PERCEPTIONS OF GERMANY IN THE SECURITY OF THE BALTIC SEA REGION SEA OF GERMANY IN THE SECURITY BALTIC PERCEPTIONS e Latvian Institute of International Aairs is the oldest Latvian G E R M think tank that specializes in foreign and security policy analysis. It is an O F A N S Y independent research institute that conducts research, develops N publications and organizes public lectures and conferences related to I O global aairs and Latvia's international role and policies. T P E C R www.liia.lv E P I N T H E S Konrad-Adenauer-Stiung (KAS) is a German political foundation E named aer the rst Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany. C His name is synonymous with the rm alignment of foreign policy with U the transatlantic community of values and the vision of a unied R Europe. I T Y With more than 80 oces abroad and projects in 120 states, G I O N KAS actively promotes the values of freedom, justice and solidarity E R O around the globe. e Nordic Countries Project of KAS based in A Riga/Latvia strengthens the ties between Germany and the Nordic E F S Countries by promoting political dialogue, organizing political confer- C ences and further improvement of cooperation with ink Tanks, I T non-governmental organizations and the civil society. T H L A E B www.kas.de EDITORS Andris Sprūds Elizabete Vizgunova PERCEPTIONS OF GERMANY IN THE SECURITY OF THE BALTIC SEA REGION EDITORS Andris Sprūds Elizabete Vizgunova PERCEPTIONS OF GERMANY IN THE SECURITY OF THE BALTIC SEA REGION EDITORS Andris Sprūds Elizabete Vizgunova Supported by: The book project ‘Perceptions of Germany in the Security of the Baltic Sea Region’ assembles the contributions from Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Germany. It assesses the perceptions of Germany’s contribution to hard, soft and regional security of the Baltic Sea region. The publication also engages in a mapping exercise, pinning down the most important perception- drivers – various stake-holders from public and private sector and most important security narratives – and offers recommendations. Editors: Andris Sprūds, Elizabete Vizgunova Authors: Costan Barzanje, Malte Engelmann, Emil Jørgensen Øverbø, Riina Kaljurand, Barbara Kunz, Piret Kuusik, Santtu Lehtinen, Benjamin Mangus, Aylin Matlé, Matti Pesu, Anke Schmidt-Felzmann, Andris Sprūds, Monika Sus, Amelie Theussen, Elizabete Vizgunova Project coordinators: Elizabete Vizgunova, Elīna Klīve English language editor: Līvija Anna Uskale Layout: Oskars Stalidzāns Cover design: Zigmunds Lapsa This book is published in collaboration with the Publishers Hansa Print. The opinions expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Latvian Institute of International Affairs or the Konrad Adanauer Stiftung. ISBN 978-9934-567-27-8 © Authors of the articles, 2018 UDK 327(4) © Zigmunds Lapsa, cover design, 2018 Pe505 © Oskars Stalidzāns, layout, 2018 © Latvian Institute of International Affairs, 2018 TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION Andris Sprūds, Elizabete Vizgunova, Benjamin Mangus . 7 THE WIDER CONTEXT: GERMANY’S BALTIC ENGAGEMENT, THE ‘MUNICH CONSENSUS’ AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY Barbara Kunz . 11 GERMANY’S ROLE AND SELF-PERCEPTION AS A SECURITY PROVIDER IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION Malte Engelmann, Aylin Matlé . .26 PRAGMATIC PARTNERSHIP WITH THE NEED FOR MORE? DANISH PERCEPTIONS OF GERMANY AS SECURITY ACTOR IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION Amelie Theussen . .44 WAITING FOR GODOT? ESTONIAN PERCEPTION OF GERMANY IN THE SECURITY OF THE BALTIC SEA REGION Riina Kaljurand, Piret Kuusik . .64 A WILLING PARTNER IN THE NORTH: FINNISH PERCEPTIONS ON GERMANY AS A BALTIC POWER Matti Pesu, Santtu Lehtinen . 77 THE SECURITY ROLE OF GERMANY IN LATVIA POST-CRIMEA: NAVIGATING CHARTED WATERS Elizabete Vizgunova . .92 A NEW SECURITY PROVIDER? LITHUANIAN-GERMAN SECURITY COOPERATION Neringa Bladaitė, Margarita Šešelgytė . .115 GERMANY IN A NORWEGIAN SECURITY PERSPECTIVE: A LIKE-MINDED ALLY IN A CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT Emil Jørgensen Øverbø . 136 GERMANY IN POLISH SECURITY – ‘IRREPLACEABLE NEIGHBOUR’ BUT NOT AN IRREVERSIBLE PARTNER Monika Sus . .156 SWEDISH PERCEPTIONS OF GERMANY’S ROLE IN BALTIC SEA SECURITY Anke Schmidt-Felzmann, Costan Barzanje . .175 INDIFFERENCE IS NOT AN OPTION. GERMANY’S GROWING ROLE IN THE SECURITY OF THE BALTIC SEA REGION Andris Sprūds, Elizabete Vizgunova . 208 ABOUT THE AUTHORS . 219 6 INTRODUCTION Andris Sprūds, Elizabete Vizgunova, Benjamin Mangus The March 2014 annexation of Crimea marks a turning point in the Russia- West relationship, making the three Baltic States the frontline in a conflict between Russia and the West. Despite the heightened level of awareness of the security and the strategic situation of the Baltic Sea region (BSR) in the West, the regional security situation has only grown more complicated due to turbulence within the EU, the transatlantic relationship and the uncertain fate of the western style of governance. Amid these events, the question of Germany’s place in regional and European security is increasingly pertinent. Although Germany’s size and economic strength requires it to take even more leadership in the future, the country’s exact military potential is still unknown. In addition, the longstanding tradition of Ostpolitik has led to a virtual clash of strategies in how to approach Russia. Germany therefore has the potential to become a European ‘game-changer’ or ‘deal-breaker’. On the flipside, the BSR has also undergone rapid change that has far-reaching implications for the actors that have already been active in the region, and those who are still defining their interests. Germany’s recent recommitment to the region could be interpreted as a step towards rediscovering it’s ‘Baltic-ness’ and defining its strategic interest in the BSR. Whereas international attention has enabled the region to benefit from increasing regional security cooperation – including a stronger link between NATO, Finland and Sweden, NORDEFCO, and enhanced military cooperation between the three Baltic States – it has also led to an increased conflict of geopolitical interests. The proximity of the conflict in Ukraine and the tense relationship with Russia has pushed the bordering states of Russia to sound the alarm bells; even more so, it seems to have ended the détente between Germany and Russia and propelled a military strategic awakening for NATO. The countries of the region, included in this edition – Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland and Sweden – are 7 bound together by various regional formats, including the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the Nordic-Baltic 6 and the Nordic-Baltic 8, the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR), inter alia. Geographically, the region is linked to the Arctic, the Nordic countries, the post-Soviet space and central Europe, creating ever differing approaches to security and threats. In addition, the security of the three Baltic States is highly dependent on the US policy, which is becoming more erratic by the day. Clearly, the region has never been a priority in Berlin; rather, it has remained just one of Germany’s fields of foreign policy. However, as the region has become a security concern on a transatlantic scale, several changes may be expected. Two of them are of significance for the three Baltic States – Latvia, in particular. Firstly, Germany’s recommitment to European security, announced in the Munich Security Conference speech of 2014, indicates that the strategic awareness of Germany of the security situation in the BSR is likely to continue to increase in the future. This also means that the understanding of regional security threats in Berlin is more likely to align with that of Riga. Secondly, besides establishing itself as a regional security actor by leading the NATO forces in Lithuania, Germany seems to have taken the first steps to formulating a coherent approach to the Baltic States. Reciprocally, this volume’s primary goal is therefore to examine the developing perceptions of the regional players of Germany. The publication also aims to advance the placing of the BSR in Berlin’s agenda, as it offers both a comprehensive overview of national particularities, as well as recommendations for advancing security cooperation. For this volume, ‘perceptions’ were broadly defined primarily according to the constructivist world-view. It followed the ideas explored by Nicholas Onuf, Friedrich Kratochwil and Alexander Wendt, giving the authors full liberty to develop their own emphases and assessments, as this diversity of approaches is crucial for researching the complexity of the Baltic region. It relies on the assumption that we, in our social interactions, act differently with friends and foes. Though we may play power politics with our foes, it does not mean that this is our only strategy, since we will act differently towards our allies. Both with human interaction and inter-state interaction, these different strategies for different countries are driven by past interactions. These interactions create meaning (also called ‘perception drivers’) that people will reflect on when conducting future diplomacy 8 with these nations. We must also remember that the definition of anarchy and these interactions change as the interests and identities of nations change. Interactions lead to a certain way of doing things, and this is how perceptions are formed and compromise and bargaining begins.1 The authors, from various national backgrounds, allowed the editors of this volume to analyse the countries in a comparative perspective in the conclusive chapter of this book. To do this, each chapter addressed four main issues. Firstly, the authors assessed Germany as a ‘hard’ security actor in their respective country. ‘Hard’ security allows countries to deal with global and regional threats, inter-state conflicts, the arms race, as well as strategic choices of allies. Many of the authors in this book will discuss Germany’s general positive attitude towards the defence of the BSR and a simultaneous lack of sufficient military forces or military spending to create credible deterrence.