CHAPTER 7 From Authoritarianism to People Power in the Middle East and North Africa: Implications for Economic Inclusion and Equity Eva Bellin The developing world faces many challenges. These include the need to carry out substantial structural transformation, generate growth that is environ­ mentally sustainable, and foster development that is economically inclusive. To balance the trade-offs inevitably generated by the simultaneous pursuit of these goals, many stakeholders have emphasized the importance of expanding the role of popular voice in the policy-making process. Augmenting the scope of political inclusion is considered pivotal especially with regard to advancing the goal of economicinclusion. By giving the (poor) majority greater political voice, it is argued, greater economic equity can be achieved. If only it were so simple. As the experience of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) suggests, political inclusion and economic inclusion may be less closely paired than many might think. Since th~ momentous events of the "Arab Spring" of 2011, this region, long an epicenter of authoritarian­ ism, has begun a process of significant political opening. As such it presents a "natural experiment" for exploring the impact that expanded political inclu­ sion may have on improving economic inclusion and equity. Unfortunately, early observation of the region suggests that while demo­ cratic reform may deliver some measure of political empowerment to the people of the MENA, it may not necessarily have a positive impact in terms of delivering a better distribution of economicbenefits to the demos. This is attributable to three factors. First, many regimes in the MENA had already established relatively commendable records in terms of economic inclusion, while still thoroughly authoritarian. Consequently, there are few "low-hang­ ing fruit" for newly democratizing regimes to pick in terms of advancing 138 <)I, EVA BELLIN economic inclusion. This weakens the linkage drawn between democratic advance and distributional gains. Second, the most pressing source of eco­ nomic exclusion in the MENA today derives from the region's high level of unemployment. But it is not clear that augmenting the level of political inclu­ sion will necessarily assist in delivering the most widely hailed remedy for unemployment-economic growth. Finally, to expand economic inclusion, regimes in the region must embrace public policies that are expressly redis­ tributive as well as growth-oriented. Such policy initiatives require effec­ tive political mobilization of committed constituencies and policy makers. Unfortunately, effective mobilization is a political good that is not automati­ cally guaranteed by political opening alone. To clarify these points, this chapter explores the relationship between political inclusion and economic inclusion in the context of the MENA. First, the chapter will highlight the region's surprisingly strong past performance in terms of economic equity and distribution. The goal here is to show that political exclusion and economic exclusion are not necessarily a "matched pair" and to spotlight the comparatively high bar that democratizing regimes in the region must clear in order to register progress on economic inclusion. This high bar makes the linkage between economic and political inclusion less than automatic. Second, the chapter will identify the causal mechanisms that lead us to link political opening to economic inclusion (at least theo­ retically) and then present the mechanisms that thwart the pairing of these two goals in reality. Specifically, mobilizational failures by constituencies committed to distributive agendas prevent political opening from necessarily delivering on inclusionary goals. Third, the chapter will explore one of the most central development challenges faced by the region-unemployment­ and consider the contribution political opening may make to meeting this challenge. The ambiguous role political opening plays in eliminating the key obstacles to job growth in the region (e.g., limited foreign investment, low integration into international trade) suggests the tenuousness of pairing political and economic inclusion in the MENA. Fourth, and more optimisti­ cally, the chapter will reflect on some of the positive models of paired politi­ cal and economic inclusion that can be found among some key political and cultural referents for the region. Specifically, it will consider how success in Turkey, Indonesia, and Malaysia may gird the Arab world with the political inspiration and will to embrace the policies necessary to achieve dual inclu­ sion simultaneously. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC lNCLUSION/ExcLUSION- A MATCHED PAIR? Analysts who are philosophically committed to the goals of both political inclusion and economic equity have long been susceptible to the persuasion that "all good things go together." That is, they have long been inclined to believe that the extension of political rights to ever-larger segments of society POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INCLUSION • 139 will result in a fairer sharing of society's bounty. Conversely, they tend to believe that political exclusion of major segments of society will also spell economicexclusion of the majority. Although there are valid analytic grounds for the pairing of political and economic inclusion (as will be explored below), the reality on the ground is often quite different. Observers from the United States know this only too well. In terms of its formal political institutions, the United States is one of the most politically inclusive democracies in the world. And yet, the United States ranks as one of the least economically inclusive countries among its industrialized peers. Its performance on social indicators such as infant mortality and economic inequality place it in the company of countries that are much poorer and significantly less well endowed with democratic heritages (Bakalar 2011). Clearly, the provision of (formally) equal opportunities for political inclusion does not guarantee commensurate access to society's wealth. The fact that political and economic inclusion and exclusion are not a matched pair is nowhere more evident than in the case of the Arab world. This is a region that has long been renowned for authoritarianism, excep­ tional in both its scope and endurance. Freedom House and the Polity Project have routinely ranked the Arab world as the world region that is the least free and the least politically inclusive. And yet the region's performance in terms of economic inclusion (i.e., sharing society's wealth among all seg-. ments of society) has been surprisingly strong. This is evident in terms of a number of indicators. Most impressive is the Arab world's performance in terms of limiting lev­ els of absolute poverty. The Arab world has long had the lowest level of absolute poverty of all developing regions in the world. That is, a smaller percentage of people live on less than $1 a day or even $2 a day in the Arab world than in Latin America, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, or East Asia (see table 7.1 and figure 7.1). In this regard, the Arab world is "comparable to the super successful Asian countries" (Noland and Pack 2011:66). Among all Arab countries, only Yemen and Egypt have poverty levels that approach Third World levels (Noland and Pack 2011). The Arab world's impressive performance in terms of economic inclusion is also evident in its performance on numerous human development / social welfare indicators. Between 1960 and 2000, the region registered consider­ able gains in terms of life expectancy, infant mortality, child immunization rates, child nutrition, and education rates. For example, by the early 2000s, life expectancy in most Arab countries had risen by 44 percent, nearly equal­ ing that of the United States and surpassing the performance of comparably developed countries in East Asia and South Asia. Infant mortality rates had fallen dramatically, decreasing more than that of any other region. Child immunization rates had risen impressively, to the point that immunization became nearly universal. Educational opportunities increased dramatically with primary school education nearly universal in most Arab countries. 1 By some lights educational expansion had even gone too far, overproducing some tertiary education, if judged by the limited employment opportunities 140 '*' EVA BELLIN Table 7.1 Population below the poverty line(%) Co,mtry Year $1/day $2/day Middle East Algeria 1995 2.0 15.1 Egypt 2000 3.1 43.9 Jordan 2003 2.0 7.0 Morocco 1999 2.0 14.3 Tunisia 2000 2.0 6.6 Yemen 1998 15.7 45.2 Resotirce rich comparators Botswana 1993 23.5 SO.I Indonesia 2002 7.5 52.4 Nigeria 2003 70.8 92.4 Venezuela 2000 8.3 23.6 By region Middle East 2002 1.6 19.8 East Asia 2003 11.6 40.8 Latin America 2002 8.9 23.4 South Asia 2002 31.l 77.8 Sub-Saharan Africa 2002 44.0 74.9 Sor,rce:World Bank, cited in Noland and Pack (2011:68). 100 90 ·----------------------............_.... 80 ---------------- 70 B 0 a. 60 'E Cl) 50 ~ 40 if 30 -------------------- -----.............,:.·.·-~"'!:e..,I':'~- •......_- 20 ..•••••••••••••• --... 10 .... 0 ·-----------·"' 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2001 -- East Asia and Pacific - - • - · East Europe and Central Asia -- Sub-Saharan Africa - • - - · Latin America and the Caribbean -- Middle East and North Africa - - - • · South Asia Figure 7.1 Comparative trends in regional poverty at $2/day line, 1987-2001. So11rce:World Bank, cited in Iqbal (2006:8). available to many university graduates (Iqbal 2006:21-22, Noland and Pack 2011:62-64). Table 7.2 illustrates these accomplishments. Perhaps most surprisingly, the region's achievement in terms of eco­ nomic inclusion is evidenced by its relatively strong performance in terms POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INCLUSION <> 141 Table 7.2 Human development in the Middle East and North Africa (1960-2000) 1960 1980 2000 Years of education (average per person over 15) 0.9 2.6 5.5 Years of education (average per female over 15) 0.5 1.8 4.6 Child mortality (deaths per 1,000 births) 262 138 47 Life expectancy (years at birth) 47 58 68 S011r,e:World Bank, cited in Iqbal (2006:22).