Issues & Options May - 2012 Issue: I No: V Leadership – Policies And Preparedness Assertive China: Strategic Dilemmas Nehru’s Ignorance And Intellectual Arrogance Ad -holism At Its Worst and many more …. Published By : Vivekananda International Foundation 3, San Martin Marg, Chanakyapuri, New Delhi – 110021, [email protected], www.vifindia.org Contents Articles - A Two-Front War In The Near Term Some Bold Ideas From Mr. Purno 3 Sangma - VIF Paper 75 - A. Surya Prakash Fast Track Top Down Defence Reforms - Immediate Need Of The Nation 14 Setting Up A Central University: - Paper Prepared By Six Defence Experts Vision, Issues And Debates 80 Tibet In International Law And Practice - Anirban Ganguly 22 - PP Shukla A Tale Of Two Abductions In Odisha The Arc Of The India-US Partnership 90 - Dr. N. Manoharan - Kanwal Sibal 38 President Zardari’s India Visit: A Need For An Indian Aerospace Command; Now And Here 94 Precursor To PM’s Pak Visit 55 - Satish Chandra - Radhakrishna Rao Gilani’s Conviction: A Soft Constitutional Events Coup And The Crisis Of State 59 Seminar On - ‘Towards Reducing - Sushant Sareen Earthquake Risks Of India’ 103 Do We Ever Think Before We Act, Or Is It Talk On - ‘Sufism And Indian Islam’ Ad-Hocism Zindabad? 66 107 - Dr. M.N. Buch VIVEK : Issues and Options May – 2012 Issue: I No: V 2 A Two-Front War In The Near Term - VIF Paper - 23 September 2011 here are important weight and assertive behaviour of similarities between the China. From America to Vietnam T strategic situation in which to Singapore and the Philippines, India finds itself today vis-à-vis many of the countries are looking China and the situation which we at India to provide the numerical faced in the period 1956-62, which heft in any strategy to address the culminated in the humiliating war Chinese assertiveness. In a way, of October-November 1962. These this is reminiscent of the situation similarities would point to the in the late 1950’s, when temptation facing the Chinese democratic India was contrasted leaders as they themselves with communist China. Now more analyse their options in the near than ever, the comparison is term. This could lead them to economic too, and more and more conclude that their strategic analysts are coming to the dilemmas, especially in the Indo- conclusion that India has the Pacific region are best served by better medium-term prospects. an attempted repeat of the 1962 China, in fact, knows that too. war with India. It is the purpose of 3. The second parallel is to be this paper to try and understand found in the situation in Tibet. In the similarities and the logic that the late 1950’s, the challenge to may drive the Chinese leaders in Chinese authority was more the direction of the exercise of overtly military, from the hard power against India. Khampas and other rebel groups 2. The first similarity is the inside Tibetan areas. And the growing weight of India in Indo- Chinese were convinced of Indian Pacific affairs. More and more complicity in this armed rebellion countries are turning to India as a – confirmed in their eyes by the reassurance against the growing fact that His Holiness the Dalai VIVEK : Issues and Options May – 2012 Issue: I No: V 3 Lama [HHDL] fled to India and failure of the Great Leap Forward, was given asylum there. Today, and the subsequent famine, today the situation is a bit different, and there is a leadership transition the challenge to Chinese rule is under way. This transition is not less of a guerrilla nature. going altogether smoothly, with Nonetheless it is equally former Party leader, Jiang Zemin unsettling to Beijing, especially continuing to play some kind of since it also coincides with role behind the scenes, though it is growing restiveness in other not entirely clear what. But now, ethnic minority areas as well. And as then, the uncertainty is once again, there is a perception resulting in the growing influence that India is involved in the of the military in foreign policy unrest. In Chinese eyes, this is not and security matters. The just the simple fact that HHDL is uncertainty is also reflected in the living and operating freely in official acknowledgement that India, but also the fact that the there have been over 80,000 cases Prime Minister visited Arunachal of civil unrest for each of the past Pradesh, HHDL himself went to three years in China, most of them Tawang. Last, but also very over economic issues. However, important, we allowed the former some of them have taken political Speaker of the US House of overtones. All of these factors are Representatives to visit HHDL in adding up to the growing influence Dharamshala in 2008, during the of the security forces, and to the periodic troubles inside Tibet. assertiveness of the Chinese These troubles continue, and are postures abroad, which are gaining prominence in the world causing unease among the media. neighbours. 4. A third similarity relates to the 5. Another, fourth, similarity is leadership issues inside China also worth mentioning: this is the itself. Whereas in the late 1950’s, fact that then, as now, the security Mao was facing quiet questioning establishment was in denial about – as we now know – after the China’s intentions. The situation VIVEK : Issues and Options May – 2012 Issue: I No: V 4 is somewhat better today, thanks better account of itself, the to the fact that there are situation would have evolved independent media outlets, but differently. And that is the final, the official stance of playing down but key, aspect of the comparison the possible dangers is between the late 1950’s and today. reminiscent of the late 1950’s. It is We are, of course, much better no one’s case that we should whip prepared for any eventuality on up hostility, but factual the border with China; but China assessments are too is much better important; the The key word, of course, is prepared than it current secrecy is “successful” – had India given was in 1962. The leaving the public a better account of itself, the balance of power unaware of the situation would have evolved thus becomes differently. And that is the true state of final, but key, aspect of the crucial, and it is far affairs. comparison between the late from clear that the 1950’s and today. We are, of answer is of a kind 6. All of the course, much better prepared that would give us problems faced by for any eventuality on the comfort. China were border with China; but China addressed and/or too is much better prepared 7. There are some mitigated by the than it was in 1962. The important successful war of balance of power thus becomes dissimilarities too, crucial, and it is far from clear October-November from the earlier that the answer is of a kind 1962. India was no that would give us comfort. period, and longer equated unfortunately, they with China for also work against several decades afterwards; Tibet our interests. The most important similarly disappeared from the concerns Pakistan. In 1962, Ayub international discourse for Khan was tempted to take decades. And Mao went on to advantage of India’s difficulties, strengthen his position internally. but was held back by strong The key word, of course, is demarches from the Americans. “successful” – had India given a This was because the Americans VIVEK : Issues and Options May – 2012 Issue: I No: V 5 saw China as an overt enemy 8. What this implies is that this then, and did not want India to be time, our nightmare might well further humiliated by Pakistan. come true: a two-front war Today, it is unclear what the involving both China and American stand would be in any Pakistan. It is usually believed eventuality – sympathetic no that China does not wish to get doubt, but probably, not of the involved in Indo-Pak issues, kind and scale that we saw in especially wars. Supporters of this 1962. This would be especially point of view argue that both in true of an Obama Administration. 1965 and 1971, China stayed out Equally important, it would be fair of the action. There are two to argue that Pakistan will not problems with this view of the listen to the Americans as Ayub history of those wars. For one did. There is enough evidence of thing, in 1965, China did get this in the recent deterioration in involved, and gave us two relations between America and warnings in the course of the war Pakistan. There is also evidence of which lasted from 6 to 22 Pakistani hostility towards India, September. The second was a firm especially in the Army [which is ultimatum issued on 18 what matters], in the kind of September objecting to some ground level activity we are structures inside Sikkim [not a witnessing across the LoC and part of India then], and give us a elsewhere. In recent weeks, there 72-hour deadline. As it happened, has been some change of nuance, we did agree to a cease-fire within but this is because of their that time frame, whether because problems with America; several of the perceived threat from China press commentaries in Pakistan or because of the way things have suggested that neutralising developed in the UN Security India, through diplomacy, would Council, it is hard to be sure. But be a good idea while America was then too, China demolished some piling on the pressure. of our bunkers in Sikkim, just as they have done in recent months.