No.5 2018 PUBLISHED BY THE SWEDISH INSTITUTE brief OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. WWW.UI.SE UI Resilience Against Influence Operations in the Eastern Partnership Countries Henrik Sundbom and Martin Kragh Table of Contents Executive Summary 3 Introduction 6 An Economic Overview: Political and Business Risks 8 Trade and Foreign Direct Investments 8 Economic Inequality and Organized Crime 10 Concluding Discussion 10 Political Parties 12 Ukraine 12 Moldova 13 Georgia 14 A Shift from Left to Right 14 Political Parties – Concluding Discussion 15 Civil Society 16 GONGOs and Ofcial Tink Tanks 16 Local NGOs in the EaP Countries 16 Western NGOs and Tink Tanks 17 GONGOs in Multilateral Organizations 17 Election Monitoring 18 Educational Ties 19 Religious Organizations 20 Concluding Discussion 21 Media 23 News Consumption 23 Entertainment 24 Social Media 25 Countermeasures 25 Media – Concluding Discussion 26 We are grateful to Luca Karafath for valuable support in the research for this report. All the usual disclaimers apply. Te report was written with the fnancial support from the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Afairs (#UD20017/13864/ EC). © SWEDISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS | NUMBER 5/2018 2 Resilience against Infuence Operations in the Eastern Partnership Countries Executive Summary he focus of this study are the potentially subversive markets such as Ukraine and Georgia. Tese changes and less transparent dimensions of the geostrategic can be expected to alter the geostrategic environment, toolbox which states may apply in order to infu- as new actors compete to shape local conditions to their Tence and shape the political and security development in advantage. the European Union’s Eastern neighbourhood. It examines Russia’s economy has an international competitiveness the various vectors of infuence that operate in the public problem, and the Kremlin lacks in traditional soft power space, nominally independent but in practice controlled infuence. Russia is, however, able to undermine further and funded by foreign states or non-state actors. In other integration with the EU. Moscow has a range of instru- words, the report is limited to what may primarily be consi- ments at its disposal – from the military to the economic, dered the external threat environment, the associated risks, political, diplomatic and informational – which can be and how these interact with and infuence local developme- deployed simultaneously to varying degrees in order to nts in the Eastern Partnership countries. hinder reform or stimulate counter-reforms. Especially Tree Eastern Partnership countries are struggling demo- notable are business connections between Russian elites cracies – Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, while three are and political leaders in virtually all the Eastern Partner- more or less authoritarian states – Armenia, Azerbaijan ship countries. Te increasing presence of other import- and Belarus. All states face non-negligible challenges in ant actors, such as China, Turkey or Iran, can likewise fghting corruption, enforcing private property, refor- disinterest regional elites in the pursuit of EU integra- ming courts, police and legislature, and building Wes- tion, which may potentially threaten their ability to cap- tern-style state capacity. Although several or most of ture rents and maintain the political status quo. these issues have domestic and historical roots, outside Te second section gives short introductions to the threats to the countries’ reform agenda cannot be igno- political landscapes in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, red. Te primary focus of this study is on Georgia, Mol- with a focus on vulnerabilities to infuence operations. dova and Ukraine. Attempts to infuence politics comes in diferent shapes: Additionally, the study ofers suggestions for counterbal- direct support of parties, politicians or infuence groups; ancing this infuence and promoting democratic devel- fnancial infuence via businesspeople in politics, or cor- opment in the targeted countries. ruption; strengthening of separatist movements and trouble-makers, etc. Factors such as corruption, volatil- Te frst section describes the various economic and busi- ity and person-orientation afects the countries’ vulnera- ness interests in the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood, with a bility to such infuences. particular focus on Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Te section describes the economic interests of other coun- Instead of the traditional left-right divide, politics in the tries in the region, including Russia, Turkey and China, region is defned by key fgures and their geostrategic ori- but also the role of the EU. Particular emphasis is placed entations. Te presence of strongmen and high corrup- on issues such as corruption, political and business risks, tion creates a volatile political environment, making the and the economic consequences of military confict. future difcult to predict. Lack of trust in the political elite is a general characteristic in these countries, creating Te main factor behind economic underperformance in fertile soil for the emergence of radical movements that the Eastern Partnership countries since 1992 has been promise to change the political orientation of their coun- the lack of political reforms, and the countries can be tries. In the long-term, it is crucial to rebuild people’s expected to proceed more slowly and unevenly with trust in both politics and ofcial institutions in order to reforms than what many Western modernizers would create lasting democratic resilience. ideally prefer. Te attractive position of the European market, however, will perhaps remain the primary pull Te third section discusses how civil society is infu- factor for further modernization. At the same time, enced by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), trends suggest that other countries, such as China and so-called Government Organized NGOs (GONGOs), Turkey, will be able to improve their relative weight in and religious denominations. Te use of state-sponsored the region as well. Russia, meanwhile, has experienced NGOs, or GONGOs, has become a conventional com- a decline in its economic role in historically important ponent of the geostrategic toolbox of many countries. In © SWEDISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS | NUMBER 5/2018 3 Resilience against Infuence Operations in the Eastern Partnership Countries the Eastern Partnership countries, they are visible in the Te media sector in the Eastern Partnership countries form of nominally independent think tanks, religious has been highly afected by foreign infuence operations organizations, and educational institutions. Although for several reasons. Te media landscape of these coun- Russia is the leading country within this domain, coun- tries is in most cases characterized by an overconcentra- tries such as Belarus, Turkey and China are embracing tion of ownership in the hands of powerful oligarchs similar methods. GONGOs can be used to build con- and/or politicians. Cultural and linguistic proximity has nections to local organizations, promote anti-EU narra- allowed Russian propaganda outlets to actively dissemi- tives, disrupt multilateral negotiations and deploy fake nate their narratives in these countries, both directly and election monitors in order to promote their interests. through local media. Religious organizations such as the Russian Orthodox Traditionally, news consumption has been dominated by Church play a key role in promoting pro-Russian and television channels throughout the region, with a strong anti-Western narratives in the region. presence of Russian propaganda channels such as RT Te fourth and fnal section investigates media con- and Sputnik. However, the use of social media is increas- sumption in Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. It addresses ing in all three countries. Te three countries in question the issue of news reporting infuenced by domestic and have opted for diferent solutions to tackle the problem foreign political interests, as well as entertainment con- of disinformation, ranging from an outright ban on Rus- taining elements of propaganda. In the Eastern Partner- sian media in Ukraine to softer regulative measures in ship countries, television has long been the dominant Georgia. medium, but the Internet and social media are catching Some examples from Ukraine show the risks of govern- up as major news outlets. Hence, we pay special atten- ment-supported projects against disinformation. Civil tion to social media usage. Te three countries in this servants engaging in counter-propaganda, troll attacks study have chosen diferent paths in tackling foreign pro- against independent journalists, and legislation violating paganda, with Ukraine as the most radical example. the principles of free speech and media freedom are all pitfalls. Recommendations Te level of quality of a country’s institutions is key to building resilience. Weak protection of property rights, cor- ruption, absence of rule of law, poor safeguards for human rights, and inequality in options create the most con- ducive local conditions for outside attempts to shape political developments. In its negotiations with the Eastern Partnership countries, the EU needs to make clear its commitment to reform and democratization. Furthermore, it needs to be stressed that for the EU, its targets and demands require commitment and strict conditionality. Recent revelations of corruption schemes in Moldova and Ukraine should be met with resolute countermeasures by the EU, such as the withdrawal of fnancial and political support,