BACKGROUNDER No. 3038 | JULY 23, 2015 U.S. Engagement Required: Afghanistan Must Avoid an Iraq-Style Breakdown Lisa Curtis Abstract The surprise success of ISIS in a single year, since July 2014, which has Key Points put the future of Iraq in jeopardy, has prompted concern among U.S. policymakers that, as U.S. and coalition forces depart, Afghan forces n This past year’s surprise success could face a similar threat from the Taliban. While Afghanistan does of the Islamic State, which has put not face the same Sunni–Shia sectarian divisions that have fueled the the future of Iraq in jeopardy, has prompted concern among U.S. fighting in Iraq, the Afghan government remains dependent on inter- policymakers that, as U.S. and national financial support, and the Afghan security forces require U.S. coalition forces depart, Afghan air support, equipment, training, and intelligence to maintain an edge forces could face a similar threat over the Taliban. Similar to Iraq, Afghanistan could quickly erupt into from the Taliban. chaos if U.S. and international forces depart as hastily as scheduled. n The Afghan government remains The U.S. should continue to lead coalition efforts to help stabilize Af- dependent on international ghanistan by leaving a residual U.S. force in the country as long as nec- financial support, and the Afghan essary, and drop all arbitrary deadlines for withdrawal. The successful security forces require U.S. air March 2015 visit to the U.S. by Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and his support, equipment, training, and coalition partner, Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah, demonstrates intelligence to maintain an edge that there is an opening to build a more effective and long-lasting U.S.– over the Taliban. Afghan partnership to deny global terrorists the opportunity to revive n The U.S. should continue to lead their base of operations in the country. coalition efforts to help stabilize Afghanistan and leave a residual U.S. force in the country as long his past year’s surprise success of the Islamic State (ISIS), as necessary, dropping all arbi- Twhich has put the future of Iraq in jeopardy, has prompted con- trary deadlines for withdrawal. cern among U.S. policymakers that, as U.S. and coalition forces n Washington should also main- depart, Afghan forces could face a similar threat from the Taliban. tain assistance programs that While Afghanistan does not face the same Sunni–Shia sectarian help bolster democratic trends divisions that have fueled the fighting in Iraq, the Afghan govern- and contribute to economic ment remains dependent on international financial support, and development and regional the Afghan security forces require U.S. air support, equipment, economic integration. n Focusing on a long-term strategy This paper, in its entirety, can be found at http://report.heritage.org/bg3038 of engagement with Afghanistan The Heritage Foundation will contribute to regional stabil- 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE ity and deny global terrorists the Washington, DC 20002 opportunity to revive their base of (202) 546-4400 | heritage.org operations in the country. Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress. BACKGROUNDER | NO. 3038 JULY 23, 2015 training, and intelligence to maintain an edge over parliamentary form of governance. The National the Taliban. Similar to Iraq, Afghanistan could Unity Government Agreement states that the presi- quickly erupt into chaos if U.S. and international dent and chief executive will make policy decisions forces depart as hastily as scheduled, especially if in consultation with the cabinet, which is run by the financial and diplomatic support for the National president. The chief executive, in turn, is respon- Unity Government dwindles. sible for managing the cabinet’s implementation of The U.S. should continue to lead coalition efforts government policies and chairing weekly meetings to help stabilize Afghanistan by leaving a residual of the Council of Ministers. The agreement holds U.S. force in the country as long as necessary. The that the two sides will hold a Loya Jirga (consulta- White House decision in late March to extend the U.S. tive assembly) by the end of 2016 to amend the con- troop presence in Afghanistan by at least six months stitution and convert the chief executive position was welcome, but the Administration should drop into a permanent prime minister position. all arbitrary deadlines for withdrawal. Although the U.S. aid footprint will inevitably diminish, Washing- U.S. Extends Troop Presence ton should maintain assistance programs that help as Attacks Escalate bolster democratic trends, contribute to economic Shortly after assuming power, Ghani signed the development and regional economic integration, and U.S.–Afghanistan Bilateral Security Agreement that can be insulated from the pervasive corruption (BSA), paving the way for the U.S. to leave a residual that plagues Afghan society. The successful March non-combat force presence in the country. Presi- visit to the U.S. by Afghan President Ashraf Ghani dent Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah held suc- and his coalition partner, Chief Executive Abdullah cessful meetings in Washington in March, secur- Abdullah, demonstrates that there is an opening to ing a commitment to a long-term partnership from build a more effective and long-lasting U.S.–Afghan President Barack Obama, as well as an extension of partnership that can contribute to regional stability the American troop presence by keeping 9,800 U.S. and deny global terrorists the opportunity to revive forces in place at least through the end of this year. their base of operations in the country. During an address to a joint session of the U.S. Congress, President Ghani went to great lengths to Unity Government Forms extend Afghanistan’s appreciation for U.S. sacrific- Following a three-month political crisis over es in the country, while making clear that the ulti- allegations of voter fraud in the presidential run- mate goal of his government is to establish Afghan off election held last June, the contenders signed a self-reliance. He touted the fact that three million power-sharing agreement on September 21, 2014, Afghan girls are enrolled in primary school and that in which Ashraf Ghani was made president and the average Afghan lifespan had increased from 44 Abdullah Abdullah the chief executive. The two years to over 60 years since 2002.1 Ghani received leaders appear genuinely committed to making the a warm welcome from U.S. congressional mem- power-sharing deal work, but delays in establish- bers, relieved to see the departure of former Presi- ing a cabinet demonstrate the inherent challenges dent Hamid Karzai, who frequently criticized the of sharing governance between competing bases of U.S. role in Afghanistan and had become toxic to power. It took nearly five months to put into place the relationship. the finance, foreign affairs, and interior ministers, Last year, President Obama had pledged to cut U.S. and the government has still not appointed a defense force levels to 5,500 by the end of 2015, and then to minister, the head of the supreme court, and many zero by the end of 2016. But President Ghani’s request provincial governors. earlier this year that the U.S. reconsider the timeline With the establishment of the National Unity for withdrawal, and growing concern among U.S. Government, Afghanistan has shifted from a presi- policymakers about the potential for Afghanistan’s dential system to a combination of a presidential and security to deteriorate in the absence of international 1. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Office of the President, “President Ghani’s Address to the U.S. Congress,” March 25, 2015, http://president.gov.af/en/news/president-ghanis-address-to-the-us-congress (accessed June 29, 2015). 2 BACKGROUNDER | NO. 3038 JULY 23, 2015 forces (similar to the situation in Iraq last summer), Even so, the number of Afghan security forces led the White House to adjust its withdrawal sched- (police and army) killed or wounded increased by ule slightly by keeping more troops in Afghanistan 70 percent in the first four months of this year com- at least until the end of 2015. The White House says pared to last year.4 The fighting is also taking a heavy it remains committed to withdrawing all U.S. forces, toll on the civilian population. The United Nations except those necessary to protect the U.S. embassy, says there has been a 16 percent increase in civilian by the end of 2016. President Ghani’s willingness to casualties in the first four months of 2015 (around agree to U.S. terms for military engagement, such as 1,000 killed and 2,000 injured).5 easing restrictions on U.S. night raids and air strikes, The Taliban began its annual spring offensive in likely also contributed to the White House decision April and has intensified fighting in all parts of the to extend the U.S. troop presence. country, including in Helmand, Uruzgan, Kunduz, There are around 13,200 U.S. and NATO forces and Balkh provinces. In late April, the Taliban over- currently stationed in Afghanistan as part of the ran several outposts in Kunduz in the north, and Resolution Support mission to train and advise came close to taking the provincial capital, causing Afghan forces. NATO formally ended combat opera- 100,000 Afghans to flee their homes. The Afghan tions last December, but coalition forces regularly Army sent reinforcements to the area but the region conduct airstrikes in support of the Afghan forces, is still being contested with the Taliban capturing and American Special Operations Forces (current- two districts near the capital in late June.