SOMALILAND: DEMOCRATISATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 28 July 2003 Africa Report N°66 Nairobi/Brussels TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................... 1 II. BRIEF HISTORY OF SOMALILAND........................................................................ 2 A. THE BRITISH SOMALILAND PROTECTORATE (1884 – 1960)...................................................2 B. THE STATE OF SOMALILAND (1960).....................................................................................4 C. INTERLUDE: DICTATORSHIP AND CIVIL WAR........................................................................5 D. THE REPUBLIC OF SOMALILAND...........................................................................................6 III. GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRATISATION .......................................................... 8 A. FACTIONAL RULE (1991-1993).............................................................................................8 B. CLAN REPRESENTATION AND CIVIL ADMINISTRATION (1993-1997) ..................................10 C. TOWARDS CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY .........................................................................12 1. The May 2001 Constitutional Referendum .............................................................12 2. Constitutional Transition: The Death of Egal..........................................................13 IV. ELECTIONS: “THE OLD WAYS DIE HARD”....................................................... 14 V. LOCAL ELECTIONS: TOWARDS DECENTRALISATION................................ 15 A. POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS...................................................................................................16 B. THE ISSUES .........................................................................................................................16 C. THE POLL ...........................................................................................................................17 D. THE RESULTS......................................................................................................................18 VI. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: THE COIN TOSS ................................................ 19 A. THE CHOICE........................................................................................................................19 1. UDUB......................................................................................................................19 2. Kulmiye ...................................................................................................................20 3. UCID........................................................................................................................21 B. THE CAMPAIGN...................................................................................................................21 C. THE POLL ...........................................................................................................................23 D. THE RESULTS......................................................................................................................24 E. RECRIMINATIONS................................................................................................................25 F. THE SUPREME COURT .........................................................................................................27 VII. SOOL AND EASTERN SANAAG REGIONS .......................................................... 28 A. SOMALILAND AND THE HARTI............................................................................................28 B. WHERE NEXT?....................................................................................................................30 VIII. COMPLETING THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION ........................................... 31 A. STRENGTHENING THE MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM ....................................................................32 B. THE CONSTITUTION ............................................................................................................32 C. HUMAN RIGHTS AND PRESS FREEDOM ...............................................................................33 IX. CONCLUSION: THE SOMALI PEACE PROCESS AND THE PROBLEM OF RECOGNITION ........................................................................................................... 34 APPENDICES A. MAJOR CLANS AND SUB CLANS OF SOMALILAND...............................................36 B. LOCAL AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS..................................................................37 C. MAP OF SOMALIA ...............................................................................................................38 D. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................39 E. ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS.................................................................................40 F. ICG BOARD MEMBERS .......................................................................................................46 ICG Africa Report N°66 28 July 2003 SOMALILAND: DEMOCRATISATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Recent developments have made the choice faced by The electoral process has met with widespread the international community considerably clearer: approval from domestic and international observers develop pragmatic responses to Somaliland’s demand alike, but has not been without problems. The for self-determination or continue to insist upon the enlistment of government resources and personnel in increasingly abstract notion of the unity and territorial support of the ruling party’s campaign, the integrity of the Somali Republic – a course of action disqualification of numerous ballot boxes due to almost certain to open a new chapter in the Somali procedural errors, reports of government harassment civil war. and intimidation of opposition supporters in the aftermath of the election, and the opposition’s initial Somaliland’s presidential election of 14 April 2003 refusal to accept defeat all marred an otherwise was a milestone in the self-declared, unrecognised promising democratic exercise. republic’s process of democratisation. Nearly half a million voters cast ballots in one of the closest polls The next phase of the democratic transition will be the ever conducted in the region: when the last votes most critical: until opposition parties are able to contest had been counted and the results announced on 19 parliamentary seats, Somaliland will function as a de April, the incumbent president, Dahir Rayale facto one party state. Somaliland’s international Kahin, had won by only 80 votes. partners can play a key role in assisting the National Electoral Commission to convene legislative elections A former British protectorate in the Horn of Africa, with the least possible delay, while ensuring a level Somaliland declared its independence from the rest playing field. Constitutional and judicial reforms may of the Somali Republic in May 1991, following the also be required to ensure the integrity of the collapse of the military regime in Mogadishu. democratic process over the long-term. Although unrecognised by any country, Somaliland has followed a very different trajectory from the Somaliland’s increasingly credible claims to rest of the “failed state” of Somalia, embarking on a statehood present the international community with a process of internally driven political, economic and thorny diplomatic dilemma at a time when southern social reconstruction. Somaliland’s democratic Somali leaders are meeting under the auspices of the transition began in May 2001 with a plebiscite on a Inter-Governmental Authority on Development new constitution that introduced a multiparty (IGAD) with the aim of establishing a new Somali electoral system, and continued in December 2002 government. Recognition of Somaliland, although with local elections that were widely described as under consideration by a growing number of African open and transparent. The final stage of the process and Western governments, is still vigorously resisted – legislative elections – is scheduled to take place by many members of both the African Union (AU) by early 2005. and the Arab League on the grounds that the unity and territorial integrity of member states is sacrosanct. Furthermore, the creation of a new Somali Somaliland: Democratisation and its Discontents ICG Africa Report N°66, 28 July 2003 Page ii government emerging from the IGAD process that 7. Undertake a comprehensive review of the claims jurisdiction over Somaliland threatens to open electoral law, based on lessons learned. a new phase in the Somali conflict. 8. Introduce legislation to strengthen the Diplomatic hopes for a negotiated settlement between electoral process, including penalties for Somaliland and a future Somali government, infractions of the electoral law. however, are unlikely to bear fruit. A hypothetical 9. Commission an independent judicial review, dialogue on Somali unity would have to overcome with a view to introducing reforms mutually exclusive preconditions for talks, divergent strengthening both the capacity of the visions of what a reunited Somali state might look judiciary and its independence from political like and incompatible institutional arrangements. influence. Failing a negotiated settlement, any attempt to coerce