CONGRESSIONAL PROGRAM Finding a Diplomatic Solution to the North Korean Crisis March 2-4, 2018 Stanford, California Copyright @ 2018 by The Aspen Institute The Aspen Institute 2300 N Street Northwest Washington, DC 20037 Published in the United States of America in 2018 by The Aspen Institute All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America Pub # 18/006 Finding a Diplomatic Solution to the North Korean Crisis March 2-4, 2018 The Aspen Institute Congressional Program Table of Contents Rapporteur’s Summary Elliot Serbin ................................................................................................................................................. 3 Finding a Diplomatic Solution to the North Korean Crisis: Historical Context ......................................... 13 Kathleen Stephens What We Really Know About North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons, And What We Don’t Yet Know for Sure .................................................................................................... 17 Siegfried Hecker DPRK National Strategic Considerations, Objectives ............................................................................... 21 Sue Mi Terry Former Defense Secretary William Perry on why we didn't go to war with North Korea ........................................................................................... 37 Barbara Demick Sanctions on North Korea ........................................................................................................................... 39 Marcus Noland The Price of War With North Korea ........................................................................................................... 47 Barry Posen The Korean Missile Crisis: Why Deterrence Is Still the Best Option ..................................................................................................... 49 Scott Sagan New Thinking to Solve the North Korean Nuclear Conundrum ................................................................. 57 Fan Gaoyue Setting a Timetable for Denuclearization of North Korea .......................................................................... 59 Fan Gaoyue A View from China on Triangular Relations .............................................................................................. 63 Wang Dong Making Sense of North Korea [with Admiral Dennis Blair and Ambassador Chris Hill] ........................................................................... 73 Susan Glasser Can We Still Negotiate with North Korea? A South Korean Perspective ....................................................................................................................... 89 Chung-in Moon Moon’s Bet on the Olympics: What Comes Next? ..................................................................................................................................... 97 Gi-Wook Shin and Joyce Lee North Korea in 2017: Closer to Being a Nuclear State .................................................................................................................. 99 Gi-Wook Shin and Reggie J. Moon Trump Should Help North Korea Keep Its Nukes Safe ............................................................................ 107 Michael Auslin Can Kim Jong-un Control His Nukes? ..................................................................................................... 113 Michael Auslin Trump’s Biggest North Korea Mistake Is Coming ................................................................................... 117 Michael Auslin How Trump Should Talk to North Korea ................................................................................................. 121 Suzanne DiMaggio and Joel S. Wit The Art of Diplomacy: Key Aspects of a Potential Agreement ..................................................................................................... 123 David Straub Conference Agenda .................................................................................................................................. 127 Conference Participants ........................................................................................................................... 133 Finding a Diplomatic Solution to the North Korean Crisis Rapporteur’s Summary Elliot Serbin Research Assistant to Professor Siegfried Hecker Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) Stanford University The views expressed here are not the author’s, rather the rapporteur’s effort to reflect the discussion. *** Introduction Following North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s surprise overture to South Korea in his 2018 Under the auspices of the Aspen Institute New Year’s Address, South and North Korea Congressional Program, a bipartisan group of undertook diplomatic efforts to reduce tensions thirteen members of Congress convened from during the 2018 Winter Olympics in March 2 to March 5, 2018, at Stanford Pyeongchang, South Korea. Subsequently, University to discuss policy options regarding South Korea dispatched special envoys to meet the current North Korea crisis. The members of with Kim Jong-un in Pyongyang, North Korea. Congress deliberated with scholars and Aspen meeting participants discussed whether practitioners to acquire a better understanding of the inter-Korean dialogue had provided a North Korea and its ruling regime and regional window of opportunity for the U.S. to actors, assess the range of potential solutions to successfully engage with North Korea. [On the crisis, and determine the role of Congress on March 8th, three days after this meeting, this issue. President Trump provided his own answer to that question when he accepted Kim Jong-un’s The participants were mindful that the state of proposal to meet.] Kim Jong-un reportedly affairs on the Korean Peninsula remains fraught. conveyed to South Korean envoys a willingness The U.S. has continued its “maximum pressure” to discuss denuclearization in a dialogue with campaign against North Korea in an effort to the U.S. and agreed to a moratorium on nuclear isolate the country and force it to adjust its and missile testing for the duration of talks. As strategic calculus in favor of denuclearization. the U.S. and North Korea prepare for a possible Despite this pressure campaign, North Korea has Trump-Kim summit by the end of May, thoughts continued its determined effort to develop its and reflections from the Aspen meeting nuclear and missile programs, conducting its contained herein may help to inform U.S. policy sixth nuclear test and first ICBM tests in 2017. as it tackles these new developments. American officials have cautioned that time is running out, explaining that diplomacy is Understanding North Korea under the Kim preferred but military options remain on the Jong-un Regime table. Throughout the meeting, members of Congress expressed great interest in learning more about 3 the notoriously closed society of North Korea. because it diverts and consumes scarce The conversation often returned to questions resources. One participant concluded that North about Kim Jong-un’s personality, the political Korea would not be able to pursue both tracks objectives of his regime, and the nature of daily simultaneously and would continue to jump life in North Korea. back and forth between the two. Participants stressed that we know very little The discussion also touched on the current state about what Kim Jong-un actually wants, how he of the North Korean economy. Participants thinks, and how he would react in various explained how it was decimated by the Korean scenarios. Judgments about him and his goals War, rebuilt with the help of the Soviet Union, are based on speculation. A number of and suffered in the 1990s following a reduction participants suggested, however, that it is in foreign economic aid. North Korea endured a relatively safe to assume that Kim Jong-un is a famine in the 1990s, which gave rise to small rational actor. At the same time, he may be scale working units engaging in entrepreneurial locked in a poor information environment and behavior to procure food. The limited surrounded by “yes-men”, which could impair marketization of some elements of the North his decision-making process. Korean economy has not been a top-down process, though Kim Jong-un has relaxed certain Participants discussed a “theory of dictatorship” policies to allow for some market activity. In as a lens through which to understand Kim Jong- recent years, the economy has generated greater un. One participant posited that if Kim Jong-un inequality and the general population continues is like other dictators, he is not crazy but in fact to suffer from a chronic lack of food. The North intelligent, capable, and bold. Furthermore, it is Korean people are in survival mode, but hope likely that eventually he will overreach that the limited economic reforms will provide externally, sparking a conflict. Another some opportunity. participant pushed back against this theory, arguing that while dictators are horrible to their North Korea’s Nuclear Capabilities own people, they don’t always spark external conflagrations. This participant did not think that Participants reviewed the present state of North war with North Korea would be inevitable, but Korea’s nuclear capabilities given its significant expressed concerns that the theory of advancements in 2017. According to one dictatorship made war falsely appear participant, North Korea has demonstrated the unavoidable. capability to produce fissile material in the form of plutonium and highly