Loyola University Chicago Loyola eCommons Dissertations Theses and Dissertations 1992 John Locke on the naturalness of rights Peter C. Myers Loyola University Chicago Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss Part of the Political Science Commons Recommended Citation Myers, Peter C., "John Locke on the naturalness of rights" (1992). Dissertations. 3017. https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/3017 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License. Copyright © 1992 Peter C. Myers JOHN LOCKE ON THE NATURALNESS OF RIGHTS By Peter c. Myers VOLUME II A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy January 1992 CHAPTER V NATURAL HISTORY AND THE STATE OF NATURE In the second section of chapter III above, we re­ ferred to Locke's apparent relegation of morality to the periphery of his concern in writing the Essay. Locke seems in effect to promise that however novel in other respects may be his empiricist account of natural science, that account leaves relatively inviolate the province of moral­ ity; he declares in closing that the study of nature is "wholly separate and distinct" (4.21.5) from the science of ethics or morality. We have noted too that Locke's asser­ tions of the possibility of a demonstrative, mixed-mode science of morality appear to entail an insistence on precisely such a strict separation of the respective sciences of morality and nature.1 In fact, however, there are significant ambiguities in Locke's presentation of this proposal. To say the least, it is by no means clear that he does insist upon the total or even decisive abstraction of morality from nature; indeed we may wonder whether his occasional qualifications of this proposal, taken together, serve ultimately to undermine in principle any attempt at such an abstraction. In the midst of his chapter "Of the lsee chapter III above, especially pp. 99-106. 218 219 Improvement of Our Knowledge, " for instance, Locke pro- fesses to "doubt not, but if a right method were taken," that not all, but only "a great part of Morality" might be demonstrated "to a considering Man" with a clarity equal to that of a mathematical demonstration (4.12.8). Similarly, in his discussion "Of the Extent of Humane Knowledge, " he claims that the central ideas of the proposition that human beings as "understanding, rational Beings" are God's Work- manship would, "if duly considered, and pursued, afford such Foundations of our Duty and Rules of Action, as might place" morality among the demonstrative sciences, "to any one that will apply himself with the same Indifferency and Attention" to morality that he devotes to mathematics ( 4. 3. 18) . Shortly thereafter, in explaining why attempts at demonstrations in ethics have hitherto caused greater difficulties than those in m~thematics, he makes the same point still more cautiously, maintaining that a search with "indifferency" would bring us only "nearer perfect Demon­ stration, than is commonly imagined" (4.3.20).2 Leaving aside for the moment the implications of the questionable likelihood of widespread "indifferency" on the part of individuals in their moral inquiries, we first 2Gibson is rare among Locke's commentators in noting the caution apparent in Locke's formulations concerning the possibility of a demonstrative science of morality, but he seems nonetheless to hold that Locke is at best dimly aware of the difficulties that such a pure science would entail (1896, 50,58). 220 wonder in the wake of these qualifications precisely how according to Locke an indifferent inquiry would fall short of strict demonstration, or what part of morality necessar- ily resists attempts at demonstration. We recall that though he acknowledges that moral discourses inevitably contain substance ideas as well as ideas of mixed modes and relations, he maintains that the presence of substance ideas need not disturb such discourses, because the adequacy of their definitions need not--indeed cannot--be self-evident or demonstrated, and so instead can and must be merely supposed ( 3. 11. 16) . As Grant explains, "With respect to subjection to the law, the question to be asked is not, Is this a Man? but Is this a corporeal rational Being?" (1987, 30). Locke suggests here that our inability to achieve any precise, finally adequate definition of a human being is inconsequential for morality, insofar as we can nonetheless frame an abstract idea comprising the qualities essential to moral beings. 3 The undemonstrative portion of ethical science would then appear to be the supposed or posited character of the subject of morality, of the "moral man" or person. 3This reasoning appears to underlie Locke's occasional references to the subject of law or morality as a "rational Creature" or a "free and intelligent Agent" (TT II .12, 57; also STCE 31). We hope to show in what follows, however, that for Locke such references to agency or personhood may provide greater analytical precision, but they do not imply the invalidity of ordinary references to human beings as the subjects of morality. 221 It is important to recognize, however, that this supposition lying at the basis of Lockean moral science does not represent a pure act of mental construction or creativity. Locke does not suggest that we ponder, in a spirit of indifference to whether such beings actually exist, what faculties one would have to possess in order to qualify as a moral being. Morality is our great concern, "the proper Science and Business of Mankind in general" (4.12.11); insofar as we do so with even minimal rational­ ity, therefore, we frame moral ideas, be they substances or mixed modes, with a view to their usefulness (2.22.6,10; 2.28.2; 3.5.7). In the context of his own account of the origin of our moral ideas, Locke's framing of the concept of a moral man or person makes sense only on the premise that such beings actually exist in the world. He proceeds not by simply positing an idea, but instead by collecting the morally basic or necessary qualities of the class of moral beings actually existing, of which we have actual experience. Once again, Locke appeals to what "Every one, I think, finds in himself" (2.21.7) in order to corroborate his account of our moral faculties.4 The complex idea of a corporeal rational creature is not then a pure creature of the mind, but is instead formed in an act of abstraction proper. It is abstracted from real experience. The premise of the present chapter is that throughout 4see chapter IV above, pp. 191-193. 222 the Essay Locke tends to exaggerate the methodological separation of moral from natural science, just as elsewhere he exaggerates the distinction between the abstract, norma- tive-theoretical principles of political science and the empirically, historically grounded prudential art of governing.5 In maintaining that "at best an Argument from what has been, to what should of right be, has no great force" (TT II.103), Locke implies no more than that what is moral or just cannot be simply reduced to actual historical practice; he does not deny that historical inquiry is use- ful and indeed necessary for the development of a proper understanding of the nature and limits of our capacities as 5see again "Some Thoughts Concerning Reading and study for a Gentleman," in Axtell 1968, 400. I do not mean to argue that the distinctions in question are without any validity for Locke. I am suggesting only that the rules of morality, and by implication the principles of political justice, rest ultimately upon an empirically grounded conception of the nature of those to whom such rules and principles properly apply. Locke's exaggerations of these distinctions tend to obscure the extent to which his account of a constructivist moral science rests upon a natural ground. Focusing on other textual ambiguities, Strauss persuasively explains much of the reason for Locke's exaggeration by reference to the different form of caution proper to practical as opposed to theoretical writers (1953, 206-209; cf. Cox 1960, 11). I believe that in the Essay Locke indeed intends to attack scholastic morality, but to do so for the most part indirectly, through his critique of scholastic natural science; he seeks to clear a space of relative freedom to deliver his critique of scholastic natural science, by suggesting misleadingly that that critique will not implicate scholastic morality as well. 223 moral beings. 6 In keeping with the "Historical, plain Method" of the Essay as a whole (1.1.2), Locke employs the idea of "moral man" as an empirically grounded, testable hypothesis, even as a kind of thought-experiment. Let us suppose, Locke reasons in effect, that the beings in the world who possess the capacity or equipment for morality constitute a natural species; the following empirical questions then arise, as most immediately relevant to our purposes. In what relation does the class of moral beings stand to the class or classes of beings ordinarily denom- inated "human"? What if anything can we infer from the nature of this moral equipment concerning the specific content of the political morality most appropriate to the class of tho.se so equipped? What further common qualities can we discover that may be relevant to our construction of moral ideas? What natural needs, desires, interests, and passions do the members of this class share, in addition to the qualities constitutive of moral personhood, which may 6cf.