Notes 1 Parties and the Challenge of Multi-Level Politics 1. In this study, we use the customary abbreviations MP and MEP to mean member of (a national) parliament and member of the European Parliament, respectively. The term ‘parliamentarian’ we use as a synonym for both MP and MEP. 2. This reflection may well be far from exact, not least because the leaders of most governments in parliamentary systems are not elected by the parlia- ment, but rather tolerated by it. Müller, Bergman and Strøm’s (2003: 13) definition of parliamentarism, which we accept, is ‘a system of government in which the Prime Minister and his or her cabinet are accountable to any majority of the members of parliament and can be voted out of office by the latter’ (emphasis removed). 3. Since the Treaty of Lisbon came into force at the end of 2009, a legal mechanism has existed by which a state can, in principle, leave the Union. Greenland, an autonomous part of the Danish state, became the only territory to leave the EU, in 1985, after a referendum three years previously. 4. Hurrelman and DeBardeleben (2009: 231–2) discuss a third, ‘supplementary’ and ‘transnational’ channel of EU democracy, in which civil-society organi- sations communicate with, primarily, the European Commission. This is an interesting perspective, but we will leave it there, due to the weak presence of political parties in this channel. 5. The arguments in this paragraph are associated with the ‘standard version’ of the democratic deficit as summarised by Follesdal and Hix (2006: 534–7). 6. See Auel (2005) for more work in this area, especially the Nordic survey by Damgaard and Jensen (2005). 7. On the other hand, Raunio and Hix (2000) have argued that national MPs have learned to ‘fight back’, tackling their information deficit through inter alia setting up European affairs committees, even if these institutions are of varying strength, depending on the customary position of the national parliaments vis-à-vis governments (Raunio 2005). 8. Bovens (2007: 5–7) points out that the English term ‘accountability’ does not have a direct equivalent in many other languages. In Swedish, the best effort is ansvarsutkrävande – literally, a demand for responsibility. We like Bovens’s definition of a ‘narrow’ form of accountability as ‘a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to jus- tify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgment, and the actor may face consequences’ (emphasis removed). For us, this definition is strongly redolent of a delegation relationship. 9. Koelbe (1996: 256) similarly argues that party activists prefer strict control mechanisms over party representatives’ actions, while leaders prefer a greater part of the decision-making to be unconstrained. 218 Notes 219 10. Hanley (2008) uses a similar approach in his analysis of ‘transnational parties’. 11. The position of some of the more devout rational-choice scholars is that accuracy of predictions trumps realism of assumptions (see Elster 2007: 25–6). But this is a weak defence in party studies. The application of some of the more reductionist rational-choice-based models of party life has often generated hypotheses that have wilted easily in the face of empirical testing (Montero and Gunther 2002: 10–3). 12. Haverland (2006: 135–6) puts the point in a slightly different way. 13. Haverland (2006: 139–40, 144) has his reservations about the most- similar-countries strategy. But we are less certain about his ‘theoretical concerns’ in using it, and we agree with the ‘methodological reasons’ in its favour. 14. We concur with the definition of a case, offered by Seawright and Collier (2004: 275), as ‘[t]he [unit] of analysis in a given study. Cases are the political, social, institutional, or individual entities or phenomena about which information is collected and inferences made. Examples of cases are nation-states, social movements, political parties, trade union members, and episodes of policy implementation.’ We further agree with Gerring (2004: 342) that ‘[a] case is comprised of several relevant dimen- sions (“variables”), each of which is built upon an “observation” or observations’. 15. There are a few exceptions to these criteria. The Danish Christian Democrats and the Norwegian Coastal Party, both of which lost their seats in the national elections of 2005, were excluded from our survey. So too were the parties whose representatives are elected by voters in the Faroes and Greenland to the Danish parliament; and from Åland to the Finnish parliament; and the Danish Liberal Alliance, which arrived in the Danish parliament only in 2007. Also excluded is Feminist Initiative to which a Swedish MEP, elected on the Liberals’ list in 2004, defected in 2006; it won no seats in the 2009 European election. Nor did two Danish parties, the Social Liberals and the June Movement, and a Finnish one, the Left Alliance. However, because these three had seats in the 2004–9 EP, they are included in the set. Finally, the Finnish Christian Democrats and the Finns Party won, in a technical alli- ance with each other, a seat each in the 2009 European election. However, while they are included in our national-level observations, their activity at EU level is not explored. 16. Here we depart somewhat from the practice in Katz and Mair (1992, 1994). We prefer party board to ‘national executive’, because we are not convinced that the board’s role is executive in the same way as that of the party leadership; the executive committee clearly is. 17. It also means that the Norwegian Kristelig Folkeparti is referred to as the Christian Democratic Party, the English-language name on the parliament’s website, despite the fact that ‘Christian People’s Party’ would be a much more faithful translation, and despite the fact that the party congress has discussed and rejected changing the party name to (in Norwegian) the Christian Democrats. Thanks to Nick Sitter for pointing out this interesting linguistic discrepancy. 220 Notes 2 Principals, Agents, Parties and the EU 1. See also the discussion in Lupia and McCubbins (2000: 294). 2. Swedish has a nice word, förtroendevald, to describe any person in whom con- fidence is invested via election. In English, we have to make do with using the label ‘representative’. 3. Note that credibility in this context does not necessarily imply a realistic pros- pect of manifesto pledges being implemented as public policy. That might be an essential part of manifesto credibility in some parties. In others, however, influence over public policy may not be a likely prospect. In such cases, mani- festo credibility might be dependent on other criteria, such as the support of party members or core supporters. 4. If a party is not in government, however, and therefore does not have its parliamentary leader in a ministerial position, contacts with the party’s MEPs would be of little use to MPs in the intra-party channel of delegation and accountability. Recalling their role in the constitutional channel, however, it is clearly in the interests of MPs to get information about Brussels policy issues as early as possible so that they can hold their government to account, irrespective of whether an MP’s party is in government or opposition. 3 Denmark: Party Agents on Tight Leashes 1. Note that the following description applies to one type of legislation, bes- lutningsforslag. Another type, lovforslag, gets a single reading. 2. In the electoral reform of 2007, these were reduced from 17 constituencies and 103 nomination districts. 3. Before the 2007 reform, a modified St Laguë was used in the allocation process (Elklit 2002). 4. The exception is the small Baltic island of Bornholm, which is guaran- teed at least two seats, more than the size of its population alone would justify. 5. The following smaller parties had representation in the Folketing prior to 1973: Liberal Centre (Liberalt Centrum) in 1966–8 and the Independents (De Uafhængige) in 1960–8. 6. In order for a government to be formed it just need to be tolerated by a majority in parliament, it does not have to be supported by a majority (Bergman 1993). 7. Originally, the committee was known as the Market Relations Committee (Markedsudvalget). 8. The Party of European Socialists changed its name during the seventh parliamentary period to the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats. 9. The split in the European People’s Party at the beginning of the seventh parliamentary period and some Eurosceptical parties (particularly the British Tories) formed the European Conservatives and Reformists. The Danish Conservatives never considered moving to this group. 10. The following description is based on Dansk Folkeparti (2010); Enhedslisten (2010); Konservative Folkeparti (2010); Radikale Venstre; Socialdemokreterne (2009); the partially implemented new statutes contained in Socialistisk Folkeparti (2010); and Venstre (2010). Notes 221 11. In the Socialist People’s Party, this applied after the annual meeting in 2010, before which the party board was larger and included representatives from the regions. 12. However, in the Social Democrats’ statutes, the board is made responsible for maintaining contact with the labour movement in general and, specifically, the trade unions. 13. In the Conservatives, this might be handled at the chairs meeting and, in the Social Democrats, at the congresses that are arranged between the ordinary congresses. 14. According to one informant, the party ended these special congresses because of their cost. 15. In the Red–Green Alliance, only 20 per cent of board members may be full- time politicians. 16. The decision of the board was taken by a single-vote majority. The leadership was in favour of joining the Green group.