View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Archive of European Integration READINGS IN EUROPEAN SECURITY VOLUME 3 CHAIRMAN: FRANÇOIS HEISBOURG EDITORS: DANA H. ALLIN & MICHAEL EMERSON CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES BRUSSELS INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES LONDON This volume of Readings in European Security contains the papers commissioned for presentation and discussion at the meetings of the CEPS- IISS European Security Forum (ESF) in the period from January 2003 to June 2005. They have been previously published in the European Security Forum Working Paper series, Nos. 16-20. CEPS and IISS gratefully acknowledge financial support received for the European Security Forum from the Compagnia di San Paolo, the US Mission to the EU and NATO. ISBN 92-9079-590-5 © Copyright 2005, Centre for European Policy Studies & International Institute for Security Studies. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means – electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise – without the prior permission of the Centre for European Policy Studies or the International Institute for Security Studies. Centre for European Policy Studies International Institute for Strategic Studies Place du Congrès 1 Arundel House 1000 Brussels, Belgium 13-15 Arundel Street, Temple Place Tel: 32 (0) 2 229.39.11 London WC2R 3DX, United Kingdom Fax: 32 (0) 2 229.39.72 Tel: 44 (0) 20 7379 7676 E-mail: [email protected] Fax: 44 (0) 20 7836 3108 Website: http://www.ceps.be E-mail: [email protected] Website: http://www.iiss.org READINGS IN EUROPEAN SECURITY VOLUME 3 CONTRIBUTORS DIDIER BIGO PETER BROOKES PATRICK CLAWSON MICHAEL EMERSON ANDREI FEDOROV FRANÇOIS HEISBOURG IRINA KOBRINSKAYA EUGENE B. RUMER JACQUES RUPNIK VLADIMIR SAZHIN DANIEL SERWER JEREMY SHAPIRO BORIS SHMELEV BRUNO TERTRAIS ALEXEI D. VOSKRESSENSKI Contents FOREWORD FRANÇOIS HEISBOURG i RUSSIA AND THE WEST FROM AN AWKWARD PARTNERSHIP TO A GREATER EUROPE A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE MICHAEL EMERSON 1 NEW CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE US AND THE EU IN THE 21ST CENTURY AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE EUGENE B. RUMER 20 RUSSIA AND THE WEST A RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE IRINA KOBRINSKAYA 31 EUROPEAN HOMELAND SECURITY POST-MARCH 11TH AND TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS INTRODUCTION FRANÇOIS HEISBOURG 40 LES POLITIQUES ANTITERRORISTES APRES LES ATTENTATS DE MARS 2002 – UN PROGRES DANS LA COLLABORATION UN PERSPECTIVE EUROPEEN DIDIER BIGO 44 DOMESTIC DILEMMAS: US HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY AND TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE JEREMY SHAPIRO 55 HOMELAND SECURITY – RUSSIA’S CHALLENGES A RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE ANDREI FEDOROV 67 A EUROPEAN BALKANS? INTRODUCTION FRANÇOIS HEISBOURG 74 EUROPE’S CHALLENGES IN THE BALKANS A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE JACQUES RUPNIK 78 KOSOVO WON’T WAIT AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE DANIEL SERWER 82 THE BALKANS: POWDER KEG OF EUROPE OR ZONE OF PEACE AND STABILITY A RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE BORIS SHMELEV 90 THE RISE OF CHINA WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ARMS SUPPLIES EUROPE AND THE EMERGENCE OF CHINA: CONSEQUENCES FOR THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE BRUNO TERTRAIS 99 THE LIFTING OF THE EU ARMS EMBARGO ON CHINA AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE PETER BROOKES 103 THE RISE OF CHINA AND ITS MEANING FOR THE STRUCTURE OF st GLOBAL LEADERSHIP IN THE 21 CENTURY A RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE ALEXEI D. VOSKRESSENSKI 107 IRAN: THE MOMENT OF TRUTH IRAN: THE MOMENT OF TRUTH A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE FRANÇOIS HEISBOURG 123 INFLUENCE, DETER AND CONTAIN – THE MIDDLE PATH FOR RESPONDING TO IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAMME AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE PATRICK CLAWSON 131 IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAMME A RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE VLADIMIR SAZHIN 137 ABOUT THE CHAIRMAN AND EDITORS 149 Foreword This new volume of Readings in European Security comes at a time when the European Union has entered a protracted period of crisis, in the wake of the ‘voters’ revolt’ that took place in France and the Netherlands in the spring of 2005. This new development in itself constitutes a substantial change in the conditions of European Security: the period during which an ever-enlarging Union was at the same time developing its ability to produce a foreign and security policy in its own right has been replaced by a situation in which enlargement will, at the very least, slow down, while the major changes contained in the Constitutional Treaty in the field of external relations are put on hold. This state of affairs will materially affect the EU’s own security, notably in the Balkans, while limiting its prospects as a major actor on the world scene, not least because the EU’s political energy will be focused more than ever on its internal problems. This will in turn have knock-on effects, positive and negative, on the interests of outside actors, notably the US and Russia but also further afield – such as those of China and India as emerging great powers or the troubled regions of Africa and the Middle East. A divided, inward-looking Europe will be a less-interesting partner for allies like the US or for friends in need, such as Africa, as well as those seeking ‘multipolar’ support, e.g. China. But such a Europe will also be less of a problem for partners pursuing their own goals (as in the case of transatlantic divergences on the lifting of the EU’s arms embargo vis-à- vis China) and will present an easier target for countries seeking to improve their hand in a bilateral relationship with the EU, as in the case of Russia. That such events should be unfolding need not come as a surprise – after all, during the last 20 years, bigger changes have affected just about every player on the international scene, to the point of eliminating some entirely (the Soviet empire) or transforming others beyond recognition (NATO). That the EU should be entering into a period of turmoil is not in itself an anomaly, but a challenge that has to be taken in stride. Indeed, the issues affecting European security are no less relevant in the current EU environment. Even when in disarray, the EU has a degree of institutional inertia and covers a field of competence so great, that its own responses – even if they were to occur by default (as in the case of not deciding to lift the arms embargo towards China) – continue to have great importance for itself and quite often no less (and sometimes even more) for others. | i ii | READINGS IN EUROPEAN SECURITY Thus, Russia’s relationship with the West (as covered in the papers from the European Security Forum (ESF) session of 22 March 2004) will continue to hinge to no small extent on the state of the EU and its decisions (or lack of decisions). The EU’s crisis may have made the corresponding problems more difficult to handle, but neither less acute nor less important. European homeland security and transatlantic relations (ESF session of 7 June 2004) is unfortunately more relevant than ever, with North America and the EU intertwined in the world’s tightest network of economic and societal relations. The manner in which the EU puts its counter-terrorism act together is of substantive and direct importance to US homeland security, and US-EU counter-terrorism relations are essential to all. Russia’s management or mismanagement of its own homeland security challenges merges with its broader relationship with both the EU and the US. What was true in the aftermath of the 11 March 2004 bombings in Madrid is no less true today. Meanwhile, the question of a ‘European Balkans’ (ESF session of 25 October 2004) has become even weightier as result of the crisis of EU enlargement after the French and Dutch referenda. The ESF session on this topic emphasised the absolutely vital nature of prospective EU membership as a source for security in both the Balkans and the EU. Out of the otherwise catastrophic meeting of the European Council on 16-17 June 2005 arose at least one wise decision – that of restating the ‘vocation européenne’ of the Western Balkans, affirmed in Thessaloniki two years earlier. The rise of China with special reference to arms supplies (ESF session of 31 January 2005) illustrates the challenge that will gain even greater salience as a determining factor of the organisation of the international system in general, and of Euro-American relations in particular. If Europe’s descent into a ‘default mode’ has some short-term benefits in terms of defusing the emerging arms embargo issue, in the long run, the conduct of a proactive strategic dialogue between the US and China remains in the general interest. The chapter concerning “Iran’s Moment of Truth” (ESF session of 13 June 2005) analyses an issue of no less importance, particularly in the short term. Indeed, this is an arena in which, since the autumn of 2003, the EU-3–Iran negotiation has been quite literally the only game in town. No ‘default mode’ has occurred in this regard, and mercifully so, given the unpalatable nature of whatever alternatives may be conjured up. It is on this particular issue that much of the future of US-ES security FOREWORD | iii relations rest. This is true today as it was before the current EU crisis. What is new is that the decisions of the EU-3 vis-à-vis Iran have also become crucial to the ability of the EU to affirm itself as a major player, with or without a duly ratified Constitutional Treaty. If the ‘proof of the pudding is in the eating’, it can be said that the demonstration of the EU’s role as an international actor rests in large part on the manner in which it collectively handles the Iranian affair, with the EU-3 acting by proxy for all.