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Hypatia, Inc. and Wiley are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Hypatia. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded on Tue, 22 Jan 2013 13:58:12 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions An Alternativeto Pacifism? Feminismand Just-War Theory LUCINDA J. PEACH Only rarelyhave feminist theorists addressed the adequacyof just-wartheory, a set of principlesdeveloped over hundreds of yearsto assessthe justice of goingto war and the moralityof conductin war. Recently,a few feministscholars have found just-wartheory inadequate, yet theirown counterproposals are also deficient. I assess feministcontributions to just-war theorizing and suggest ways of strengthening,rather thanabandoning, this moral approach to war. INTRODUCTION Womenhave traditionallybeen excludedfrom involvement in war.War has been consideredalmost exclusively a male enterprise:fought by men, with and againstother men, for male-definedpurposes and ends. Culturally,traditional ideasabout gender roles identifymen with warand soldiering,and women with peace and mothering. Women remain largelyabsent from ethical and policy debatesregarding when to go to war,how to fight a war,and whether resorting to war is morallyjustifiable. In recent years,several feminists have challenged this traditional genderizeddichotomy between war and peace, as well as the validity of the male-conceived theories that assessthe moralityof war.In this paper,I evaluate feminist criticismsof one of these male-generatedtheories, that of just-war.1 After having no discernibleimpact on foreignpolicy analysisof any armed conflict for many years,just-war theory suddenlygained national prominence and recognition in relation to the Persian Gulf War. The theory developed over many centuries in Christian theology and internationallaw into a set of criteriadesigned to determinewhen, and to what extent, limited participation in armedconflict maybe moral.Just-war theorists generally share with pacifists a basicpresumption opposing war as morallywrong (see Miller 1991, 117;Cady 1989). However,whereas pacifist perspectives share a firm belief that war is Hypatiavol. 9, no. 2 (Spring 1994) © by LucindaJ. Peach This content downloaded on Tue, 22 Jan 2013 13:58:12 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions LucindaJ. Peach 153 never a moral means to achieve potentially just goals, those subscribingto just-wartheory are open to being persuadedthat war may be morallyjustified in certain circumstances.Both of these positions contrast with the views of "warists"or "warrealists," who considermorality to be irrelevant,inapplicable, or ineffective in relation to war (see Cady 1989, xi-xii).2 In our gender-struc- tured society, warism has been the culturally dominant and presumptively correct view (see Cady 1989, chap. 1). There are undoubtedlymyriad problems with attemptingto generalizea "fem- inist perspective"about just-wartheory, given the varietyof differentfeminist perspectivesabout the moralityof war.Popular conception and actualpractice alike align women with peace and pacifism,not with a positionthat acceptswar as potentiallymoral. For example,women have been and continue to be more actively involved than men in peace movements.3Recent public opinion polls indicatethat women aremore oriented to peacefulresolution of disputesthan are men, reflectingan average15 to 20 percent"gender gap" on the issueof military involvement and the use of force (see Gallagher1993; Branscombeand Owen 1993;Baxter and Lansing1983, 56-57, 196).4Women's social protest movements have achievedsignificant political leverage from their identification as "naturally" more peacefulthan men, basedon their relationshipto childbearingand child- rearing(see Ruddick1989; Pierson 1988; Swerdlow 1989). But despite the historical and ideological alignmentsbetween women (and feminists) and peace, not all women, even feminist women, are pacifists.5 Political scientist Jean Bethke Elshtain,for instance, expresslydenies that she is a pacifist, arguing that some wars have been necessary and that it is not possible to transcend "collective violence in defense of the state" (Elshtain 1987, 257). Feminist theorist Sara Ruddickaligns herself more with pacifism, especially in denouncing just-wartheory for its legitimation of certain forms of violence. However, she argues that "threatenedpeoples [may] not have alternative nonviolent ways of protecting what they love and getting what they need" (Ruddick 1989, 139). Ruddickand Elshtainagree with St. Augus- tine, an early Christian Church Fatherwho is consideredto be the "founder" of just-wartheory within the Christian tradition (see Kehoe 1986, 156), that war may be an element necessaryto peace, rather than completely separate from it (Ruddick 1989, 137; Elshtain 1987, 253). Even those women who do characterizethemselves as pacifists may have radically diverse reasons for doing so, some of them drawing on just-war reasoning (see Cady 1989, chap. 4; Miller 1991, 104-05). Further, as Elshtain discusses, the notion of women's innate or natural orientation to peace and pacifism needs to be questioned as a product of a gender system that serves to maintain men as strong warriorsand women as weak and passive peacemakers, thereby perpetuating war rather than bringing peace. These factors suggest that a feminist appraisalof the just-wartheory is an importantcomponent of feminist theorizingabout war and peace. This content downloaded on Tue, 22 Jan 2013 13:58:12 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 154 Hypatia Only a few feminist scholarshave yet explicitly addressedjust-war theory. Nonetheless, there have been a few significant feminist critiques of various elements found in just-warthinking. Forexample, Elshtainand Ruddickhave both pointed to some specific deficiencies with traditionaljust-war thinking and have proposedalternative frameworksfor analyzingthe morality of war. In this article, I arguethat manyof the feministcriticisms that have been waged againsttraditional just-war theory are well taken.Notwithstanding the validity of these "deconstructive"efforts, however, to date no adequateconstructive feminist alternative has been proposed. Rather than reject and/or replace traditionaljust-war theory, I argue,feminist principles and insights can and should provide a much needed reconceptualizationand revitalizationof the applicationof just-warcriteria. I begin with a brief backgroundof just-wartheory, including three classic contrastingapproaches: those of Augustine, Reinhold Niebuhr,a mid-twenti- eth-century Protestanttheologian, and Michael Walzer,a contemporarysec- ular social and political theorist. Although by no means exhaustive of the complete spectrumof just-warideas, these three views do exemplify some of the more significant strands and influences, both theological and secular, historical and contemporary,of the tradition. I then discuss significant ways in which traditionaljust-war thinking is deficientfrom a feministperspective. I use Elshtain'sand Ruddick'salterative approachesto the moralityof war to illustratehow feministefforts to replacejust-war theory have been inadequatethus far.In the finalpart of the article,I outlinehow feministperspectives and insights can providea frameworkfor revitalizingthe applicationof just-wartheory. THE JUST-WARTRADITION The manyvariants of just-wartheory which have been developedover the past millenniumdiffer in the specificcriteria used to determinethe moralityof war (both in generaland in relationto particularconflicts), the burdenof evidence necessaryto satisfythose criteria,and the relation between criteriaand their relative weight.6Nonetheless, there is generalagreement that just-waranalysis entails two sets of criteria:one govering the moralityof goingto war (the jus ad bellum),the otherthe actualconduct ofwar (the jus in bello). There is alsosignificant agreementthat the jus ad bellumcriteria include some or all of the following: 1. a just cause (self-defenseor defense of others); 2. right authority(determination to go to war is made by the appropriate governing officials); 3. right intention (must be to reestablishpeace); 4. proportionality(between meansemployed in fightingand ends or goals to be achieved); This content downloaded on Tue, 22 Jan 2013 13:58:12 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions LucindaJ. Peach 155 5. relative justice (in acknowledging that no participant in war has absolutejustice on their side); 6. last resort (all other alternatives for conflict resolution have been exhausted); and 7. a reasonablehope for success. There is also substantialconsensus that the jus in bellocriteria require: 1. "discrimination"between combatants and noncombatants and the permissibilityof