Australian Journal of Political Science For Peer Review Only Court Politics in a F ederal Polity Journal: Australian Journal of Political Science Manuscript ID: Draft Manuscript Type: Original Article Keywords: court politics, core executive, Queensland URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cajp Email: [email protected] Page 1 of 28 Australian Journal of Political Science 1 1 Court politics 2 3 4 5 COURT POLITICS IN A FEDERAL POLITY 6 7 8 9 10 11 Introduction 12 Australian political scientists have explored the core executive only episodically. Rhodes 13 14 and Wanna’sFor (2009) review Peer of the literature Review found little research on Only Australian executive politics; it 15 16 1 17 was ‘almost devoid of theory, even controversies’. Other characteristics include: the 18 19 predominance of realpolitik in accounts of executive power and a tendency to emphasise ‘practice 20 21 over theory, commentary over fieldwork, and teaching over research’ (Rhodes and Wanna 2009, 22 23 129-30). Weller (2005, 37) concurs, noting the academic literature provides ‘slim pickings for a 24 25 reader who wants to know how the executive system of government works in Australia’. The 26 27 28 challenge for Australian political scientists, therefore, is to provide theoretically informed studies of 29 2 30 the political executive based on original fieldwork. Strangio, ‘tHart and Walter (2013) also call for 31 32 a greater focus on the political executive. They exhort the next generation of scholars to pursue an 33 34 ‘integrated approach to the study of prime ministerial leadership, focusing on the interplay 35 36 between political circumstances, institutional possibilities, individual characteristics and social 37 38 39 relations at the apex of executive government’ (Strangio et al. 2013, 6, emphasis in original). 40 41 This article offers theory and fieldwork. We argue for a focus on court politics and we 42 43 illustrate our argument with a case study of the court politics of Queensland under Labor premier 44 45 Anna Bligh. We pose three key questions. First, why is court politics a useful approach in studying 46 47 the Australian core executive? Second, what is the nature and extent of court politics in State 48 49 50 politics? Finally, recognising that local traditions shape and inform the beliefs and practices of 51 52 political elites, how does the court politics approach need to be modified for application in 53 54 1 Their review included textbooks, journalism, biographies and memoirs. 55 56 2 In the 2000s, there is evidence of a reinvigorated field in Australia. See: Bennister 2012; Strangio et al. 2013; and 57 Rhodes and Tiernan 2014a . 58 59 60 1 URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cajp Email: [email protected] Australian Journal of Political Science Page 2 of 28 1 2 Court politics 2 3 4 Australia? We highlight four dilemmas that characterised the court politics of Queensland’s 5 6 central networks. These are: 7 8 9 • Contingency, which continuously frustrates agenda-setting and other efforts to plan for 10 11 the medium-term. 12 13 • The problem of fragmentation and coordination, which arguably is greater because of 14 For Peer Review Only 15 16 States’ service delivery responsibilities. 17 18 • The primacy of coping and survival in the calculus of political-administrative elites, 19 20 especially as electoral defeat looms; and 21 22 • The tendency of a besieged leader to rely on an ever decreasing circle of close 23 24 25 advisers. 26 27 We also identify those features of the court politics approach that work in Australia and 28 29 highlight some differences arising from local traditions and practices. These key differences 30 31 are: the physical location of network members; the greater number of partisan staff near to 32 33 leaders; and the close and closed relationships among network members over the course of 34 35 36 long-term governments. 37 38 39 40 TTTheThe court politics of the core executive 41 Court politics have existed throughout the ages (see Campbell 2010), but in its 42 43 44 current reincarnation the idea marries the core executive to the analysis of prime ministerial 45 46 predominance and to the study of statecraft. 3 It focuses on the beliefs and practices of core 47 48 executive actors. Practices are actions that display a stable pattern; they are what a group of 49 50 people do. So, a government department or a core executive network or the court is a set of 51 52 embedded practices. We interpret these actions by ascribing beliefs to them. Practices 53 54 55 56 3 For a detailed account of the core executive debate, its criticisms and variants and its emergence as the ‘new 57 orthodoxy’ in executive studies see Elgie (2011), Heffernan (2003 and 2005) and Rhodes (2006 and 2014). 58 59 60 URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cajp Email: [email protected] Page 3 of 28 Australian Journal of Political Science 1 3 Court politics 2 3 4 presuppose apt beliefs, and beliefs do not make sense without the practices to which they 5 6 refer. So, a government department is a set of embedded practices; so too a Cabinet, a 7 8 9 Premier’s or Prime Minister’s office. 10 11 Beliefs and practices are passed on through inherited traditions. Central to analysis of 12 13 traditions is the notion of situated agency : of individuals using local reasoning consciously and 14 For Peer Review Only 15 subconsciously to reflect on and modify their contingent heritage. So, analysis shifts to people’s 16 17 beliefs and practices, the traditions in which they are located, and the games interdependent 18 19 20 people play to resolve dilemmas. A dilemma arises when a new idea stands in opposition to 21 22 existing beliefs or practices, forcing individuals or institutions to reconsider their existing beliefs 23 24 and associated tradition. To accept a new belief is to pose a dilemma that asks questions of existing 25 26 traditions (Bevir and Rhodes 2003; 2006a). The court politics approach’s emphasis on the beliefs, 27 28 29 practices, traditions and dilemmas of courts provides the organising concepts for exploring how 30 31 they work (see Rhodes 2011, chapter 1; Rhodes and Tiernan 2014a, chapter 2). 32 33 Court politics exists as journalists’ reportage, in the autobiographies, biographies, diaries 34 35 and memoirs of politicians.4 The nearest usage to that employed here is that of Savoie (2008, 36 37 16-7). He defines the court as ‘the prime minister and a small group of carefully selected 38 39 40 courtiers’. It also covers the ‘shift from formal decision-making processes in cabinet … to 41 42 informal processes involving only a handful of actors.’ 43 44 Such courts perform essential coordination and management tasks that hold the centre 45 46 together (Rhodes and Tiernan 2014a). The court prioritises and coordinates the policy process. In 47 48 the quest for coherence, it contains and manages conflicts. It is the keeper of the government’s 49 50 51 narrative; the gatekeeper and broker for internal and external networks. 52 53 54 55 4 On the reportage, auto/biographies, memoirs and diaries relevant to court politics, there are too many items for a 56 complete listing here. Recent Australia, examples include: Blewett (1999); Fraser and Simons (2010); Howard 57 (2010) and Watson (2011). 58 59 60 URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cajp Email: [email protected] Australian Journal of Political Science Page 4 of 28 1 4 Court politics 2 3 4 Court politics offers useful insights into the problems of effective government. For 5 6 Walter (2010, 9-10), ‘court politics’ implies small, closed group decision-making. He is 7 8 9 concerned about potential dysfunctions – poor decision-making, an inability and unwillingness 10 11 to engage in ‘rigorous reality-testing’ and other pathologies, if this mode of decision-making 12 13 should become routine. Rhodes and Tiernan (2014a, 196-204) report the siege mentality that 14 For Peer Review Only 15 gripped Julia Gillard’s court as she faced the extreme contingency of a minority government, 16 17 relentless destabilisation from her predecessor and the missteps of her own supporters as they 18 19 20 became insular and defensive. However, it is a mistake to focus only on the pathologies of 21 22 court politics. We should ask too about its several pros and cons. Thus, Savoie (2008, 232) 23 24 argues that the court helps prime ministers ‘to get things done, to see results, and to manage the 25 26 news and the media better than when formal cabinet processes are respected’. It dispenses with 27 28 29 the formalities of government; for example, records and minutes and other formal processes. 30 31 Savoie (2008, 230 and 339) emphasises that the key adverse consequences are centralisation 32 33 and the collapse of accountability; ‘the centre has slowly but surely been made deliberately 34 35 stronger’; … and ‘the chain of accountability … has broken down at every level’. 36 37 There are also more prosaic but no less important consequences – the loss of 38 39 40 institutional memory and the tendency to ‘organisational forgetting’ (Pollitt 2000, 2008). Savoie 41 42 (2008, 25) agrees ‘senior civil servants no longer have the experience, the knowledge, or the 43 44 institutional memory to speak truth to power’ (see also Rhodes 2011, 293-5). We need to tease 45 46 out both the intended and unintended consequences of court politics. 47 48 49 50 51 Research methods 52 This article draws on a larger study that assesses the nature and extent of court politics in 53 54 Australia.