Yale University Library Digital Repository Collection Name: Henry A. Kissinger papers, part II Series Title: Series III. Post-Government Career Box: 738 Folder: 10 Folder Title: Sylvanus Thayer Award dinner, West Point, Sep 13, 2000 Persistent URL: http://yul-fi-uat1.library.yale.internal/catalog/digcoll:558816 Repository: Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library Contact Information Phone: (203) 432-1735 Email: [email protected] Mail: Manuscripts and Archives Sterling Memorial Library Sterling Memorial Library P.O. Box 208240 New Haven, CT 06520 Your use of Yale University Library Digital Repository indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use http://guides.library.yale.edu/about/policies/copyright Find additional works at: http://yul-fi-uat1.library.yale.internal Erribëaded Object Pagel •— , Thayer Award Speech, Dr Henry A. Kissinger September 13, 2000 General Christman, Distinguished Guests, Members of the Corps: I came to this country as a refugee from totalitarian oppression. When I was drafted into the United States Army, where I served for over three years before I was transferred to military intelligence, I served in the 84th Infantry Division. (And my brother, who was here as well, served in the 24" Infantry Division on Okinawa.) I always say that I landed on Omaha Beach, but I don't tell people that it was six weeks after the contested landing. Later on I was transferred into the division headquarters, in fact, in the regimental intelligence, and so I have experience at least at the fringes of combat and a little bit of combat. I served there in the Battle of the Bulge, and the advance across Germany. More important than that, the 84 Infantry Division was composed of soldiers from Wisconsin and Illinois. It was the Rail Splitter Division, and it was my introduction to the heart of America. I served for two years with these people, without whom I would never have understood what America really represents. So I owe much of what came later to the extraordinary opportunity I had of serving with an infantry division in World War II. I must also say how much it means to me that my family can be here with me -- my wife and my brother, my brother-in-law and their families, and so many of my friends who it I Embedded Object , 4_111, • -13-ag9-21 cyJ have sustained our lives. But I'd like to say a special word about two West Point graduates, for whenever people list achievements ascribed to me, their names should always be listed together with mine. When I eventually went to Washington as National Security Advisor, we had 550,000 troops in Viet Nam. Some of those who had put them there had by then joined the peace movement. We had to extricate those troops with honor in an atmosphere of public demonstrations and civil disobedience, and with almost all of the media violently opposed to the war. I mention all of this because at that time I said, "I need a combat officer on my staff, somebody who has been to Viet Nam; somebody who can explain the meaning of the various recommendations that we may or may not receive because I have then to pass on to the President an analysis of what those recommendations imply." I had the good luck that someone recommended Al Haig, who has gone on to great things on his own. But he wasn't even my deputy. He was a kind of military assistant at first, responsible for relations with the Pentagon, though he soon became my deputy, and we could not have gotten through that period without his fortitude, without his courage, and without his patriotism. Then he went off and became Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and, when Watergate descended upon us, he became Chief of Staff to President Nixon. Thereafter we had another period of the closest collaboration, which is now sometimes viciously misrepresented in books that have appeared. So I would say again, our country would not have gotten through the Watergate period if Al Haig had not been there to keep the ship of state steady and to help manage the crisis. t Embedded Object Ly-) And then, when Al left me to do great services for the country as NATO commander and then as Secretary of State, I was unbelievably fortunate in getting to know another West Point graduate, Brent Scowcroft. Brent Scowcroft was at that point, military assistant to President Nixon. It was never fully clear to me what exactly a military assistant to the President does, except to carry the war plans around in case there is an emergency. He and I had the opportunity on presidential trips to have long conversations, which showed me that he was a man of extraordinary knowledge and truly sterling character and, shall I say, having the dedication which I believe is characteristic of the men and women in the Corps of Cadets. He became my deputy, then my successor, and went on to serve as security advisor in a subsequent administration. After Watergate, we had to manage a transition of presidencies under truly tragic circumstances. Here was Gerald Ford at the helm, an un-elected president at the end of a Middle East War, at the beginning of our relationship with China, at the height of the Cold War, and meanwhile, the entire administration had to be reconstituted. Again, Brent Scowcroft's wisdom and loyalty and dedication have meant an enormous amount to our country, and have meant an enormous amount to me as his friend. I want to thank the United States Military Academy for the great national servants it has trained, men who have sustained me,from whom I have learned so much, and who have supplied a basic aspect of the structure of my life. I want to thank them both, together with my other friends here, for coming and sharing in this honor. i r-,:p000..q0. 9,0j .q page_4 „._... , 4, 1 ,•,,,,, , , ,. / _. W ..._, ,r I1P, , , ....2,,,..4 ....1_, 1 CV I have had the privilege of serving in the Army and then, as fate would have it, I was in Korea for six weeks during the Korean War in 1951. There, I visited the units and was at the front, north of Seoul. I also visited every corps area or military region in Vietnam before I became National Security Advisor, and then, of course, I visited it several times as Security Advisor. As a student of foreign policy, I have had many opportunities to reflect about the relationship of a nation's power to its objectives. We, as a country, have had a terrible time, not so much in winning our wars, but in ending our wars. Having always lived securely between two great oceans, with never a powerful neighbor, we have developed the idea that conflict is unusual. We tend to think that wars are caused by evil men or by some violation of some recognized international law, and we are embarrassed to affirm that our national interest is an objective. President Woodrow Wilson said,"we don't want a rivalry of power, but a community of power." We won in Europe in World War II, but we could not convince ourselves that the location of the front lines at the end of the war would determine the political structure of Europe for a long time to come. And when Winston Churchill called attention to that reality, we claimed that we had overcome history, that history held no lessons for America because we were going to change all the previous patterns. In World War I, we fought a war for self-determination and to make the world safe for democracy, but we wound up with a Europe that was structurally more vulnerable than the one that had begun the war; and, actually, Germany was better off strategically as a result of World War I than it had been. , Embedded Object Page 5 , ry.D Before the war it had had powerful neighbors. As a result of our ideas of the peace, it became surrounded by weak neighbors, and it was only a question of time until Germany threw off the shackles of disarmament that had been imposed upon it -- after which it was strategically stronger than before. And this pattern can be traced through all our subsequent enterprises. In the Korean War we had similar difficulty defining our objective. We began by wanting to repel aggression. Then, when we achieved victory, we decided to unify Korea; and then, when the Chinese intervened, we retreated to stalemate. But I think it ought to be a fundamental principle of American national strategy that countries that tackle us militarily must be worse off as a result of their aggression than they were before. Therefore, I believe that whatever mistakes may have been made in the aftermath of the Inchon landing, once China entered the war, MacArthur's basic judgment was correct. I remember when I visited Korea in 1951, that all our military leaders on the ground were quite convinced that if they could pursue the offensive they could have achieved a success. Instead, we stopped military operations when the negotiations started and as a result found ourselves in a stalemate. Now what does one mean by success? How far should the offensive have been pushed? Many of you know that I am a strong advocate today of cooperative relations with China, but not when we are in the middle of a war with it. And now I want to say a few words about Vietnam.