project, focusing specifically on Indonesia. In order to illustrate the role of ISIS and, more generally, terrorism in Indonesia, we have provided an outline and assessment of terrorism in its recent history. This chronological account brings us to the current state of terrorism in Indonesia today. Our analysis draws clear parallels between the previous role of al-Qaeda and the current role of ISIS opportunistically feeding off the global undercurrent of radicalisation within Islam and instigating equally global initiatives which delve into and drive domestic affairs of this country. <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">©ISS Risk 2016 </li><li style="flex:1">Page | 3 </li></ul><ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">Intelligent Security Solutions Limited </li><li style="flex:1">Frontier & Emerging Markets Analysis </li></ul>As you will see in the sections that follow, there are dominant groups, such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), some are willing to associate and carry out attacks in the name of ISIS, but in actuality are following an entrenched vision of their own extremism. ISIS is the current means to an end. Furthermore we put forward the analysis that when considering the historical nature of JI and its own regional ambitions, it is unlikely that the two will ever align, but merely complement each other‟s aspirations. Most of these indigenous groups will exploit ISIS‟ presence in the country by resurging and growing and operating in its shadows. Consequently to this „indigenously rooted standpoint‟ of JI, ISIS‟ greatest potential for new recruits in Indonesia is to be found in the younger generations, emergent groups and those incarcerated in the country‟s prisons. As admitted by the authorities, the overcrowded Indonesian prison system has virtually created a breeding ground for jihadists. It is these prisoners‟ that can be most easily lured by fellow inmates, including clerics that regularly preach calls to jihad during their incarceration. ISIS is fully taking advantage of these conditions to grow its network in the country. However, at the same time indigenous groups are also capitalising on this „captive audience‟ and the resurgence of radical Islamic doctrines and ideology that had slowed since AQs and JIs quietening in the late 2000s to early 2010s. The mix of international and domestic extremist groups in Indonesia presents an interesting dynamic for assessment and analysis. Historical competing interests remain subject to a myriad network of interests which are expediently aligning and re-aligning currently. Marriages of conveniences‟ are ever more frequently materialising. So, effectively, between the influence of al-Qaeda, indigenous groups, and ISIS, we are seeing jihadism in Indonesia come full circle. How this is playing out domestically and regionally is the focus of this report. Contextualisation 1. Political backdrop to today’s terrorist landscape The politics of Indonesia have long affected the landscape of terrorism in the country. Although radical Islam has been present in the country since before its independence from colonial rule, it is the experiences of the past 20 years that have seen it become deeply rooted. Under President Sukarno, Indonesia‟s government transformed to an authoritarian system. The second president, Suharto, continued the system, strengthening the power of the military, ousting opponents and bureaucratising social and political organisations. The strong hand of these rulings left little room for Islamic extremists to foster influence and make significant gains in the country. Consequently, and in stark contrast to the experiences of several other „Muslim countries‟ during these decades, Islamic terror attacks and activity <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">©ISS Risk 2016 </li><li style="flex:1">Page | 4 </li></ul><ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">Intelligent Security Solutions Limited </li><li style="flex:1">Frontier & Emerging Markets Analysis </li></ul>were marginal as radical leaders fled to foreign countries or worked solely underground. Though, as time progressed and Suharto‟s power base waned, this secular authoritarian influenced landscape began to change. It did not change because of a weakening hand, but rather because Suharto began appointing politically conservative Muslims to high governmental and military positions in exchange for support to maintain his own position. Conservative parties often utilise extremist groups to promote their agendas. Consequently, for Indonesia, this meant expanding the presence of radical Islam and terrorist activities across the country from within its ruling political elite. With Suharto‟s generals commonly giving tacit support to these extremist groups, the continuity of the system of authoritarian government was eventually weakened, providing opportunities for radicals to breed more. Conservative influence in the political system became entrenched and as such complicated, during the country‟s transition to „democracy (albeit) with Asian characteristics‟. Despite reforms and legislations, sectarian tensions and corruption have continued to plague governmental affairs and remain a critical issue within the country. More so, such an environment has and remains an advantageous environment for radical Islam to form, incubate and flourish. Since 2000, local extremist groups have made significant strides in the country. We have identified the most prominent of these local groups in the section that follows. Moreover, we discuss how the diffuse nature of the groups and networks has been both a weakness and the potential strength of the broader evolving interconnected networks that are gradually meshing to the call of a commonality of purpose – the global jihad. 2. The consequences brought by globalisation of jihad to local groups Jihadism has experienced an evolution over the past four decades, not unlike many facets of globalisation under the auspices of modernity. Specific waves of radicalisation can be identified in this forty year period, dealt with later in this report. The terrorist campaigns waged by what were historically „Islamist Separatist groups‟ and the now growing and disruptive presence of „Pan-Islamism‟ extremism generally, has altered the fabric of radical islamification over this period. The key strand of DNA connecting the evolution of global jihadism is the evolving connectivity of the ideology. The indigenous terrorist groups of Indonesia have both benefited and on occasion barely survived their collaborations with global jihadist groups. If the Philippines represent the potential „operational hub‟ for radical Islamic fundamentalism in Southeast Asia, then Indonesia represents the potential „Ideological incubator‟ for the region. More importantly, like a strain of genetically modified wheat that can cross fertilise and infect and alter neighbouring fields; an idea can also be <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">©ISS Risk 2016 </li><li style="flex:1">Page | 5 </li></ul><ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">Intelligent Security Solutions Limited </li><li style="flex:1">Frontier & Emerging Markets Analysis </li></ul>ingrained, become insidious and can be exploited. As such, the potential for Indonesia to become the backbone of the regionalisation of radical Islam should not be underestimated. Figure 1: Primary areas of radicalisation in Indonesia a) Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) Although it is not the most dangerous at present, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) is undoubtedly the most prominent extremist organization in Indonesia. This group remains responsible for the majority of terrorist attacks that have occurred in the country over the past 15 years. Following a crackdown by the Indonesian government against Darul Islam (DI) – an indigenous terrorist organisation which aimed to establish the Islamic State of Indonesia - serious disruptions to its activities led to its eventual collapse and effective dismantling. It was at this juncture that JI splintered away to form its own entity. Underground networks of radicals and extremists from the parent DI group remained across the country, providing a rich vein of members to groups such as JI looking to grow and fill the void left by DI‟s demise. The JI organization grew steadily and significantly during the late 1990‟s to the mid 2000‟s becoming not just a local-to-national militant terror group but a regional group of real influence with proven operational capacity. Operating originally from Malaysia and then returning to Indonesia following the fall of Suharto, the group ultimately became a regional <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">©ISS Risk 2016 </li><li style="flex:1">Page | 6 </li></ul><ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">Intelligent Security Solutions Limited </li><li style="flex:1">Frontier & Emerging Markets Analysis </li></ul>threat with enhanced relations and connectivity with other groups in Southeast Asia under the stewardship of AQ cementing its position. The group‟s founders, two Yemeni-born Indonesian clerics Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba‟asyir strategic decision to grow their group from Malaysia, was a direct result of them having to flee to Malaysia in the 1980s so as to evade prosecution for ties to DI. Despite the death of Sungkar shortly after returning to Indonesia, Abu Bakar Ba‟asyir without doubt remains a key player in the regions jihadi efforts – a matter discussed further within this report. In line with DI‟s ultimate plans for Indonesia, the original intention of JI also was to establish an Islamic State, yet their vision was of an Islamic State that would consist of not just Indonesia, but also Malaysia, southern Thailand, Singapore, Brunei, and southern Philippines. In spite of cells and partnerships across the region since its establishment and return to Indonesia the group‟s current members have said that in recent years its focus had returned solely to the creation of an Islamic state within Indonesia. It is safe to say that this viewpoint and strategic ambition may well be changing again under new and improved conditions for jihadists in the region! After re-establishing headquarters in Indonesia, JI began carrying out a series of terror attacks that ripped through the country throughout the 2000s. JI was responsible for numerous large-scale attacks including the car bomb explosion beneath the Jakarta Stock Exchange and Christmas Eve bombings of 2000, the Bali Bombings of 2002 and 2005, and the JW Marriot / Ritz Carlton hotel bombings of 2009. During this period, JI focused heavily on attacks against Christians and westerners often using VBIED‟s or suicide attacks. Before the 2002 Bali Bombing, the Indonesian government refused to acknowledge the existence of such extreme terror threats within its borders. In fact, Megawati [the then President] ignored persistent and frequent warnings of the imminent threats faced by his country from neighbouring countries and the United States. With nearly 200 people killed by JI members in Bali, the government were finally forced to take notice and begin their crack down on the organization. By 2003, the Indonesian security forces had identified and captured JI‟s operational chief, Nurjaman Riduan Ismuddin. Over the next few years an aggressive counter terrorism campaign by the government‟s police and security forces resulted in hundreds of JI members and supporters arrested and jailed. In 2008, three out of four of the main suspects behind the Bali bombing were executed. <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">©ISS Risk 2016 </li><li style="flex:1">Page | 7 </li></ul><ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">Intelligent Security Solutions Limited </li><li style="flex:1">Frontier & Emerging Markets Analysis </li></ul>b) Free Aceh Movement (GAM) For the past forty years, Aceh [a region located on the northern end of the Indonesian island Sumatra] has been plagued by separatist conflict. The Aceh region‟s campaign for independence began in 1976 when a former DI member, Hasan di Tiro, established the

Existent Terrorism in Indonesia and the Opportunities for the Growth of Radical Islam and ISIS September, 2016

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