Sarajevo a Stud Y in the Origins of the Grea Τ War

S A R A J E V O A STUD Y IN THE ORIGINS OF THE GREA Τ WAR By R. W. SETON-WATSON D.Litt. (Oxon), Hon. Ph.D. (Prague and Zagreb); Masaryk Professor of Central European History in the University of London; Hon. Member of the Roumanian Academy LONDON: HUTCHINSON & CO. (Publishers), LTD. PATERNOSTER ROW, E.C. Made and Printed in Great Britain by The Camelot Press Limited, London and Southampton TO MY WIFE AS A MEMORY OF FOUR JUGOSLAV JOURNEYS TOGETHER (1912, 1913, 1920, 1925.) SARAJEVO (A SERB FOLKSONG) Sarajevo, whence comes thy gloom? Tell me, has fire consumed thee? Or has the flood engulfed thy streets? Or has the plague laid hold on thee? Softly Sarajevo gives answer: " Had fire consumed me so sore, My shining courts would rise again. Had the fierce flood engulfed my streets, My markets would be cleansed and fresh. But plague has laid her murderous hand, Her murderous hand on young and old, And those I love has torn apart." PREFACE MUCH has been written on the immediate origins of the Great War and the complicated diplomatic conflict which preceded actual hostilities; but till very recently the Balkan aspect of the question has not received the attention which it deserves. The two most authoritative surveys in English — Mr. Headlam-Morley's The History of Twelve Days (1915) and Sir Charles Oman's The Outbreak of the War (1918) — are now both out of date, owing to the subsequent publication of the German and Austrian diplomatic documents, and of much supplementary material of a less official character. Thus there is great need of a book summarising all the latest evidence on a question which is of burning importance in the Europe of to-day. The original German theory, which made of Britain and of Sir Edward Grey the villains of the piece, has long since been exploded, and, for the time at least, abandoned even in Germany itself: nor is it ever likely to convince any person who, with open mind, reads that statesman's newly published memoirs. The attack was then transferred to Russia, and the alleged methods by which a general mobilisation was carried out behind the back of the Tsar were treated as responsible for the final catastrophe. The superficiality of this argument was from the first apparent to all save the wilfully blind, and was finally demonstrated by the critical study of General Dobrorolski and other publications. The most recent tendency has been to shift the main responsibility on to the shoulders of Serbia; and it therefore becomes all the more necessary to place the Serbian side of the problem in the forefront of discussion, instead of treating 8it as a mere accessory to general diplomatic history and thereby missing the true significance of events. The present volume, then, is an attempt to subject much new and hitherto undigested material to a critical and detailed analysis, and to place in their proper European perspective both the Austro-Serbian quarrel and the crime of Sarajevo which resulted from it. I found myself almost involuntarily driven to the attempt, while engaged upon a larger work which traces the Jugoslav national movement from its origins to the achievement of unity and independence. It soon became obvious that to treat the crisis of 1914 in that detail which alone could ensure fairness and make it comprehensible would utterly destroy the proportions of the proposed book, and I therefore decided to detach it from the main narrative and present it to the public in a form which would leave freer play to the argument. During a long visit to Jugoslavia last spring I was able to obtain much additional information from first-hand sources, and especially from the survivors of the revolutionary movement inside the Dual Monarchy, whose spontaneous nature has been too often overlooked. It is hardly too much to assert that one prime cause of the disaster which befell Europe was the failure of her leading statesmen to estimate truly the forces at work in what was called the " Eastern " or " Balkan " Question. Without any accurate diagnosis there could obviously be no hope of applying an effective remedy; and hence the measures adopted between 1908 and 1914 at best only postponed, and at worst actually aggravated, the malady. One fact which emerges from the following narrative is the superficial outlook of all the Powers towards a problem so full of explosive elements as the Southern Slav; and this may perhaps serve as a reminder that similar national problems subsist in an acute and unsolved form, even in post-war Europe, and deserve close and constant attention. 9 In this connection I desire to make quite clear the motives which prompted me to undertake this work. After seven years of confusion and recrimination Europe at last seems to be moving slowly in the direction of peace and conciliation; and there is a tendency in some quarters to regard the question of responsibility either as a mere irritant which should now be relegated to the background and replaced by the motto "Forget and forgive," or as an insidious excuse for re-opening problems which the war has solved. Both these views seem to me fundamentally false. The question of war guilt is likely to, and ought to, occupy some measure of the attention of all who wish to see the European Commonwealth placed on a sounder and safer basis; for it provides the main clues by which we may judge and compare the merits of the old system and the new. An honest investigation of the causes of the war, however severe the verdict to which it may lead, cannot properly be regarded as a vindictive act towards our former enemies; and I for one am perfectly prepared to cooperate with German no less than Allied students of the problem, with a view to the elucidation of the truth. The stronger our condemnation of the old forces and the old regime, the keener should be our desire to establish a common basis of outlook and of action with the new. A considerable portion of the present volume had already been completed when the publication of an amazing article by Mr. Ljuba Jovanovic aroused acute controversy at home and abroad, and led to a determined attempt ta saddle Serbia with the main responsibility for the outbreak of the Great War. In chapter vi. I have tried to reduce this incident to its true-proportions, and. an appendix to the same chapter contains a summary of subsequent developments. The silence of Mr. PaSic and his Government — due apparently to intricate motives of internal party politics and to a singular indifference 10 to moral considerations —reflects great discredit upon them, and has gravely injured the reputation of their country abroad, but none the less it cannot affect the main issues involved. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Mr. Headlam- Morley, who allowed me to read the advanced proofs of the complete edition of British Diplomatic Documents relating to the outbreak of the war, which he has prepared for publication and which is due to appear shortly. I was thus enabled to add valuable points of detail to my narrative, and above all to assure myself that nothing really material to the issue had been withheld by the British Government in August 1914. Much has been written for and against Lord Grey's policy, but even to this day he has never received full credit for the publication of the frankest and fullest White Paper ever published in our history. The moral effect of that publication was simply incalculable, both at home and abroad; and the publication of the German, Austrian, and Russian documents, and the British Government's decision last December to entrust Mr. Gooch and Mr. Temperley with a similar task, were, it seems to me, merely the logical consequence of Lord Grey's initiative in August 1914 and of its decisive influence upon world opinion. R. W. SETON-WATSON. 15 November, 1925. CONTENTS CHAPTER I. THE AUSTRO-SERBIAN CONFLICT <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">The </li><li style="flex:1">Habsburg </li></ul>and <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">mission </li><li style="flex:1">against </li><li style="flex:1">the </li><li style="flex:1">Turks–Serb </li></ul>and Rome-The Michael-The occupation reugeees Illyrian crisis of Bosnia-Sebia Khuen–The in Hungary and 1875-8 under Croatia-Byzantium Jugoslav and ideas-Prince Austria-Hungary's Eastern of <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">Milan </li><li style="flex:1">and </li><li style="flex:1">Alexander-Croatia </li><li style="flex:1">under </li></ul>revival of 1903 Austro-Hungarian –The „Pig War” –The Serbo-Croat Coalition –and Izvolsky-The Friedjung Russian annexation Trials-William <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">rivalry </li><li style="flex:1">in </li></ul>of „in the Bosnia shining Balkans- –armour” Aehrenthal Zagreb <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">and </li><li style="flex:1">The </li></ul><ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">and </li><li style="flex:1">II </li></ul>– The Southern Slav Question as an International issue …………………… 15 CHAPTER II. THE BALKAN WARS The The Tugoslav Affair-Serbia's Bosnian defeat Diet-Conrad of Turkey-Cuvaj's <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">and </li><li style="flex:1">Italy-The </li></ul>dictatorship allies and Second held Balkan mThe the Balkan back League- Croaüa- Prochaska Southern War- <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">enthusiasm </li><li style="flex:1">for </li><li style="flex:1">the </li><li style="flex:1">Balkan </li></ul>–Adriatic and claims-Conrad <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">Masaryk-The </li><li style="flex:1">Slavs-Berchtold </li></ul>The and —Treaty Germany-William <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">of </li><li style="flex:1">Bucarest-Austria-Hungary </li></ul>II helps Kings <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">by </li><li style="flex:1">Italy </li></ul><ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">Constantine </li><li style="flex:1">and </li><li style="flex:1">Charles </li></ul><ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">Berchtold, Conrad, and the war party in Vienna-Pasic </li><li style="flex:1">s</li></ul><ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">overtures </li><li style="flex:1">rejected-Serbia and Russia-Balkan megalomania- </li></ul>Unrest in Bosnia and Croatia-Widespread conspiracy……………………….. 38 CHAPTER III. THE JUGOSLAV REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">Serbian </li><li style="flex:1">sentiment </li><li style="flex:1">for </li><li style="flex:1">Bosnia-Kallay's </li></ul>The new generation Kocic and Radulovic <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">warnings </li><li style="flex:1">to </li></ul>—Vienna- <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">Student </li><li style="flex:1">The revolutionary tradition </li></ul>—journals Governor —– —Zerajic's attempt on the Hero and its influence-The spread <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">The Death of </li><li style="flex:1">a</li></ul>of his group conspirators in Sarajevo ……………………………………………… <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">terrorist </li><li style="flex:1">ideas-Agitation </li></ul>Constant demonstrations and terrorist talk <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">in </li><li style="flex:1">the </li><li style="flex:1">schools-Gacinovic </li><li style="flex:1">and </li></ul>The 63 <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">—</li><li style="flex:1">—</li></ul>12 CHAPTER IV. THE ARCHDUKE FRANCIS FERDINAND Character of the Archduke political changes policy His illness II and Francis Ferdinand problem Czernin's warnings —Conflicts at Court His hostility to Hungary William II and Francis Joseph Discussion of the Roumanian King Charles's alarm The —His desire for <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">—</li><li style="flex:1">—</li></ul>His foreign <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">—</li><li style="flex:1">—</li><li style="flex:1">—</li></ul>William —<ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">—</li><li style="flex:1">—</li><li style="flex:1">—</li></ul>meeting of Konopiâtë — The growth of a legend…………………………… 80 CHAPTER V. THE MURDER OF THE ARCHDUKE The Bosnian manœuvres and Vidovdan dents of the funeral The lack of precautions in Sarajevo General Potiorek Outrages against the Serbs enquiry The Austro-Hungarian dossier against Serbia —The murder —Inci- <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">—</li><li style="flex:1">—</li></ul><ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">—</li><li style="flex:1">—</li></ul>The Wiesner <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">—</li><li style="flex:1">—</li></ul>Press polemics — The death of Hartwig………………………………………….. 101 CHAPTER VI. THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CRIME Four possibilities internal troubles grade's inaction —The Serbian Government absorbed in The problem of Montenegrin Union BelThe "Narodna Odbrana" Voja Tankosic — — — — —The "Black <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">The Salonica </li><li style="flex:1">Hand" </li></ul>Trial and its connection with Sarajevo The Bosnian youth and their conspiracies —Colonel Dimitrijevic — —The real initiative — —The reminiscences <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">of Mr. Ljuba Jovanovié — Could Belgrade have warned Vienna?............ </li><li style="flex:1">129 </li></ul>APPENDIX: <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">The "Revelations" of Mr. Jovanovic………………………………………… </li><li style="flex:1">155 </li></ul>CHAPTERVII.COUNTBERCHTOLD'S PREPARATIONS FOR WAR Berchtold's exposé of policy —Its revision after the murder Obstacles to warlike Berchtold and Berlin The Hoyos William II and Vienna William II's marginalia The alleged "Crown The Joint Austro-Hungarian Council in The gradual conversion of Tisza Berchtold Tschirschky keeps Berlin informed The Joint Council of July 19: —Tisza's memorandum to Francis Joseph —action mission — —Tisza's attitude <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">—</li><li style="flex:1">—</li></ul><ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">—</li><li style="flex:1">—</li></ul>Berlin's encouragement of Vienna Council" at Potsdam Vienna (7 July) — —<ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">—</li><li style="flex:1">—</li></ul>and Tisza in agreement <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">—</li><li style="flex:1">—</li></ul>Reasons for postponement —final decisions…………………………………………………………………. 160 CHAPTER VIII. THE DUPING OF EUROPE Conrad and Krobatin go on leave — Berlin's connivance. 13 BERCHTOLD AND ST. PETERSBURG: <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">Sazonov´s </li><li style="flex:1">confidences </li></ul>misleads <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">Poincaré's </li><li style="flex:1">visit-Szápáry's </li></ul>evasions-Berchtold Kudashev — German views of Russian unpreparedness. BERCHTOLD AND PARIS: BERCHTOLD AND LONDON: Lützow's <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">warning </li><li style="flex:1">to </li><li style="flex:1">de </li><li style="flex:1">Bunsen </li></ul>Grey's apprehensions and struggle for peace. BERCHTOLD AND <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">ROME: </li><li style="flex:1">Alarm </li></ul>Vienna-Italy's <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">of </li><li style="flex:1">San </li></ul>right Giuliano to <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">and </li><li style="flex:1">Flotow </li></ul><ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">Berlin's </li><li style="flex:1">advice </li><li style="flex:1">to </li><li style="flex:1">compensation- </li></ul>Berchtold's failure to notify Rome. attitude of Bucarest-King offer of mediation………………………………………………………….. <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">The </li><li style="flex:1">Charles's </li><li style="flex:1">warnings </li><li style="flex:1">and </li></ul>202 202 CHAPTER IX. THE ULTIMATUM TO SERBIA The Austro-Hungarian Note to Serbia Jagow and "Central European time" —Giesl's instructions — —The impression in Europe The Serbian answer and "Invasion" mediation Francis Joseph —The German Government's reception of the Note William Il's comments Ultimatum An Austrian legal opinion Sazonov's overtures to Vienna Austria-Hungary declares war —"<ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">—</li><li style="flex:1">—</li></ul>—"—Grey's efforts at Berchtold deceives — A last attempt <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">—</li><li style="flex:1">—</li></ul>—in Rome — The Tsar's appeal — Conrad and Moltke ……………………. 244 286 CHAPTER X. CONCLUSION SERBO-CROAT ORTHOGRAPHY. c =ts in the English c=ch c =t gj =j <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">" lots " </li><li style="flex:1">nj =gn in the Italian </li></ul>s = sh in the English " degno " "show" " view " " jour " „„,, „"church" " tune " " June " " yet " vj =zvi „z = j in the French <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">dz = j in the English </li><li style="flex:1">j =y </li><li style="flex:1">" jungle " </li></ul><ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">lj = gl in the Italian </li><li style="flex:1">" meglio " </li><li style="flex:1">[All other letters as in English.] </li></ul>ABBREVIATIONS. D.D. = Die Deutschen Dokumente (German post-war collection of diplomatic documents, 4 vols., Berlin 1920). D.A. = Diplomatische Aktenstücke (Austrian post-war ditto, 3 vols. Vitnan 1919). SARAJEVO CHAPTER I THE AUSTRO-SERBIAN CONFLICT THE murder of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife at Sarajevo was merely the spark that fired the powder magazine of Europe. But the Southern Slav Question, of which it was a symptom, was one of the most burning of pre-war problems, and may take rank with <ul style="display: flex;"><li style="flex:1">Franco-German, </li><li style="flex:1">Anglo-German, </li><li style="flex:1">and </li><li style="flex:1">Austro-Russian </li></ul>rivalry as a fundamental cause of the Great War. Though overlooked by Western opinion till very recently, it was far from being a new problem. Indeed, its origin and explanation are to be sought as far back as the Turkish conquest of Serbia and Hungary, which arrested the political development and the culture of the Southern Slavs, and was followed by the long struggle of Habsburg Imperialism to eject the infidel invaders from its dominions, to win back South-Eastern Europe for Christendom, and at the same time to establish German Habsburg hegemony over the Balkan Peninsula. In the nineteenth century the rivalry of Austria and Russia came to play an almost dominant part in the foreign relations of the Southern Slavs. But it must be remembered that in the preceding century and a half Austria had had an easy lead, and might, but for wasted opportunities, have solved the problem in her own favour before Russia became a really serious rival. The creation of the " Military Frontiers " in the late sixteenth century —territory organised on a special military tenure along the old river frontier against Turkey — gave rise to a race of hereditary fighters of Serb and Croat race, trained in a tradition of dynastic loyalty, 16 pinning their faith to Vienna as the predestined liberator of their kinsmen under Turkish yoke, and, indeed, often forming the spearhead of the Austrian fighting machine. Then, again, at the close of the seventeenth century (1690) we find the Serbian Patriarch, with many thousands of Serbian families, withdrawing into Habsburg territory, and forming at Karlovci and Novi Sad, on the middle Danube north of Belgrade, what were for over a century the only real centres of Serbian culture. The Serbian element in Syrmia and South Hungary was still further strengthened in the early eighteenth century as part of the scheme of colonisation which followed the final ejection of the Turks. The victories of Prince Eugene represent the high-water mark of Austrian prestige in the Balkans, and from 1718 to 1739 the northern portion of the modern Serbia (including the Sumadija, afterwards the real kernel of national resistance to the Turks) was in Austrian possession. But the disastrous war of 1737-9 ended in its restoration to Turkey, and fifty years later the war of 1787-92, undertaken jointly with Russia, and crowned for a time with Laudon's conquest of Belgrade, again ended in failure and an unexpected rally of Turkish power. On each of these two occasions Austria had been valiantly supported by the native Serbs, who found themselves exposed to Turkish vengeance when their protectors withdrew. Henceforward they relied more upon their own strength than upon foreign aid. Yet, none the less, Kara George, the first hero of Serbian independence, began with an appeal to Vienna —though Francis was too absorbed in the European struggle against Napoleon to give much heed to an obscure handful of illiterate Balkan peasants. From Austria the Serbs turned to Russia, with whom, remote as she was, they were bound by the two powerful ties of Slav kinship and Orthodox religion. Throughout the nineteenth century the movements of Panslav 17 solidarity gained in strength, on the one hand serving to stimulate Russian opinion in favour of the oppressed Balkan Slavs, and on the other hand providing a basis for Imperialistic aims, and only too often exploited by those whose real objective was Constantinople and the Straits. Meanwhile the growth of national feeling in Europe transforms the relations between Austria and the Southern Slavs, a majority of whom are actually living on Habsburg territory even before the occupation of Bosnia. Serbia starts from very modest beginnings as a vassal peasant state, but with each new generation tends more and more to become a centre of national culture, and also a point of attraction for her kinsmen under alien rule. And thus it is not really surprising to find Serbs from the Banat, and also from Bosnia and Dalmatia and Montenegro, playing quite a notable part in the political and intellectual life of the new principality, while, on the other hand, Serbs from the principality intervened very actively in the racial war of 1848 on behalf of the Croats and Serbs of Croatia and the Banat against Hungary. One of the main factors in Jugoslav history has been the rival influence of Byzantium and Rome, of Orthodoxy and Catholicism, in the formation of the national character. In each case political influence has been superimposed, thanks on the one hand to the alliance of Habsburg and ultramontanism, and on the other hand to the privileged position of Hellenism in the Eastern Church under Turkish rule. The religious issue which thus arose has long since died — for certain ecclesiastical jealousies of to-day cannot properly be described as a religious issue

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