NORDIC ARMS TRANSFER CONTROLS AND THE ARMS TRADE TREatY: STRENGTHS AND CHALLENGES ELLI KYTÖMÄKI 1 SAFERGLOBE taBLE OF CONTENTS SaferGlobe is an independent Finnish peace and security research network. The network, which consists of around 50 members from different academic disciplines, seeks to find 04 INTRODUCTION and elaborate new perspectives for the world's security problems. It conducts research and 06 PART I - BACKGROUND TO ARMS TRANSFER CONTROLS IN THE NORDIC COUNTRIES offers expert services in a wide range of topical areas in the field of peace and security. SaferGlobe has published almost twenty 07 HistoRY reports, many of which have been recognized 08 NORDIC DEFENCE INDUSTRIES also in the Finnish or international media. 09 FIGURES OF ANNUAL EXPORTS FROM THE NORDIC COUNTRIES 13 PaRTICIPation IN EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES 14 SUPPORT to THE ATT negotiations AND TReatY IMPlementation Ms. ELLI KYTÖMÄKI 18 PART II - NORMatIVE AND STRUCTURAL FRAMEWORK Elli Kytömäki is an independent policy analyst and SaferGlobe researcher working on 19 ReleVANT legislation disarmament and arms control issues, most 23 ResPONSIBLE agencies AUTHOR notably conventional arms control and nuclear Elli Kytömäki non-proliferation. She is also Associate Fellow 28 Defining PRODUCTS, actiVITIES AND RECIPIENTS at Chatham House (UK) and the United Nations 29 ReciPIENTS OF NORDIC DEFENCE mateRIAL LAYOUT Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR, 30 TYPES OF actiVITIES AND LICENSES Mert Sasioglu Switzerland). 33 LICENSING PARTS AND COMPONENTS 34 ReVOKING APPROVED LICENCES Prior to starting her own consultancy, Ms. Kytömäki 36 COORDination AND OUTReach PUBLISHER worked as a Project Manager at UNIDIR, where SaferGlobe she was in charge of activities to support the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) negotiations. In 2006- 38 PART III – CURRENT PRACTICES IN SELECTED KEY AREAS PRINTING 2009, Ms. Kytömäki was a politico-military Kopio Niini Oy officer at the Organization for Security and 39 RecoRD-KEEPING AND TRANSPARENCY Höyläämötie 2 Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). She worked at 42 CONTROLLING IMPORTS UNIDIR also prior to 2006, specializing in small 43 BROKERS AND BROKERING actiVITIES 00380 HELSINKI arms and explosive remnants of war. During her 2015 career, Ms. Kytömäki has also worked at the 44 TRANSIT AND TRANS-SHIPMENT research institute Small Arms Survey, the UN 44 CONTROLLING RE-TRANSFERS: Notifications AND END-USE GUARANTEES PHOTOS Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian United Nations Affairs (OCHA), and the Permanent Mission of 52 PART IV – CONCLUSIONS: NORDIC STRENGTHS AND CHALLENGES The Nordic Council Finland to the UN Conference on Disarmament. She has authored several articles and papers 57 Notes on conventional arms trade and nuclear policy and eagerly follows international developments 60 BiBLIOGRAPHY in these areas. This publication is funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland 2 3 defence industry, especially in terms of con- In selected sections the report presents brief ventional arms and equipment.5 It also dis- practical case studies to illustrate the strengths cusses the participation of Nordic countries in and weaknesses of different aspects of Nor- various multilateral export control regimes and dic transfer controls. The report concludes with support of the ATT. a collection of findings and recommendations INTRODUCTION relevant to both general aspects of ATT im- The second part presents the ATT-related leg- plementation and some specific challenges po- islation that is relevant in the Nordic countries tentially related to it, stemming from the body and discusses some of the general elements es- text. sential in its effective implementation, including the relevant national authorities and their co- The report demonstrates that despite having operation, licensing procedures and the cate- comprehensive and sophisticated arms trans- gorization of items and activities falling under fer control systems in place, even the Nordic the ATT. export controls have potential areas of weak- ness that, if exploited, could enable weapons, The report places special emphasis on the defi- ammunition and parts and components manu- nition and practical implementation of transit, factured in these countries to be diverted or re-transfer and end-use regulations, including retransferred to areas of war or conflict, or addressing the risk of diversion. These are ar- to recipients that might use them to commit se- A legitimate and lucrative area of international As the ATT enters into its second year, more eas that remain challenging even in countries rious violations of human rights. It argues that business, the production and trade in defence research will be needed both on countries’ that have well-established transfer control sys- constant review and development of both the material requires careful controls and constant strengths and on the practical challenges in im- tems, and can have devastating consequences regulative framework and actual practices is monitoring in order to avoid the many poten- plementing the Treaty, both nationally and in on the ground. Transparency – already ex- required in order to ensure continued and im- tially devastating consequences of a poorly terms of promoting international compliance. ercised at relatively high levels in the Nordic proved implementation of the ATT and overall controlled and illicit arms trade. With the arms countries – is also one of the central themes responsible, transparent and comprehensive trade becoming increasingly globalized, it is This report presents the legislative framework in the report and its findings. These specific controls over the international legal trade in more and more difficult for individual states to of Nordic conventional arms transfer controls2 themes are discussed in the report’s third part. conventional arms. exercise the necessary controls and to effec- and discusses some practical measures taken tively monitor the production and transfers of by Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden3 to their weapons and equipment. Global activi- implement effective export controls over these ties require global standards. weapons. It is part of a project funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland and im- On Christmas Eve, 24 December 2014, the plemented between December 2014 and June landscape of arms transfer controls gained an 2015 to compare the arms transfer control important addition with the entry into force of structures of four Nordic countries. By analyz- the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT, in the text also ing the respective structures and practices, the referred to as “the Treaty”), the first interna- report aims at identifying good practices and tional, globally binding treaty to control the makes recommendations regarding some of transfers of conventional arms.1 The Nordic the challenging aspects of the ATT’s implemen- countries of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Nor- tation. Information in the report is based on way and Sweden were among the most active interviews with officials from the Nordic coun- supporters of the Treaty and were among the tries conducted in March-May 2015, together first to join it. They also remain committed to with a range of background material, includ- promoting the active implementation and uni- ing relevant national laws and regulations, in- versalization of the Treaty, and the experience cluded in the bibliography.4 gained by them in developing and undertak- ing arms transfer controls can undoubtedly The first part of the report presents a brief provide valuable lessons learned and good history of Nordic defence policies and coop- practices to be internationally utilized. eration and gives an overview of the region’s 4 5 The Nordic countries are often seen as a ho- ism’8 became an increasingly important factor mogenous group, having partially undergone in Nordic culture and politics. similar social and political developments. How- ever, they each have their unique history and When the large European countries fought distinct national characteristics which have each other as part of the two World Wars, shaped their national defence policies: Den- and the Cold War that followed divided the mark and Norway are long-standing members continent with an iron curtain, the Nordic coun- of NATO, while Finland and Sweden have re- tries took somewhat divergent paths in devel- mained non-aligned and built their doctrine oping their security and defence needs. A key paRT I around ‘total defence’.6 Denmark, Finland and feature for all was some level of neutrality, Sweden are members of the EU and – with the however with national specificities and individ- exception of Denmark – implement the Euro- ual characteristics. In the 1960s, they started pean Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). De- implementing what has been referred to as BACKGROUND TO ARMS spite their differences, the Nordic states have the ‘Nordic balance’: a combination of poli- for decades systematically built their security cies aimed at preserving a balance between TRANSFER CONTROLS IN and defence cooperation – a trend that today the two superpowers while maintaining strong THE NORDIC COUNTRIES is possibly stronger than before.7 national defence, even with Norway and Den- mark as members of NATO.9 For much of the All Nordic countries have indigenous nation- 20th century, emphasis was placed on forming al defence industries, albeit of very different and maintaining strong national armed forces magnitudes, and have over the decades de- based on conscription, which in turn required veloped comprehensive