COMINTERN AND THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR IN SPAIN Svetlana Pozharskaya Institute of Universal History of the Russia Academy of Sciencies Resumen El art´ıculo se preocupa por la influencia del Comintern en la denominada Revolucion´ espanola.˜ La autora expone el papel desempenado˜ por la Comintern en la internacionalizacion´ del conflicto espanol.˜ La intervencion´ pol´ıtica de Stalin en Espana˜ no fue solo´ motivada por la ideolog´ıa sino que tambien´ influyo´ el miedo a la amenaza del nazismo en Europa. Por este motivo, como argumenta la autora, la contribucion´ del Comintern en la Guerra Civil espanolanos˜ olo´ fue pol´ıtica sino tambien´ de apoyo militar a la causa republicana mediante voluntarios, armas y municiones. Palabras clave: Comintern, Stalin, Brigadas Internacionales, Pol´ıtica europea. MAIG 2003 Abstract 47 This article focuses the influence of the Comintern in the so-called Spanish Revolution. The author talks about the part payed by the Comintern in order to make Spanish conflict international. The Stalin’s policy in Spain was not only for idealism but for fear of the Nazi regime threat in Europe. For this reason, as the author argues, the participation of the Comintern into Spanish Civil War was not only political but military support to the Republican cause —volunteers, weapons and ammunition. EBRE 38 Keywords: Comintern, Stalin, International Brigades, European politics. Ebre 38. -N´um. 1, pp. 47-56 Revista Internacional de la Guerra Civil (1936-1939) Civil wars were familiar to Spain not only in its influence was essentialy less than that of the the 20th century. Thus, throughout the 19th Spanish Socialist Working Party and the weight century the country was twice involved in the of its trade-union centre subdued to the weight internal armed conflicts of the oppositioning of the Anarcho-Syndicalist National Labour Con- parties protecting the right to have their own fideration and General Union of the Workers. vision of the socio-political order of the country. W.Churchill was obviously exaggerating saying But then it was an internal affair of Spaniards in the House of Commnons in November 11, themselves. In the tense internal atmosphere 1936 that “there is no doubt revolutionary situ- of the second half of the 30s of the 20th cen- ation in Spain was initiated by Russia” and that tury it appeared no longer possible to consider “if not for Russia, Russian Communism whose the conflict internal. In very first days of the re- propagation and intrigue had been tormenting volt that threw the country in trenches of the civil Spain for more than six months before the revolt, war, the opposing paved the way to the process there would be no Spanish horror”.3 It was only of the conflict internationalization. That is the after the revolt began that “the Russian aspect” key asked for the external help: the government was a myth no longer but became real. The part of Spanish Republic —Leon Blum in Paris—, payed by Comintern as an instrument of the So- Franco —Hitler in Berlin and Mussolini in Rome. viet foreign policy turned out to be a factor which Those decisions proved to be fatal though prob- made the Spanish conflict international. ably inevitable. But in the terms of international As early as on August 21, 1935 J.Stalin was affairs there was no doubt in European capi- elected a member of Presidium of Comintern tals that the Pyrenean Peninsula would soon be- Executive Commitee for another term and a lot come the area of confrontation between Berlin of Comintern documents signed by G. Dimitrov, MAIG 2003 and Moscow. were addressed to J. Stalin, V. Molotov, K. According to R.Vansittart, Constant Deputy Min- Voroshilov, National Comissar of Internal Affairs 48 ister of Foreign Affairs of Great Britain “Russian N. Ezhov, later on —to L. Beria. aspect in Spain” was the key factor which had On June 21, 1936, i.e. three days later the re- defined Germany’s reaction to the Spanish Civil volt started, the meeting of ECCI Secretariate War. He arrived to that conclusion after the con- devoted to the situation in Spain was held. On EBRE 38 versation with Hitler during his visit to Berlin on July 23 during the next ECCI meeting G.Dimitrov August 5, 1936.1 But at that time Moscow in- warned that the revolt could hardly be supposed terference into Spanish events was confined to and soon suggested that they be created army Comintern instruction transmitted by its advisers. as a “state military organization”.4 The next day In the first days of the revolt V.Codavilla in his letter to J.D´ıaz and Luis (V.Codavilla) Dimi- (pseudonyms “conspirational names” Lu´ıs and trov insisted on avoiding of any measures which Medina) was in Spain: when after the 7th Com- could undermine unity of the National Front in its intern Congress its delegations were withdrawn, struggle against rebels. For this purpose he con- Spain was an exclusion. Hungarian Communist sidered it necessary to do the following: “As long E. Gere (pseudonyms Pedro and Singer) was as it possible to do without direct participation of sent to Catalonia in August. Later on S.Minaev Communists in the government for this will make (known in Moscow as I.Stepanov and in Spain it easier to safeguarding the unity of the National as Moreno) who had been supervising Span- Front. To participate in the government only as ish Communist Party since the twentieth years arrived in Spain. Stepanov was the very man 1. Documents on British Foreign Policy. 1919-1939. 2 ser. who prepared the letter to the Executive Com- London. 1979. Vol. 17, pp. 758-760. mitee of the Communist International (ECCI) of 2. Rossiisky Tsentr Khranenija i Izuchenija Dokumentov June 7, 1926 which noted that the influence of Noveyshey Istorii (RTsKhIDNI). F.495. Op. 25. D. 616. L. 103-109. Spanish Communist Party had come to naught.2 3. Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons. Vol. 316. And though the numbers of the Communist Party Col. 318. had increased many-fold within the past decade 4. RTsKhIDNI. F. 495. Op. 18. D. 1101. L. 22-23. a last resort, if it is extremely necessary for the not been exchanged till August, 1936. That time purpose of the revolt supression”.5 M.Rozenberg was appointed ambassador of The solutions of Trade-Union International Russia in Spain, M.Pascua became ambassador (Profintern) Bureau hold in Prague on July 26 of Spain in Moscow and Antonov-Ovseenko was witnessed to the effect that hopes for fast re- sent as general consul to Barcelona. Together volt suppression were hardly probable. The de- with the Staff of the Embassy military advis- cision was taken that Profintern would undertake ers and agents of intelligence service arrived to initiate assistance to the Republic. It was also in Spain. Rozenberg handed his credentials to determined to establish the fund of 1 milliard of president Azana˜ on August, 31. francs and the most part of the sum should be According to the opinion of American historian collected by the USSR Trade Unions. Those and publicist H.Matthews “the impetus os Stalin’s means were to be transferred to JoseD´´ ıaz, Do- policy was neither idealist not moral principles lores Ibarruri, M.Torez, P.Togliatti, F.Largo Ca- nor love for Spain. His fear of the aggressive ballero i.e. to two leaders of the Spanish Com- Nazi regime was quite grounded... And he was munist Party, two members of ECCI and one so- searching detente´ with Britain and France... as cialist. At the same meeting the solution was ac- a counterbalance of Nazi Germany”.7 But Spain cepted to create one, or in case of necessity, sev- also became just the such field where detente´ eral brigades of foreign volunteers. At first, it was turned out to be impossible. Furthermore, the planned to recruit five thousand of soldiers sup- importance attained to Comintern by Moscow plied by necessary arms. S.Alvarez´ who was of played far from the least part in the situation. immediate creators of the Republican army sup- After the fall of Talavera de la Reina (Toledo) posed that the decision layed the basis of the which opened the road to Madrid governmen- 6 process of international brigades formation. Af- tal crisis burst out. Largo Caballero declared MAIG 2003 terwards the solution turned out to be rather well- to President Azana˜ that he was going to take timed: by that time not only the putsh had de- historical responsibility but he stipulated social- 49 veloped into a long-term civil war but the conflict ists’ predominance in the government. Socialist had taken an international form. of centric orientation I.Prieto opposed Largo Ca- According to many investigators’ opinion the ballero’s presence as the leader of the govern- Kremlin was well aware of those complications ment and socialists in state administration. He EBRE 38 created by the Civil War in Spain on the interna- considered that it could compromise the Repub- tional arena, those complications being undesir- lic in eyes of West and alienate middle class of able for it. The 3.5 thousand of kilometers sep- the country. Evidently similar were ECCI leader- arating the Peninsula and the Soviet Union also ship’s notions expressed at the Secretary meet- disposed to contemplations. Furthermore much ing of July 24, 1936. They ordered the Com- in the “regrettable Spanish situation” had to be munist Party to agree to enter the government made clear for Moscow. For that purpose it was “only as a resort, if it is absolutely necessary with necessary to have a legal basis in Spain which the purposes of the revolt suppresion”.