MY LIFE AND ACTS IN HUNGARY IN THE YEARS 1848 AND 1849. BY ARTHUR GÖRGEI. VOLUME II. LONDON: DAVID BOGUE, FLEET STREET. MDCCCLII. CONTENTS OF VOL. II. CHAPTER I. PAGE Retrospective glance at my helpless situation as commander of the army, after the first news of the declaration of independence. How events assisted me. Situation at that moment, and my pro- clamation of Komorn ........................................................................... 1 CHAPTER II. The theatre of war after the 26th of April. Instead of the unin- terrupted prosecution, as at first intended, of our offensive operations against the hostile main army, the siege of the fortress of Ofen comes into the fore-ground................................................................ .............. 12 CHAPTER III. My appointment as war-minister. Damjanics becomes unfit for service. Klapka leaves the main army in order to act as my sub- stitute in the war-ministry. Changes in the army ………………… 24 CHAPTER IV. Pöltenberg occupies Raab. The main body of the army invests Ofen. The range of the investment. The fortress of Ofen. The disposition of our batteries. The over-hasty attack. Its cessation. My letter to Major-general Hentzi. His answer. A letter from Klapka, in which he dissuades from the operation against Ofen . 27 VI CHAPTER V. PAGE The siege of Ofen ................................................................................. 38 CHAPTER VI. Criticism on the siege and defence of Ofen……………………………...56 CHAPTER VII. The events of the war on the upper Waag. Condition of affairs in the district of the operations of the main army at the time of the taking of Ofen. Klapka's plan of defensive operations, and my dis- position of the troops, immediately after the taking of Ofen …………60 CHAPTER VIII. A meeting between General Klapka and myself. Its conse- quences. I refuse the distinctions which the Diet had intended for me, and in consequence of this enter into communication with the parliamentary opponents of the declaration of independence……….. 65 CHAPTER IX. Account of the circumstances which, on the one hand, bound me to the chief command of the army, and on the other hand deter- mined me to undertake personally the management of the ministry of war. Plan for the offensive against the Austrians. Origin of the central office of operations ................................................................... 74 CHAPTER X. My meeting with members of the peace-party in Debreczin………….79 CHAPTER XI. Kossuth and the declaration of independence. My relation to Kossuth after the 14th of April 1849 .................................................... 87 CHAPTER XII. The seat of the government, notwithstanding my counter-repre- VII sentations, transferred from Debreczin to Pesth. Commencement of my activity against the existence of the declaration of independ- ence. Two captured Honvéd officers executed by order of the new commander-in-chief of the Austrian army, Baron Haynau……………..91 CHAPTER XIII. Significance and consequences of the executions mentioned in the preceding chapter. Continuation of my endeavours hostile to the existence of the act of independence. The final aim of these endea- vours. The peculiarity of my relation to the peace-party, to Szemere, to Kossuth. Supplementary facts from my duties as war-minister…….. 97 CHAPTER XIV. Events on the theatre of war of the Hungarian main army from the taking of Ofen till the middle of June. Reciprocal position of the Hungarian and Austrian main armies at that time. My suppositions about the enemy's plan of operations. Uncertainty as to the strength and the serious commencement of the Russian intervention. The influence of this uncertainty on my resolves as commander-in-chief of the army. The causes of the delay of our offensive. Dispositions for the retreat and other preparations in the event of a serious com- mencement of the Russian intervention ............................................. 107 CHAPTER XV. The opening of our offensive against the Austrians (on the 16th of June) miscarries. I fix the 20th of June for a second more ener- getic attempt at the offensive. General Klapka dissuades from it, and proposes again instead his plan of defensive operations, but in vain ....................................................................................................... 119 CHAPTER XVI. The events of the war on the 20th, 21st, and 22d of June …………….126 VIII CHAPTER XVII. PAGE The first news of the serious commencement of the Russian inter- vention. Their confirmation, and influence on my resolutions. The ministerial council of the 26th of June. Loss of Raab (28th June). Retreat into the fortified camp at Komorn ............................................ 156 CHAPTER XVIII. Differences between the government and myself……………………... 172 CHAPTER XIX. The 2d of July ...................................................................................... 180 CHAPTER XX. The last days at Komorn ....................................................................... 202 CHAPTER XXI. A part of the main army leaves Komorn. Retreat as far as Waizen. First encounter with outposts of the Russian main army. Battle at Waizen (15th of July). Not able to improve the advan- tages gained by it, and informed that the Russian main army was immediately opposite us, I determine on turning the latter by Mis- kolcz. Reasons for this choice. Necessity of gaining on the new line of retreat a considerable advance on the Russian main army. The only means of attaining it, the nightly retreat from the position before Waizen, is ordered for the night between the 16th and 17th of July. Unexpected interruption. The hostile surprise very early in the morning of the 17th of July. General Leiningen nevertheless enables the army to depart. Rear-guard combat on the Waizen mountain, before Rétság and at this place. Continuation of the retreat on the 17th of July as far as Vadkert. Commencement of the further retreat on the 18th towards Balassa-Gyarmat……………….238 IX CHAPTER XXII. PAGE Events of the war from the 18th to the 20th of July. Our con- jectures at that time about the plan of the enemy's operations. Their influence on the employment of the divers army corps. Dispositions for the march on the 21st of July .................................................. 263 CHAPTER XXIII. The first Russian trumpets in the camp of the army under my command. Immediate consequences of this event…………………270 CHAPTER XXIV. Continuation of the operation of breaking through towards Mis- kolcz. Drawing up of the army on the left bank of the Sajó. Situa- tion of the army at that time. Encounter of outposts at Harsány on the 23d of July. Dispositions for the 24th………………………282 CHAPTER XXV. A letter of the Russian General Count Rüdiger. My answer. What occurred to it. Exchange of arms between Lieut.-General Sass and myself .................................................................................... 291 CHAPTER XXVI. Combat at Gö'römböly on the 24th of July. Battle on the Sajó on the 25th. Retreat from the Sajó to the left bank of the Hernád. My determination to remain on the Hernád. Motives for it ……….. 295 CHAPTER XXVII. Kossuth censures my answer to the Russian commander-in-chief. Particular motives which determine me to receive this censure in silence. The real object of a letter to General Klapka. Conditions for a favourable turn of affairs in the south of Hungary. I advise Kossuth to remove Dembinski from the chief command. Kossuth assents, and intends himself to take the chief command. A pro- jected rendezvous with Kossuth does not take place…………………..305 X. CHAPTER XXVIII. PAGE The Russians cross the Theiss at Tiszafüred. Our strategic situa- tion on the Hernád. A new Russian corps enters on the scene of war. Combat at Gesztely on the 28th of July. Commencement of the retreat from the Hernád in the night between the 28th and 29th. News about the movement of the Russians from Tiszafüred. Divi- sion of the army into two columns (at Nyíregyháza). Dispositions of the march for the combined retreat. Explanations of them; and instructions for the leader of the secondary column. Conflict be- tween the latter and the Russians at Debreczin on the 2d of August. The situation of the principal column (the main body of the army) during this conflict and immediately after it. Retreat as far as Gross- Wardein. General Nagy-Sándor's culpability, and my seeming indulgence towards him. The consequences of the 2d of August at Debreczin, and their influence on the further dispositions. Uninter- rupted continuation of the retreat from Gross-Wardein to Arad………….310 CHAPTER XXIX. Supplementary account of divers circumstances, rumours, and events, from the time of the retreat from the Hernád to Arad…………….331 CHAPTER XXX. The next war-operations, and Lieut.-General Dembinski's retreat from Szöreg to Temesvár. General Nagy-Sándor on his march from Arad to Temesvár attacked and forced back to Arad. The last ministerial council of the 10th of August 1849……………………………35i CHAPTER XXXI. The provisional government and the negotiations with Russia. Tendency of my taking part in the latter ............................................... 371 CHAPTER XXXII. My last meeting with Kossuth. Count Guyon reports that Dem- binski's army has been scattered at Temesvár. I call upon Kossuth XI. PAGE to resign. He nominates me commander-in-chief. Csányi induces the governor to resign. Kossuth's last proclamation to the nation. Answer of the Russians to our invitation to negotiate. I propose an unconditional