SPECIAL ARTICLE E-Governance and Corruption in the States Can Technology Serve the Aam Aadmi? Jennifer Bussell A comparative evaluation of one-stop, computerised he potential to use information and communication citizen service centres in various Indian states has been technologies to improve public service delivery has been a key topic of policy interest in both the Indian carried out in this paper to assess their efficacy. It is T states and the centre over the last decade. The central govern- found that the outcomes of policies related to ment’s National e-Governance Plan (NeGP), established in e-governance in India are not correlated to conventional 2006, set out an impressiv e agenda for developing e-Govern- variables such as economic development. Instead the ment services, networking infrastructure, state data centres, and village-level centres for delivering core services to citizens extent to which political parties in power expect such (Government of India 2006a). This programme built on earlier policies to affect their current and future electoral efforts by a wide range of states to offer computerised services statuses affects implementation. such as ration cards, incom e certifi cates, building licences, land records, and income tax payments. From eSeva in Andhra Pradesh, Nemmadi in Karnataka, and Friends in Kerala to e-Mitra in Rajasthan, Civic Centres in Gujarat, and Sugam in Himachal Pradesh, state governments have been leaders in computerised service centres. Yet, as the central and state governments continue to imple- ment the NeGP across the country, we have only a minimal un- derstanding of how states approached the problem of compu- terised service delivery in the years leading up to the national plan, what types of services were made available to citizens, what obstacles were faced by politicians and bureaucrats in the implementation of these initiatives, and the extent to which these programmes are likely to benefi t citizens. Ana- lysts have evaluated individual computerisation initiatives (see, inter alia, Ahuja and Singh 2006; Bhatnagar and Singh 2009; Caseley 2004; Kuriyan and Ray 2009), but no compre- hensive comparison of state activities has evaluated compu- terisation policy outcomes. Did all states implement computer- ised service centres in a similar manner? Did all states deliver similar types of services to their citizens through these cen- tres? If not, what explains the variation in state government choices over e-Government programmes? This article addresses these questions on the basis of a com- prehensive study of state e-Government initiatives during the period 1999-2009.1 In particular, I evaluate state efforts to in- troduce one-stop service centres, similar to the common service centres promoted in the NeGP. This analysis offers two impor- tant fi ndings. First, while nearly all major Indian states imple- mented some type of computerised service centre programme during this period, the programmes themselves differed sig- nifi cantly in terms of the number and type of services made available to citizens (Figure 1, p 78). This substantial diversity Jennifer Bussell ([email protected]) is with the Lyndon B in strategies taken by state governments highlights the dra- Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin. matic ways in which the potential benefi ts of reformed service Economic & Political Weekly EPW June 23, 2012 vol xlvII no 25 77 SPECIAL ARTICLE delivery are limited to those citizens in only a few states and technology to automate processes and establish service centres. only certain populations within the states. However, the cost of opening a single centre is relatively low Second, this variation in policy design and implementation (Toyama et al 2004) and the cost of basic software and technol- cannot be explained based on variations in economic or social ogy infrastructure has decreased over the last 15 years. A service conditions, levels of pre-existing technology infrastructure, or centre programme was within the economic reach of all states the electoral conditions in a given state. Instead, in order to during this period and, as shown below, economic conditions are explain policy outcomes, it is necessary to understand the not correlated with any major characteristics of state policies. expected effect of these policies on the economic resources of Alternatively, general political conditions might infl uence incumbent politicians and in particular politicians’ expectations the likelihood that politicians would want to invest in a pro- about the threat of more transparent service delivery to estab- gramme to improve service delivery. Those politicians who lished sources of corrupt income. While there was considerable face the greatest electoral threat from their opponents might initial enthusiasm to use new technologies, the actual benefi ts be more enthusiasti c about introducing a new type of public offered to citizens are constrained in many cases by persistent good, in the form of improved service delivery, to increase their efforts to retain access to a rich source of corruption: the bribes chances of retaining power. However, because politicians in citizens pay to get the services they are promised by the state.2 nearly every India n state face the threat of anti-incumbency bias (Uppal 2009), the pressure to perform is in important Understanding Variations ways consistent across all states. As a result, it seems instead Erstwhile Chief Minister Chandrababu Naidu in Andhra that all politicians would have an interes t in improving serv- Pradesh gained signifi cant media attention for his efforts to ices, and it is less probable that small electoral differences had computerise government services – everything from electric- a strong effect on the character of reform. Other characteristics ity bills and property tax payments to caste and income certifi - of electoral competition such as the characteristics of political cates – and to offer them in one location. The potential constituencies and vote blocs may instead play an important role Figure 1: Maximum Number of Available Services Per Centre in the implementation of policies, which are considered below. 3 in the States (2006) Contrary to these arguments, it is posited that the primary 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 cause of diverse computerised service centre policies is varia- Uttarakhand tion in the extent to which incumbent politicians expect these Delhi centres to affect their economic resources. As in other con- Orissa texts, politicians weigh the expected costs and benefi ts of im- Haryana proving public services. Yet, the costs to Indian politicians of Tamil Nadu digitising public service delivery arise because new techno- logies can streamline government processes, and so can also West Bengal limit the ability of offi cials to generate and appropriate bribes Kerala from ineffi ciencies in service delivery. Where bribes are avail- Rajasthan able in public service delivery – for example, when citizens Uttar Pradesh fi nd it necessary to pay “speed money” to access services – pol- Maharashtra iticians are less likely to be supportive of policies to increase transparency in administration. Punjab In the Indian political system, politicians have multiple possi- Gujarat ble sources of corrupt income, including bribes paid by citizens Karnataka for services, kickbacks on contracts with the private sector, and Himachal Pradesh funds skimmed from offi cial state development programmes Chhattisgarh (Bardhan 2005; Davis 2004; Frankel 2005; Jenkins 2006; Old- Andhra Pradesh enburg 1987; Wade 1985). While recent media attention has fo- cused on major cases of grand corruption, such as in the Com- improvements to the quality of service delivery seemed vast, monwealth Games (NDTV 2010a), the Maharashtra housing and chief ministers from across the country sent offi cials to scandal (Financial Express 2010), illegal export of mineral re- learn about the “eSeva” model.4 Because citizens have often sources in Karnataka (Pandey 2010), and 2G spectrum licensing faced diffi cult circumstances when attempting to access public (NDTV 2010b), it is corruption in the day-to-day activities of the services, it is not surprising that many state leaders saw this as state in interaction with the public that amounts to a Rs 21,000 an opportunity to increase their standing in the eyes of citi- crore (Transparency International India and CMS 2005) market zens by improving service delivery.5 in petty corruption that directly affects Indian citizens. But if politicians hope to use higher quality, technology- Whether the source of corrupt income is corporate kickbacks enable d services to improve their chances of re-election, then or bribes from individuals, politicians do not extract rents why did state governments differ so dramatically in their in- through the machinery of the state solely for personal pecuni- troduction of service centres? One answer might be that ary gain, but often to enhance their hold on political power poorer states did not have the economic resources to purchase (Frankel 2005; Iype 2004; Wade 1985). Access to bribes can 78 June 23, 2012 vol xlvII no 25 EPW Economic & Political Weekly SPECIAL ARTICLE serve as an important electoral resource for incumbents. in areas with high petty corruption are less likely than their Because there is no explicit funding mechanism for Indian state peers in lower corruption regions to support the initial intro- assembly elections, candidates often fund their campaigns