Edited by Diana Lary The Chinese State at the Borders UBCPress.Vancouver.Toronto 5 Ming China and Its Border with Annam Leo K. Shin Some time during the Chenghua reign (1465-87) of the Ming dynasty, a young man named Wu Rui was on his way from Hainan Island to the Chi- nese mainland when his boat was blown terribly off course. Found adrift near the shore of Annam (present-day northern Vietnam),1 Wu Rui and his twelve companions were promptly captured by the coastal patrol and brought to the Annamese capital at Thang Long (now Hanoi). For their alleged transgression, Wu’s fellow travellers were sentenced to set up agrar- ian colonies, while Wu Rui himself was ordered to be castrated. How Wu survived his years in the Annamese palace we can only guess, but his service was evidently deemed valuable. After the death of the king of Annam in 1497, Wu Rui was even offered a chance to serve as a military superintend- ent in the northern region. But just as he was finally in a position of power, Wu learned from one of his soldiers a way back to China. Determined to return home, Wu Rui trekked for nine days, often through mountainous terrain, and arrived in the native domain (tu si) of Long Zhou in the south- ern province of Guangxi. But Wu’s ordeals would not end just yet. While Wu Rui was eager to make contact with Ming officials, Wei Chen, the native chief who had offered Wu shelter, was scheming to trade him back to Annam. Fortunately for Wu Rui, before Wei had a chance to strike a deal with the agents sent by the Annamese court, a chieftain from a nearby domain de- cided to seize Wu and turn him over to the local authorities. As a result, Wei Chen was ordered to be punished, and Wu Rui was brought to the Ming capital at Beijing where he was given a post in one of the eunuch offices in the palace.2 This intriguing if somewhat cryptic account found in the Veritable Records of the Ming (Ming shi lu) – the most important official record of the period we are concerned with – certainly raises more questions than it answers. What, for instance, prompted Wu Rui and his fellow Hainan natives to cross the south China strait? Did they indeed intend, as Wu claimed, to travel to Qin Zhou at the western end of the province of Guangdong to engage in 92 Leo K. Shin regular trade? Or were they in fact involved, as in the cases of many who lived along China’s southern coast, in prohibited dealings with foreign coun- tries? How typical, or atypical, was Wu Rui’s experience? Most mainland- bound travellers from Hainan, one suspects, would not consider the risk of being castrated as high (otherwise, most would probably stay home). But just as clearly, Wu and his companions were not the only ones who had ever been caught on the wrong side of the drift. To cite one example, not long before Wu Rui was captured by the Annamese patrol, according to another report in the Veritable Records, more than a hundred men from China who were suspected of having engaged in illicit trade had also been de- tained by Annam. Apart from questions related directly to Wu’s ordeals, what types of strategic information was Wu Rui able to pass on to the Ming and how valuable were they? No doubt, it had been the practice of both the Ming and Annamese courts to dispatch agents to spy on each other. But how intensive were such cross-border activities? And how had such efforts shaped the relationships between the two states?3 For the purpose of this chapter, the most interesting set of questions raised by the experience of Wu Rui has to do with both the idea and the reality of the border. As it is well recognized, borders are almost never natural but, rather, are “constructed” in the broadest sense of the word. In northern China, as Arthur Waldron has demonstrated, even as seemingly timeless and permanent an edifice of border division as the Great Wall was, as it turned out, largely a product of political compromises of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. But if the construction of the northern border must be understood within the broader contexts of Ming-Mongol relations as well as of the internal dynamics of the Ming polity, how should one begin to tell the story of the making of China’s southern boundary? This chapter does not attempt to offer a comprehensive answer; what it does attempt to do is to explain how Ming rulers and their agents defined and defended a par- ticular southern border. To be sure, the boundary between China and Annam was never as serious a military concern for the Ming court as was that be- tween the centralizing state and the Mongols. But though the border be- tween China and Annam would continue to be permeable (in the early fifteenth century, the Ming sought but failed to colonize the southern king- dom), over time, as we will see, Ming emperors and their officials did try hard to demarcate China’s southern boundary.4 Imagining the Border Even though, almost right from the start, the Ming court had recognized Annam as a self-governing kingdom, Ming rulers did not at first appear to be especially concerned about demarcating and defending China’s south- ern border. This neglect is not surprising for at least three reasons. First, although the Ming forces had managed to bring down the Yuan dynasty Ming China and Its Border with Annam 93 and beat the Mongol remnants back to the steppes, early Ming rulers such as the Hongwu (r. 1368-98) and Yongle (r. 1403-24) emperors were clearly far more concerned about the continual military threats from the north than about the potential troubles in the south. Second, even though Ming authorities would eventually extend to the southern border region their administrative and military apparatuses, given the inherent limits of the centralizing state, it actually took the Ming court some time before it could establish a semblance of order in its southern provinces. Third, in border areas where the Ming authorities were unable or unwilling to assert direct control, Ming rulers would come to rely on native domains – and the chief- tains who ruled them – to maintain order. Not only would the Ming au- thorities increasingly depend on such tu si to provide soldiers for its military campaigns, but it would also come to regard such native domains as buffers between the centralizing state and its neighbouring kingdoms.5 To begin to understand how early Ming rulers conceived the southern border, let us consider the case of Siming and its territorial disputes with Annam. As was true for the institution of native chieftaincy in general, relations between the centralizing state and the Siming domain had, from the start, been founded on mutual benefits. In exchange for a degree of order in China’s border regions, Ming emperors were willing to continue the Yuan dynasty practices of offering native chieftains official titles and letting them rule their domains with relative autonomy. The arrangement of native chieftaincy was no doubt a double-edged sword. When Huang Guangping (d. 1393), the teenage chieftain of Siming in southwest Guangxi (just across from Annam), was accused by Ming officials in 1392 of having first ordered and then covered up the killing of another chieftain, appar- ently the most the Hongwu emperor could do was to grant the young chief a pardon. Meanwhile, the institution of chieftaincy did allow Ming rulers to buffer themselves from the immediate problems of border control. As we will see, the Ming court would still be called upon to resolve disputes, but early Ming emperors were clearly willing to let native chieftains handle the task of defending the southern border.6 The case of Siming is interesting, in part, because it helps us understand what early Ming rulers and their agents saw as the major sources of tension in the southern border region. Consider the 1396 memorial submitted by the chieftain Huang Guangcheng (d. 1413), brother of Guangping, con- cerning the latest territorial disputes between Siming and Annam. Here, two main problems are laid out. The first and more immediate one, said the chieftain, had to do with the practice of the people of Annam to encroach on areas once under the control of Siming. In particular, by seizing control of the counties of Qiuwen, Ruao, Qingyuan, Yuan, and Tuo (all located in present-day northern Vietnam), not only had the people of Annam brought terror to Siming, but they had also deprived the Ming court of its tax 94 Leo K. Shin revenues. The second and more general problem, according to Huang Guangcheng, had to do with the propensity of the people of Annam to disregard the boundary between China and the southern kingdom. To be sure, few people in the Ming period could actually say for certain where the “bronze pillar” that had long been thought to mark China’s southern bor- der had once lain. But if the physical pillar allegedly erected by the Han dynasty general Ma Yuan (14 BCE-49) could no longer be found, according to Huang, the people of Annam should still observe the boundary that had long been established in the southern region.7 The case of Siming is also interesting because it shows how Ming and Annamese rulers had rather distinct views about where the border between the two countries should lie.