CHAPTER 4 UNDERMINING UNAMIR 4.1 THE A RUSHA PEACE ACCORDS It was a triumph for international diplomacy when on August 4, 1993, the Arusha Peace Accords between the Rwandan government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) were signed. After one year of negotiations and three years of war, the parties agreed upon the power sharing agreement. Through external pressure, the two parties had come to the conclusion of the Peace Agreement, which made it a true victory for foreign diplomacy.l All regional states2 had been involved: the Organization ofAfrican Unity (OAU) had led the negotiations, and Western states had observer status3 or monitored the negoti­ ations from their embassies in Tanzania.4 The peace agreement provided for the so-called Broad Based Transitional Government (BBTG) that would hold power for 22 months at the most, after which elections would follow. This interim government would consist of 21 ministers. The Mouvement Revolutionaire National pour Ie Developpement (MRND) and the RPF would each have five ministers and the Mouvement Democratique Republicain (MRD), the largest opposition party, would have four ministers ofwhich one would be the prime minister during the transition. Faustin Twagiramungu would hold this position. The other seven ministerial posts were to be divided among the rest ofthe parties. The fear for dominance by one party or another was demonstrated by the voting system, which required a majority oftwo-thirds for decisions, meaning 14 votes in favor. 5 Linda Melvern, A People Betrayed. The Role ofthe West in Rwanda's Genocide, pp. 52-53 (2000) (hereinafter Melvern, 2000); Linda Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder. The Rwandan Genocide, p. 59 (2004) (hereinafter Melvern, 2004). 2 Melvern, 2000 p. 52; Burundi, Zaire, Senegal and Tanzania. Id. France, Belgium, Germany and the United States. Id. Britain, Canada, the Netherlands and the EU. Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History ofa Genocide (1959-1994), pp. 192-194 (1995) (hereinafter Prunier). 35 36 The Failure to Prevent Genocide in Rwanda It is argued by some that the failure ofArusha lies in the fact that extrem­ ists were not represented in the Peace Accords.6 The hardliners within the MRND and the new grouping of extremists in the Coalition pour Defense de la Republique (CDR) did not have any power within the transitional institutions. There had been difficult discussions about whether to include or exclude the CDR from the negotiations. The RPF was strictly opposed to the inclusion of the CDR saying that this party was the "fascist separation fraction ofthe MRND." France and Tanzania supported Habyarimana who was in favor ofthe inclusion ofthe CDR. According to the President, the only way to control the CDR was by having them represented in the government. Even the British and American diplomats tried to convince Paul Kagame, the leader of the RPF forces, how­ ever unsuccessfully. Some critics saw Arusha as "a conquest for the RPF;" the CDR was excluded from any position in the interim government, and the RPF Organization ofAfrican Unity (OAU) report, paragraph 8.9; Tor Sellstrom and Lennart Wohlgemuth, The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience, p. 44 (1996) (hereinafter Sellstrom); Prunier, p. 193; Melvern, 2000 p. 54; Joel Stettenheim, The Arusha Accords and the failure ofinterna­ tional intervention in Rwanda, in Words over war: Mediation and arbitration to prevent deadly conflict, p. 18 (M.C. Greenberg et al. (eds.), 2002) (hereinafter Stettenheim)..