Global Responsibility to Protect 13 (2021) 158-185 Why Indonesia Adopted ‘Quiet Diplomacy’ over R2P in the Rohingya Crisis: The Roles of Islamic Humanitarianism, Civil–Military Relations, and asean Claire Q. Smith Lecturer, Department of Politics, University of York, York, UK [email protected] Susannah G. Williams Research Assistant, Department of Politics, University of York, York, UK [email protected] Abstract Following atrocities against the minority Muslim Rohingya population by the Myanmar military, several states have imposed sanctions and deployed international justice strategies against the Myanmar government. In contrast, Indonesia has used an alternative ‘quiet diplomacy’ approach, focused on aid delivery to affected communities and cooperation with Myanmar. The paper presents one of the first empirical examinations of Indonesia’s role, and considers Indonesia’s approach from a realpolitik perspective to show why Indonesia has avoided R2P measures. The paper identifies three factors that shaped Indonesia’s approach: Islamic humanitarianism, Indonesia’s own experience of managing civil–military relations during a contested democratic transition, and its continued commitment to core asean principles. The paper also contributes to wider debates by identifying some of the limitations of R2P, especially in terms of how R2P can be sidelined by national and regional diplomatic priorities, in this case manifested in the quiet diplomacy approach. © claire q. smith and susannah G. williams, 2021 | doi:10.1163/1875-984X-13020004Downloaded from Brill.com10/02/2021 01:34:51PM This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the cc by 4.0 license. via free access why indonesia adopted ‘quiet diplomacy’ 159 Keywords Responsibility to Protect (R2P) – Myanmar – Indonesia – Rohingya – Islamic humanitarianism – quiet diplomacy – civil-military relations – asean Successive waves of military-led atrocities against the ethnic Rohingya popu- lation, a Muslim minority in Myanmar, have created the gravest political and humanitarian crisis in twenty-first-century Asia.1 The United Nations (UN) estimates that since the violence escalated in 2017, over 700,000 Rohingya have been forced over the border into Bangladesh,2 with more than 126,000 displaced internally3 and thousands more fleeing in boats across the region. The UN Human Rights Council’s Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar (ffmm) established that the incidents in Rakhine State from 25 August 2017 amounted to international atrocity crimes.4 Despite the ineffectiveness of international responses to the atrocities throughout the 2010s, the majority of research has focused on analysing the actions of the UN and Western states, and the role of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (oic) in bringing a case of genocide against Myanmar to the International Court of Justice (icj). In contrast, limited research has considered the role of neighbour- ing Southeast Asian states in addressing the crisis,5 despite their closer allegiance to Myanmar, their international commitment to R2P – the 1 The authors wish to thank Ellen Stensrud, Martin Mennecke, Noel Morada, and one anonymous reviewer for their comments on earlier drafts, Amelia Fauzia and Mohamad Rosyidin for helpful discussions, and the anonymous contributors to the research. 2 The UN Refugee Agency, ‘Rohingya Emergency’, unhcr UK, 31 July 2019, https://www. unhcr.org/uk/rohingya-emergency.html, accessed 12 July 2020. 3 Human Rights Council, Detailed findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, A/hrc/42/CRP.5, 16 September 2019, p. 19. 4 ibid., p. 72. 5 Key exceptions include Lina Alexandra, ‘Indonesia and the Responsibility to Protect’, The Pacific Review, 25(1) 51–74 (2012); Alistair D. B. Cook and S. Nathini, Pathways for ASEAN Contributions to Sustainable Peace and Security in Rakhine State, Myanmar, irb-2017-08-018-01, May 2020; Amelia Fauzia, ‘Indonesian Aid to Rakhine State, Myanmar: Islamic Humanitarianism, Soft Diplomacy, and the Question of Inclusive Aid’, Oxford Department of International Development, 31 January 2018, https://www.qeh.ox.ac.uk/blog/ indonesian-aid-rakhine-state-myanmar-islamic-humanitarianism-soft-diplomacy-and- question, accessed 23 June 2020; Noel M. Morada, ‘Continuing Violence and Atrocities in Rakhine since 2017: Beyond the Outrage, Failures of the International Community’, Global Responsibility to Protect, 12(1) 64–85 (2020); Noel M. Morada, ‘asean and the Rakhine Crisis: Balancing Non-Interference, Accountability, and Strategic Interests in Responding to Atrocities in Myanmar’, Global Responsibility to Protect [this issue]; and Global Responsibility to Protect 13 (2021) 158-185Downloaded from Brill.com10/02/2021 01:34:51PM via free access 160 smith and williams main international norm shaping atrocity prevention responses – and their critical role in protecting exiled Rohingya. In this paper, we seek to redress that balance by analysing the main factors that have shaped Indonesia’s response. Our analysis builds on the emerging body of work by Southeast Asian and regional scholars, but contributes a unique assessment of the factors influ- encing Indonesia’s ‘quiet diplomacy’ towards Myanmar. To do so, we draw on data from policy reports, UN documents, media outlets, original key informant interviews, and academic literature. Initially, the international expectations on Indonesia to challenge Myanmar over its treatment of the Rohingya were high. As home to the world’s largest Muslim majority, a close ally of Myanmar, a relatively established democ- racy, a regional power with a global role as part of the G20, and a non-perma- nent seat on the UN Security Council (2019–2020), Indonesia stood to play a critical role in responding to the atrocities. Indonesia had committed to the R2P principle at the UN,6 and publicly supported the findings of the ffmm.7 Furthermore, both national secular human rights organisations and Islamic organisations – from large moderate Islamic social movements to smaller mil- itant groups8 – lobbied the government to protect the Rohingya from further violence and provide them with humanitarian assistance.9 While attempting Mohamad Rosyidin, ‘Reconciling State’s Sovereignty with Global Norms: Indonesia’s Quiet Diplomacy in Myanmar and the Feasibility of the Implementation of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in Southeast Asia’, Global Responsibility to Protect, 12(1) 11–36 (2020). 6 A/72/PV.105, 2 July 2018, pp. 6–7. See also Indonesia’s statements at unga debates on 8 September 2014 and 2015, https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/, accessed 23 November 2020. 7 Mouayed Saleh, Report of the Human Rights Council, A/hrc/S-27/3, 1 February 2018, p. 7; unga Res. 72/248, 23 January 2018. 8 Amelia Fauzia, ‘Islamic Philanthropy in Indonesia: Modernization, Islamisation, and Social Justice’, American Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 10(2) 223–236 (2017); Fauzia, ‘Indonesian Aid to Rakhine State’; Zezen Zaenal Mutaqin, ‘What is Islamic Humanitarianism?’, Korean Journal of Humanitarian Law, 33 60–80 (2013); Euronews, ‘Indonesia’s Muslims Urge More Support for Myanmar’s Rohingyas’, 16 September 2017, https://www.euronews.com/2017/09/16/indonesias-muslims-urge-more-support-for- myanmars-rohingyas, accessed 5 July 2020; Gurjit Singh, ‘Islam and Its Role in Indonesia’s Foreign Policy’, ORF, 24 June 2020, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/islam-role- indonesia-foreign-policy-68410/, accessed 5 July 2020. 9 Alexandra, ‘Indonesia and the Responsibility to Protect’, p. 70; Deasy Silvya Sari, Taufik Hidayat, and Aliyuna Pratisti, ‘Indonesian Government Policy on Rohingya Refugees’, Andalas Journal of International Studies, 7(1) 1–13 (2018), p. 8; Fardah Assegaf, ‘A Deep Sense of Humanity for Rohingya Prevails in Aceh’, Antara News, 1 July 2020, https:// en.antaranews.com/news/151598/a-deep-sense-of-humanity-for-rohingya-prevails-in- aceh, accessed 13 July 2020. Global Responsibility to ProtectDownloaded from 13 (2021)Brill.com10/02/2021 158-185 01:34:51PM via free access why indonesia adopted ‘quiet diplomacy’ 161 to maintain close diplomatic relations with Myanmar, Indonesia responded to these domestic political pressures. Over 1,800 Rohingya refugees were eventually accepted into Aceh Province, and the government facilitated aid via asean and Indonesian humanitarian organisations into Rakhine State.10 Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi also repeatedly urged Myanmar to minimise the use of force and enable humanitarian access to Rakhine State.11 However, despite the pushes for Indonesia to use its advantageous posi- tion, particularly from national human rights and Islamic organisations, we identify two key factors that restrained Indonesia’s foreign policy over the atrocities. We find that Indonesia’s recent political transition from a military regime – including the government’s recent experiences of managing civ- il–military relations, and multiple ethno-nationalist conflict sites – informed a sense of a shared political history with Myanmar. This perspective tempered Indonesia’s approach. Further, as a secular multi-ethnic state with a strong adherence to the ‘asean Way’ – especially the principles of non-interference and consensus-based decision-making12 – Indonesia sought to avoid an inter- national perception of pro-Muslim bias against Myanmar.13 Indonesia’s cau- tious approach caused tensions with the oic,14 for example, when Indonesia called for restraint towards Myanmar, in contrast with the critical position taken by Malaysia,