Green Ideas for the Future of Europe In the Context of Germany's EU Council Presidency Published by Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung European Union, Brussels ' ' Green Ideas for the Future of Europe In the Context of Germany's EU Council Presidency Published by Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung European Union, Brussels Published by: Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung European Union, Rue du Luxembourg 47-51, 1050 Brussels, Belgium Contact: Zora Siebert, Head of EU Policy Programme, [email protected] Place of publication: https://eu.boell.org/, Brussels December 2020 Contributors: Dr. Jens Althoff, Katrin Altmeyer, Rasmus Andresen, Dr. Annegret Bendiek, Marc Berthold, Michael Bloss, Dr. Franziska Brantner, Reinhard Bütikofer, Anna Cavazzini, Dr. Christine Chemnitz, Florian Christl, Pieter de Pous, Karima Delli, Anna Depar- nay-Grunenberg, Bas Eickhout, Gisela Erler, Romeo Franz, Daniel Freund, Alexandra Geese, Sven Giegold, Céline Göhlich, Jörg Haas, Henrike Hahn, Martin Häusling, Heidi Hautala, Bastian Hermisson, Dr. Pierrette Herzberger-Fofana, Dr. Cornelia Hoffmann, Benedek Jávor, Dr. Ines Kappert, Walter Kaufmann, Martin Keim, Ska Keller, Dr. Lina Khatib, Alice Kuhnke, Dr. Sergey Lagodinsky, Joan Lanfranco, Katrin Langensiepen, Josephine Liebl, Hannes Lorenzen, Cornelia Maarfield, Erik Marquardt, Joanna Maycock, Alfonso Medinilla, Diego Naranjo, Dr. Hannah Neumann, Niklas Nienaß, Dr. Janka Oertel, Jutta Paulus, Michael Peters, Dr. Christine Pütz, Terry Reintke, Gert Röhrborn, Klaus Röhrig, Dr. Bente Scheller, Anna Schwarz, Dr. Daniela Schwarzer, Molly Scott Cato, Zora Siebert, Claudia Simons, Johanna Maria Stolarek, Patrick ten Brink, Petar Todorov, William Todts, Lisa Tostado, Malgorzata Tracz, Eva van de Rakt, Viola von Cramon, Richard Youngs, Clara Zeeh, Dr. Fabian Zuleeg. More publications: https://eu.boell.org/publications ISBN 978-9-46400744-2 D/2020/11.850/4 Table of Contents Foreword – Taking stock of Germany's EU Council Presidency 2020 9 1. Introduction – European Responses to Multiple Crises 15 2. The European Green Deal 2.1. Reform of EU Agriculture Policy and Biodiversity Protection 27 2.2. The European Green Deal and Digitalisation 35 2.3. The European Green Deal and the Future of Mobility 45 2.4. The European Green Deal and Gender Diversity 55 2.5. The Social Dimension of the European Green Deal 63 2.6.The European Green Deal and the Multiannual Financial Framework 71 2.7. Facing the Climate Crisis 81 3. The Future of the EU 3.1. Safeguarding the Rule of Law in EU Member States 89 3.2. Conference on the Future of Europe 99 3.3. The EU's Neighbourhood and Enlargement Policy 109 3.4. Post-Brexit: What Future for the EU-UK Relationship? 117 3.5. The EU's Digital Policy 125 4. The EU's Role in the World 4.1. EU-Africa: A Close and Intense Relationship 133 4.2. Between Cooperation and Systemic Rivalry: The EU-China Relationship 141 4.3. EU Trade Policy: More Transparency, Environmental and Climate Protection! 149 4.4. The EU Migration Policy: More Solidarity Is Needed! 157 4.5. The EU Must Speak With One Voice: Its Role in the Middle East 165 4.6. Democracy Support Outside the EU 173 4.7. The Future of Multilateralism 181 5. Policy Recommendations – Key Green Ideas for the Future of Europe 189 References 195 8 Foreword – Taking stock of Germany's EU Council Presidency 2020 Germany’s EU Council Presidency faced major challenges given the impacts of the Co- vid-19 pandemic. The pandemic overwhelmed healthcare systems and plunged the world into a deep economic crisis. Ill-coordinated measures and reactions, especially at the be- ginning of the year, have endangered European cohesion, with the pandemic showing us how fragile the EU is. The German EU Council Presidency had to shift from its original working programme to encouraging Member States to work together in solidarity and to find common ways out of the crisis. Its main success has been the adoption of the Multiannual Financial Framework for 2021-2027 (MFF) and the recovery instrument “Next Generation EU” (NGEU) in order to support Member States hit by the Covid-19 pandemic. The moderation of the process has not been an easy task at all. During the negotiations, many fault lines between the governments of the 27 Member States became visible and had to be addressed. It me- rits respect that a package of 1.8 trillion euros was adopted. Without the joint proposal for an EU recovery instrument, presented by Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel in May 2020, it would have almost certainly been impossible to reach an agreement. The fact that the European Commission, in order to finance the recovery, will borrow from the international capital markets on behalf of the EU (joint debts) and redistribute the money between the Member States is a historic step and would have been unimaginable prior to the pandemic. It has to be stressed that the role of the European Parliament was extremely important in preventing attempts by the European Council to undermine the European Commission’s proposals, especially regarding tackling the climate crisis, future-oriented EU funding programmes and safeguarding the rule of law in the EU. After months of negotiations, the European Commission, the Council and the European Parliament agreed on the introduction of a rule of law conditionality. For the first time in the history of the EU, the disbursement of EU funds is linked to compliance with the rule of law, with the aim of combating corruption and illiberal attacks on democracy and fundamental values. The conditionality mechanism, however, is not a panacea. Unfortu- nately, the Hungarian and Polish governments managed to weaken the original proposal of the European Commission by threatening to veto the MFF and NGEU. Nevertheless, it has to be emphasised that Hungary and Poland were not able to stop the conditiona- lity as such, and despite all justified criticism, the rule of law conditionality is a step in the right direction. It now has to be ensured that the compromise reached during the December 2020 Summit of the European Council will not result in the conditionality’s delayed implementation. In hindsight, the German government disappointed by not de- Foreword – Taking stock of Germany's EU Council Presidency 2020 9 monstrating leadership on the rule of law, despite declaring this topic a priority back in July 2020. The inaction of the German government during its EU Council Presidency in ongoing Article 7 proceedings against Poland and Hungary was deplorable. While Germany’s EU Council Presidency has officially always spoken in favour of the European Green Deal (EGD), a more detailed analysis shows that it has also stepped on the breaks regarding more ambitious, concrete policy proposals. During its first year, the EGD consisted mainly of non-legislative strategies, but it also included proposals for some binding measures, such as the Climate Law and the Just Transition Fund. The most prominent feature of the former is the updated greenhouse gas emissions reduction tar- get by 2030: from -40 to at least -55 percent. Yet, natural gas was embraced as a tran- sition fuel and Europe’s land use and forests were allowed to count toward the emissions reductions. A more progressive move was the exclusion of monies for fossil gas within the Just Transition Fund, which aims at providing the most affected regions with financi- al and technical assistance. Germany‘s official support for the EU Biodiversity Strategy has unfortunately not been followed by coherent actions. The need for more funding to protect and restore eco- systems, as well as a substantial restructuring of payments to farmers, have not been reflected in the German EU Council Presidency. One of the most disappointing aspects is the reform of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP), accounting for about one third of the EU budget. Loopholes for the already underfunded eco-schemes, disregard for the Farm-to-Fork and Biodiversity Strategy, and a big majority of the funding still paid per hectare with barely any strings attached, make the agreement between the Council and the European Parliament incompatible with the EGD. The MFF proposals are respecta- ble with regard to an increased spending target on climate, a first ever spending target on biodiversity, and own resources derived from environmental measures, such as a tax on unrecycled plastic, an extension of the EU‘s Emission Trading System (ETS) and a carbon border adjustment mechanism. Nevertheless, this success can be attributed to efforts stemming from the European Parliament rather than the German EU Council Presidency. The long-awaited New EU Pact on Migration and Asylum was published in September 2020. In practice, the proposal on the table does not mean an end to the dysfunctional Dublin regulation, but a continuation, and even an intensification, of it. It keeps a major focus on the externalisation of the EU’s responsibilities and external borders manage- ment. Since 2015, the question of how to organise a fair distribution of asylum seekers within the EU has caused serious conflicts. The European Commission’s vision of “fle- xible solidarity”, and especially its concept of the so-called “return sponsorships”, are unfortunately an absolute boon for governments that have been trying to block all soli- darity-based approaches for years, and who refuse to receive and welcome any refugees at all. Additionally, the European Commission is not planning to resume EU sea rescue operations in the Mediterranean. The German EU Council Presidency’s plan to achieve an agreement between all Member States on the Pact’s major lines by the end of 2020 failed. Foreword – Taking stock of Germany's EU Council Presidency 2020 10 After the US Elections in November 2020, EU institutions are hoping for a fresh start to transatlantic relations based on trust and predictability. Germany’s EU Council Pre- sidency, however, did not succeed in advancing the internal discussions on what future role the EU would like to play in order to strengthen multilateral cooperation, structu- res and organisations.