Covert Action: A Useful Tool for United States Foreign Policy? Derek Andrew Uram M.Ed., University of Toronto, 2002 B.Ed.,University of Toronto, 2000 B.U.R.Pl., Ryerson Polytechnical Institute, 1989 A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION in the School of Public Administration 0 Derek Andrew Uram, 2005 University of Victoria All rights reserved. This thesis may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy or by other means, without the permission of the author. Supervisor: Dr. Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly ABSTRACT Covert action is a policy tool used by the United States government. It is secretive and highly controversial in that it attempts to actively change the course of events in other nations. Much covert action undertaken by the US government has taken place within the developing world - governments have been overthrown, elections influenced, media distorted, and the lives of millions of individuals affected by covert activities secretly organized and executed by US officials in Washington, DC and Langley, Virginia - headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency. The question must be asked: Is covert action a useful tool for US foreign policy? Evidence from two important case studies - Iran and Chile - reveals that covert action has very limited genuine value as a policy tool. It does not always produce desired results. Even "successful" covert undertakings can create additional problems, the type of which may not appear until many years after the fact. Supervisor: Dr. E. Brunet-Jailly (School of Public Administration) Table of Contents Title Page .. Abstract 11 . Table of Contents 111 List of Tables iv List of Figures v Acknowledgements vi vii Dedication .. Quotations Vlll Introduction 1 Chapter I What is Covert Action? Chapter I1 Cases of Covert Action and its Use in the Developing World Chapter I11 The Usellness of Covert Action Chapter IV Case Study No. 1: Iran Chapter V Case Study No. 2: Chile Chapter VI Comparative Analysis of Covert Action Chapter VII Conclusions and Recommendations Glossary 222 Bibliography 228 List of Tables Title Paee Table 4-1 Evaluation Matrix - Iran Table 4-2 Four Measures of Inequality of Consumption Expenditure in Urban Areas in Iran, selected years 1959-1974 127 Table 4-3 Decile Distribution of Household Expenditure, Urban Areas in Iran (percent) 127 Table 5-1 Evaluation Matrix - Chile Table 6-1 Comparative Analysis of Case Studies, Iran and Chile List of Figures Title Page Figure 3-1 Evaluation Matrix - Model Figure 4-1 US Economic Assistance to Iran (Loans and Grants), 1946-1 979 Figure 4-2 US Military Assistance to Iran (Loans and Grants), 1946- 1979 Acknowledgements I wish to thank a number of different parties for the support they provided me in researching and writing this thesis. They are as follows. Firstly my thesis supervisor, Dr. Ernmanuel Brunet-Jailly, is the one scholar who provided me with advice on a regular basis. Without his encouragement, patience, and interest in foreign affairs, this project may have never materialized as a study with an international focus, and I may have been relegated towards having to undertake a more conventional, less controversial, and definitely less interesting (in my opinion) management report, the type of which is usually required of most MPA candidates. This thesis has also allowed me to contribute towards scholarly knowledge, a goal that I feel is worth pursuing and yet is still sadly lacking within public administration, especially with regards to this particular subject matter. I certainly wish to thank the other members of my committee fiom the University of Victoria. They include Dr. Reg Whitaker from the Department of Political Science, and Dr. Gordon Smith and Dr. Peter Heap from the Centre for Global Studies. Their interest and expertise in this topic, as well as the input and advice which they provided, has aided me in producing the best quality of work of which I am capable. Also, I owe a great deal of thanks to my External Examiner, Dr. Stuart Farson from Simon Fraser University, for going out of his way to analyze and critique my work. His expertise in this particular subject matter is quite rare, and very much appreciated. I would also like to thank Dr. Gregory Rowe from the Department of Greek and Roman Studies here at the University of Victoria, who took the time to act as Chair during my thesis defense. In addition, I wish to thank those respondents - all of whom were originally from either the United States, Chile, or Iran - that took the time to participate in this study. They shall remain anonymous in order to preserve confidentiality and to conform to the strict standards of ethical conduct in academic research here at the University of Victoria. Thank you everyone. Others need to be thanked for non-academic reasons. Those colleagues of mine who spent countless hours with me in the third floor computer lab certainly deserve some recognition (you know who you are). We all kept each other sane, awake, and productive when we needed it the most. Lastly, but certainly not least, I wish to thank my fiiends and colleagues at the Victoria Judo Club. It was here that I was thrown (literally), choked (literally), and taught how to do likewise. It was also here that I was constantly reminded that there is more to life than sitting in front of a computer, and that I am a human being rather than a bureaucrat, as we all are. vii Dedication This thesis is dedicated to the people of Chile and Iran. It has been the one song of those who thirst a@er absolute power that the interest of the state requires that its aflairs should be conducted in secret.. ..But the more such arguments disguise themselves under the mask ofpublic welfare, the more oppressive is the slavery to which they will lead.. ..Better that right counsels be known to enemies than that the evil secrets of tyrants should be concealed from the citizens. They who can treat secretly of the afairs of a nation have it absolutely under their authority; and as they plot against the enemy in time of war, so do they against the citizens in time ofpeace. - Spinoza, Tractatus Politicus, 1677 And many writers have imaginedfor themselves republics and principalities that have never been seen nor known to exist in reality; for there is such a gap between how one lives and how one ought to live that anyone who abandons what is done for what ought to be done learns his ruin rather than his preservation: for a man who wishes to profess his goodness at all times will come to ruin among so many who are not good. Hence it is necessary for a prince who wishes to maintain his position to learn how not to be good, and to use this knowledge or not to use it according to necessity. - Machiavelli, The Prince, 1 532 Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence. -Tom C. Clark, US Supreme Court Justice, Mapp v. Ohio, 1961 The illegal we do immediately. The unconstitutional takes a little longer. - Henry Kissinger, New York Times, October 28, 1973 Introduction The topic of covert action is one that has had a rather notorious history. In the immediate post-World War 11 era, covert action was an element of the foreign policy of numerous nations, including the United States. As a form of policy it was implemented in a highly secretive manner, and its very existence was denied by those that used it. By the 1WOs, the covert activities of US intelligence agencies had become a major recurring news story in the American (and international) media, and proved also to be a major stain on the reputation of the Central Intelligence Agency and the United States government overall. In the 1980s and 1990s its practice continued, albeit under different circumstances. Today, covert action is being promoted by many policymakers within the United States government as a means to achieve definite goals in foreign policy. The current "war on terror" and the conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, as well as 2 the presence of certain "rogue states" such as North Korea, all provide incentive for policymakers to turn towards covert action as an answer to these perceived problems. Covert action is essentially a policy tool or instrument used by various governments to pursue their own public policy goals. The main principle behind the use of covert action is the systematic interference in the internal affairs of one or more sovereign states by the government of another state, without the recipient government(s) knowing of its origin. The purpose is to actively change the course of events in the target state@).' The government of the United States has used this policy tool in a number of ways in nations all over the world, with varying results. Arguments both for and against the use of covert action have been made - and are still being made - with respect to today's situation. One must ask the question, though, "does covert action actually work?" Is covert action a "useful" policy tool or instrument for achieving current US foreign policy goals? This study attempts to address this question. Insufficient analysis of covert action and its usefulness in achieving policy goals has been undertaken as of late. Much of the existing literature on covert action has dealt only with specific aspects of its use, such as its questionable legality or its colourful and highly controversial history.