PRQXXX10.1177/1065912917721744Political Research QuarterlyÖzdamar and Canbolat 721744research-article2017 Article Political Research Quarterly 1 –13 Understanding New Middle Eastern © 2017 University of Utah Reprints and permissions: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav Leadership: An Operational Code DOI:https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912917721744 10.1177/1065912917721744 Approach journals.sagepub.com/home/prq Özgür Özdamar1 and Sercan Canbolat2 Abstract Political Islam and Islamist organizations have broadly gained strength across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in the post-Cold War era. Following the Arab uprisings, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), generally viewed as the world’s largest and most influential Islamist organization, has shaped the wider landscape of MENA politics. This study examines MB leadership by comparing M. Morsi of Egypt, R. Ghannouchi of Tunisia, and K. Meshaal of Gaza as examples of Islamist leaders to explain their political belief systems and predict their foreign-policy behavior. We use the operational code approach, a content-analysis software and statistical tests to conduct the study. Results show that the three leaders’ foreign policy beliefs are analogous to the averages of world leaders. Results also partially support the hypothesis that their foreign-policy propensities are similar to each other. We conclude that despite the conventional portrayal of MB leadership, these leaders use negotiation and cooperation to settle their differences in foreign affairs, and the best way to approach them is to engage in a Rousseauvian assurance game that emphasizes international social cooperation. Results also suggest important implications in terms of mainstream international relations theories. Keywords operational code analysis, leadership, political psychology, foreign policy decision making, the Middle East, Muslim Brotherhood, political Islam, Rachid Ghannouchi, Khaled Meshaal, Mohamed Morsi Introduction We argue that the conviction that MENA states are run by belligerent leaders does not rely on systematic and The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is one of the reproducible data and analysis. We therefore ask the fol- most conflict-prone regions in world politics. The region lowing: Are the political beliefs of the Islamist leaders has experienced a long cycle of political violence, includ- hostile or cooperative? What are the political instruments ing interstate wars, domestic conflicts, and terrorism, they use to achieve their aims—coercion or cooperation? which can be traced back to the demise of the Ottoman What are their leadership types and strategies—will they Empire and the Western incursion in the wake of World bully their opponents or resolve their differences diplo- War I. The Arab uprisings that began in Tunisia in matically? What is the best strategic approach toward December 2010 and spread across the region increased these leaders that will result in their cooperation? What is hopes for democratic transition and an open economy. the relevance of such operational code analysis in terms Instead, we have observed Islamist politicians coming to of broader IR theories? power in relatively free elections and the old establish- To answer these questions, we focus on political Islam ment’s harsh reactions to these electoral victories, fol- as arguably one of the most powerful forces shaping poli- lowed by civil wars, coups, and third-party interventions. tics in the region. We assert that one should understand In the rest of the world, governments have struggled to political Islam and its leadership patterns if one needs to interact with the new regional leadership and have faced conduct business with MENA leaders. Specifically, we criticism for tolerating Islamism as a nondemocratic ide- ology. For example, former US President Barack Obama 1Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey was accused of secretly favoring the Muslim Brotherhood 2University of Connecticut, Storrs, USA (MB), which was labeled as a terrorist organization by the US and Saudi governments as well as by both the Corresponding Author: Özgür Özdamar, Department of International Relations, Bilkent Mubarak and Sisi regime in Egypt, and considered to be University, A Building No: 306, Ankara 06800, Turkey. inimical toward Christianity (Gertz 2015). Email: [email protected] 2 Political Research Quarterly 00(0) focus on three regional leaders affiliated with the MB, on Leites’ study by dividing the questions into two catego- which holds the distinction of being the largest and most ries: philosophical and instrumental. The first group of powerful Islamist group operating in the Muslim world questions enables researchers to determine a leader’s per- (Leiken and Brooke 2007). MB’s political beliefs stem ceptions of the political universe and the role of the “Other” from a combination of religious, nationalist, and anticolo- that the leader confronts. Answers to the second group of nial provenances. Despite its significance in MENA and questions reveal an image of the leader’s “Self” to provide world politics, the MB’s political leadership pattern and a map of his or her means to achieve foreign-policy goals its foreign policy are understudied within the interna- (George 1979; Walker 1990). Together, the two sets of tional relations (IR) discipline. Studies that do analyze beliefs account for leaders’ tendencies and attitudes toward the MB lack “realistic empathy,” because the field of foreign policy making (Schafer and Walker 2006b). Middle Eastern studies is fraught with the Western Building on George’s framework, Holsti (1977) con- world’s political and cultural biases (Karaosmanoglu and structed an operational code typology. He established six Aydinli 2012; White 1991).1 operational codes (A, B, C, D, E, F), which Walker (1983; This article attempts to help bridge these gaps in the lit- 1990) later reduced to four groups (A, B, C, DEF). Holsti’s erature by contributing to operational code applications typology is based on the nature (temporary or permanent) beyond North America (George 1969; Holsti 1977; Leites and the source (individual/society/international system) of 1951, 1953; Walker, Schafer, and Young 1998) to the conflict in the political world, and it is derived from the MENA and its typical leaders. As a representative set of leader’s master beliefs, which are reflected in the answers Islamist ideology and MB pedigree, we focus on Mohamed to the P-1, I-1, and P-4 questions. Morsi of Egypt, Rachid Ghannouchi of Tunisia, and Khaled The contemporary operational code analysis uses an Meshaal of Gaza. In the next section, we review operational automated content-analysis method called the Verbs in code analysis, a highly respected leadership assessment Context System (VICS), introduced by Walker, Schafer, method, as a tool for analyzing the political belief systems and Young (1998). This method retrieves patterns of of this new generation of Islamist leaders. Subsequent sec- beliefs from a leader’s public statements and then draws tions explain the case selection, research design, and results. inferences about the leader’s operational code (Schafer The concluding section provides the crux of Islamist for- and Walker 2006b; Walker, Schafer, and Young 1998). eign policy under the new MENA leaders’ stewardship by Schafer and Walker (2006b) further developed preference presenting their general behavioral patterns and the analy- orderings regarding the outcomes of settlement, dead- sis’ significance in terms of mainstream IR theories. lock, domination, and submission between Self and Other derived from the indices for their master operational code Operational Code Analysis: Theory beliefs (P-1, I-1, P-4) by introducing a Theory of and Hypotheses Inferences about Preferences (TIP). It compares the sub- ject’s master belief scores (P-1, I-1, and P-4) with the Operational code analysis is a classic leadership asses- average scores for the 164 speeches uttered by a norming ment approach to foreign policy within the psychological group of thirty-five world political leaders. The compari- paradigm, focusing on a leader’s political belief system or sons by TIP are utilized to deduce a leader’s likely con- more broadly on a set of beliefs emanating from a soci- flict and cooperation strategies (see Table 1). ety’s cultural matrix, which are embedded in a leader’s The signs and indices for all master beliefs enable character (Schafer and Walker 2006b; Walker 2000; researchers to observe whether a particular leader’s P-1 Walker, Schafer, and Young 1998). Accordingly, political and I-1 beliefs are below (<) or above (>) the mean score leaders’ beliefs are used as causal mechanisms to account for the norming sample of world leaders. The signs for for their foreign-policy decisions (George 1969; Schafer the P-4a and P-4b indices designate whether these beliefs and Walker 2006b; Walker 1983). The operational code are more than one standard deviation below (<) or above construct was originally developed by Nathan Leites (>), or whether they are within (=) one standard deviation (1951, 1953) as a political strategy to examine the deci- of the mean for the norming sample. For example, an sion-making style of the Soviet Politburo. Leites explained individual leader with a higher P-4a value than one stan- the Soviet Union’s precarious relations and uncommon dard deviation above (>) the mean for the norming group bargaining behavior with US leadership by analyzing is expected to give more historical control to Self than to Lenin’s belief system. Other. If a leader has an average P-4a score located within Alexander George (1969) translated Leites’ study (=) one standard deviation, he or she gives approximately results into a set of questions whose answers reveal a lead- equal amount of historical control to Self and Other. er’s perceptions about the political universe, the role of the When the P-4a score of a leader is more than one standard leader in that universe, and various instrumental means for deviation below (<) the mean score for the norming exercising power. George (1969, 1979) further elaborated group, it is predicted that such a leader will attribute more Özdamar and Canbolat 3 Table 1.