Missile Developments BALLISTIC, CRUISE MISSILE, AND MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS: TRADE AND SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS, JULY-OCTOBER 1996 CONTENTS AFGHANISTAN CHINA Ukraine, 143 ISRAEL with: Internal Developments, 140 United States, 144 Internal Developments, 152 Pakistan, 138 with: with: GREECE India and Pakistan, 141 China, 141 AFRICA with: Iran, 141 India, 147 with: United States, 144 Israel, 141 Iran, Lebanon, and Syria, 149 Ukraine, 138 Pakistan, 141 HUNGARY Iraq, 152 AUSTRALIA Russia and Ukraine, 141 Internal Developments, 144 Syria, 153 with: United States, 142 Turkey, 153 INDIA Russia and Thailand, 138 United Kingdom, 153 CYPRUS Internal Developments, 144 United States, 138 United States, 153 with: with: BELARUS Russia, United Kingdom, and Canada, 140 ITALY with: United States, 142 China and Pakistan, 141 with: Russia, 138 Israel, 147 Germany, Netherlands, CZECH REPUBLIC Russia, 148 Turkey, and United BOSNIA Internal Developments, 142 Slovakia, 148 States, 143 Internal Developments, 139 EGYPT IRAN JAPAN BRAZIL with: Internal Developments, 148 with: Internal Developments, 139 Russia, 142 with: United States, 155 with: United States, 142 China, 141 Russia and United States, 139 KUWAIT FINLAND Israel, Lebanon, and United States, 140 with: with: Syria, 149 United States, 155 BULGARIA Russia, 143 North Korea, 149 with: North Korea and United LEBANON FRANCE Russia and United States, States, 149 with: with: 140 Russia, 149 Israel, Iran, and Syria, 149 Russia, 143 CANADA IRAQ MALAYSIA GERMANY with: Internal Developments, 150 with: with: India, 140 with: Turkey, 156 Italy, Netherlands, Turkey, and Israel, 152 United States, 143 134 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 Missile Developments MISSILE TECHNOLOGY Norway, Ukraine, and United UNITED ARAB EMIRATES CONTROL REGIME States, 157 with: (MTCR) Singapore, 160 Russia, 160 DEVELOPMENTS, 156 United Arab Emirates, 160 UNITED KINGDOM United States, 160 NETHERLANDS with: with: SINGAPORE Cyprus, Russia, and United Germany, Italy, Turkey, and with: States, 142 United States, 143 Russia, 160 Israel, 153 MTCR, 156 NORTH ATLANTIC SLOVAKIA TREATY ORGANIZATION with: UNITED STATES (NATO) India, 148 Internal Developments, 163 with: with: SOUTH KOREA Russia, 157 Australia, 138 Internal Developments, 161 Brazil, 140 NORTH KOREA SYRIA Brazil and Russia, 139 Internal Developments, 157 with: Bulgaria and Russia, 140 with: Israel, 153 China, 142 Iran, 149 Israel, Iran, and Cyprus, Russia, and United Iran and United States, 149 Lebanon, 149 Kingdom, 142 Pakistan and Taiwan, 157 North Korea, 157 Egypt, 142 Syria, 157 Germany, 144 TAIWAN NORWAY Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Internal Developments, 161 with: and Turkey, 143 with: Russia, Ukraine, and United Greece, 144 North Korea and States, 157 Iran and North Korea, 149 Pakistan, 157 Israel, 153 PAKISTAN United States, 161 Japan, 155 with: THAILAND Kuwait, 155 Afghanistan, 138 with: MTCR, 156 China, 141 Australia and Russia, 138 Norway, Russia, and India and China, 141 Ukraine, 157 North Korea and Taiwan, 157 TURKEY Russia, 160 with: RUSSIA Taiwan, 161 Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Internal Developments, 158 Turkey, 162 and United States, 143 with: Ukraine, 162 Israel, 153 Australia and Thailand, 138 Malaysia, 156 WASSENAAR ARRANGE- Belarus, 138-139 United States, 162 MENT, 163 Brazil and United States, 139 Bulgaria and United UKRAINE States, 140 Internal Developments, 162 China and Ukraine, 141 with: Cyprus, United Kingdom, Africa, 138 and United States, 142 China and Russia, 141 Egypt, 142 Germany, 143 Finland, 143 MTCR, 156 France, 143 Norway, Russia, and United India, 148 States, 157 Iran, 149 United States, 162 NATO, 157 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 135 Missile Developments OVERVIEW During the July-October 1996 period, United Nations and equipment from China to build an M-11 missile factory Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspectors were yet again in Tarwanah, and there were conflicting reports as to whether prevented from examining sites suspected of containing in- the facility will be capable of producing complete missile formation and materials associated with Iraq’s prohibited systems or just their components. Construction of the facil- ballistic missile program. In July, it was feared that prohib- ity began in 1995. In a related development, the China Na- ited materials, including objects that looked like Scud bal- tional Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation listic missiles were removed from a suspect location while may have supplied Pakistan with guidance technology as the Iraqis delayed the inspectors en route. According to well as chemicals to manufacture solid fuel. In response, UNSCOM Chief Rolf Ekeus, Iraq conceals banned weap- the Indian Ministry of Defence’s 1996 annual report stressed ons and materials by transporting them around on trucks the need for India to deploy the Prithvi ballistic missile and and railway cars prior to inspections. Iraq continued to ob- to develop the projected 2,500 km-range Agni IRBM in or- struct UNSCOM despite Prime Minister Tariq Aziz’s agree- der to counter missile threats in the region. According to the ment with Ekeus in June to provide unconditional access to report, advanced weapons in China and Pakistan and all sites the commission wants to inspect. In late August, Beijing’s missile sales to Islamabad compelled India to “re- Ekeus traveled to Baghdad with a U.N. Security Council main on guard.” The report said that New Delhi will pre- declaration demanding that Iraq provide his inspectors with serve its options to deploy missiles as warranted by national unrestricted access to military installations in their search security requirements. Abdul Kalam, director general of for banned materials. Ekeus departed from Iraq with assur- India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation ances that future searches would not be blocked. However, (DRDO), said operational testing of the Agni could begin as in its semi-annual report to the U.N. Security Council in soon as the government gave the go-ahead. DRDO officials October, UNSCOM accused Baghdad of “systematically said the next phase of the IRBM project will involve devel- concealing” prohibited weapons and stated that Iraq still oping facilities for missile production and an emphasis on had to account fully for all of its banned weapons, items, operations and extensive exercises. and capabilities in its ballistic missile program. During a Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Also in the Middle East, the joint Israeli-U.S. Arrow-2 seminar held during the summer in Washington, D.C., for- anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) program made signifi- eign policymakers and specialists from 12 member states cant headway in July when the Arrow-2 successfully inter- and seven non-MTCR countries exchanged ideas on how cepted a Scud-type missile armed with a dummy chemical to impede the transshipment of missile technology. This warhead over the Mediterranean Sea. Encouraged by the gathering was followed in October by the 1996 MTCR Ple- successful test, the Israeli government may exclude Arrow- nary Meeting in Edinburgh, United Kingdom, where mem- 2 funding from planned defense budget cuts. Future launches bers agreed on steps that could be taken to improve the of the Arrow-2 will test the missile’s interception capabili- regime’s effectiveness in restricting regional missile prolif- ties against different targets at various altitudes. The Israeli eration in South Asia and the Persian Gulf. The members Air Force is scheduled to receive at least 50 Arrow-2 mis- also agreed to encourage key non-MTCR transshippers to siles by February 1998, according to Israeli sources. adhere to regime guidelines, and to give them “practical as- sistance” in implementing transshipment controls on mis- In East Asia, there were indications in October that North sile technology. Although the United States has judged Korea was preparing for a test flight of the 1,000 km-range Ukraine’s export control policies to be in line with the No-dong-1 ballistic missile and that Iranian officials would MTCR, Kiev’s inventory of Scud-B missiles prohibits a be present at the test-site. The United States reacted by send- needed American endorsement for Ukraine to join the re- ing reconnaissance aircraft to monitor the test area and de- gime. Ukraine is reportedly not prepared to accept the manding that North Korea cancel the test. American position that new members must give up their In South Asia, Pakistan reportedly received blueprints offensive missiles before joining the regime. Meanwhile, 136 The Nonproliferation Review/Winter 1997 Missile Developments U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Harold Smith said Wash- NOTE: ington does not favor a Ukrainian suggestion to convert A date marked with an “*” indicates that an event was SS-24 ICBMs into space launch vehicles. Smith said the reported on that date; a date without an “*” is the date ICBMs are “too expensive to maintain” and should be de- when an event actually occurred. stroyed. But Stanislav Konyukhov, chief designer at Ukraine’s Pivdenmash, said Ukraine is not considering The numbers listed in parentheses following the biblio- destroying its SS-24 ICBMs. graphic references refer to the identification number of the document in the CNS Missile Database from which the news Controversy continued to surround U.S. National Intelli- summaries are abstracted. Because of the rapidly changing gence Estimate 95-19 (NIE 95-19) after the General Account- nature of the subject matter, The Nonproliferation Review ing Office (GAO)