Center for Strategic and International Studies Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy 1800 K Street, N.W. • Suite 400 • Washington, DC 20006 Phone: 1 (202) 775-3270 • Fax: 1 (202) 457-8746 Web: http://www.csis.org/burke Email: [email protected] Iraqi Force Development: Summer 2006 Update Anthony Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy With the Assistance of Brian Burton Revised August 23, 2006 Cordesman: Iraqi Force Development 8/23/2006 Page ii Executive Summary Iraqi force development in the summer of 2006 occurred against a backdrop of increasing adversity and violence. Initial events suggested cause for optimism. A new elected Iraqi government that included all major factions finally took shape in May. Al-Qa’ida in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was killed on June 7. Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki seemed poised to take the initiative with a proposal for national reconciliation and the beginning of the Baghdad security plan called Operation Forward Together. Yet security proved an elusive goal, and inability to halt waves of sectarian-motivated killing sparked renewed fears of civil war as Shi’ite versus Sunni clashes escalated. Militias and “death squads” became the primary targets for security forces. Securing Baghdad was clearly the central objective of Iraqi and Coalition efforts during the summer of 2006, and it proved to be an elusive goal. The “first phase” of Operation Forward Together relied on a show of strength with more Iraqi security forces on the streets manning more checkpoints. “Phase two” of the operation, formulated in late July well after the failure to slow the violence was apparent, incorporated more US troops and more elements of counterinsurgency warfare, specifically the “oil spot” strategy of creating secured areas one by one and the attempt to win the confidence of Iraqi civilians through more sensitive and subtle search operations and efforts to clean up battle-scarred neighbourhoods. “Phase two” may have been a better plan, but its true test will be when secured areas are returned to the control of Iraqi military and police units. While Baghdad remained a center of attention, Iraqi and US forces attempted to reassert government control in Ramadi and the Anbar province at large, which remained a hotspot for Sunni insurgents. Another major operational development of the summer was the handover of security responsibilities to Iraqi forces. In July, Muthanna became the first Iraqi province transferred to full Iraqi security control, and more transfers were being planned. Efforts to recruit and train Iraq’s Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior forces continued in the midst of the turmoil, and US military leaders reported that 268,000 Iraqi soldiers and police had been trained by midsummer, with the remainder of what was planned to be a 325,000-man force to be ready by the end of 2006. Yet the increased quantity of Iraqi “boots on the ground” did not result in immediate improvements of the security situation. Despite improved training and capabilities, persistent problems, notably sectarian militia loyalties, corruption, lack of logistical and administrative support, and a lack of trust from the Iraqi people, continued to hinder significant progress. Iraqi internal politics could still lead to a major civil conflict between ethnic factions and sects. It is too soon to predict how well Iraqi forces can or cannot supplement, whether they will remain unified and serve the nation and not factions, and the extent to which they can eventually replace Coalition forces. The nation-building aspects of the “war after the war” remain a struggle in progress, and there still is no way to know whether the light at the end of the tunnel is daylight or an oncoming train. Copyright CSIS, all rights reserved. All further dissemination and reproduction must be done with the written permission of CSIS. Cordesman: Iraqi Force Development 8/23/2006 Page iii Table of Contents THE ACCELERATION AND EFFECTS OF SECTARIAN VIOLENCE IN SUMMER 2006........................................ 4 THE KILLING OF ZARQAWI ......................................................................................................................... 7 EFFORTS TO SECURE BAGHDAD IN SUMMER 2006 ..................................................................................... 9 EFFORTS TO SECURE RAMADI IN SUMMER 2006 ...................................................................................... 13 THE TRANSFER OF SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES ...................................................................................... 14 THE EMERGING “SECOND THREAT:” ADDING SHI’ITE AND KURDISH VIOLENCE AND MILITIAS TO THE ISF MISSION ................................................................................................................................................... 16 The Shi’ite Militias as the Main New Threat ...................................................................................... 16 Rising Uncertainty as to the Role of Iraqi Forces in Sectarian and Ethnic Violence......................... 18 OVERALL PROGRESS IN THE RECRUITING, TRAINING AND DEPLOYMENT OF IRAQI FORCES JANUARY-JUNE 2006 ......................................................................................................................................................... 20 Trends in Quantity and Quality .......................................................................................................... 20 Iraqi Readiness and “Owning the Battle Space”................................................................................ 22 Ongoing Efforts to Recruit and Train the ISF..................................................................................... 26 Creating an Effective Officer Corps ................................................................................................... 28 Training and Progress in Military Transition Teams (MITTs)........................................................... 31 Transitioning Security Responsibility to the Iraqi Government and Criteria for Withdrawing Forces ............................................................................................................................................................ 33 A Success, Rather than Calendar-Driven, Approach.......................................................................... 34 The Effort to Create an Effective Support Apparatus ......................................................................... 36 Equipment Deliveries and Challenges................................................................................................ 38 ARMY ....................................................................................................................................................... 40 Increasing Combat Capability and Readiness.................................................................................... 41 Trend in Army Support Forces............................................................................................................ 42 AIR FORCE................................................................................................................................................ 44 MINISTRY OF INTERIOR FORCES ............................................................................................................... 48 Real versus Authorized Strength......................................................................................................... 48 MINISTRY OF INTERIOR “NATIONAL POLICE”: SPECIAL SECURITY FORCES AND POLICE COMMANDOS ... 50 Build-Up in 2006 ................................................................................................................................ 51 Reform and Persistent Problems in Spring and Summer 2006 ......................................................... 53 THE REGULAR POLICE.............................................................................................................................. 54 Increases in Police Strength ............................................................................................................... 55 The “Year of the Police” .................................................................................................................... 55 Reform of the Police............................................................................................................................ 56 Equipment and Training ..................................................................................................................... 57 Facility Construction .......................................................................................................................... 58 FACILITIES PROTECTION FORCES, PRIVATE SECURITY PERSONNEL AND “MINISTRY ARMIES” ................ 60 The Facilities Protection Services ...................................................................................................... 60 The Infrastructure Protection Forces ................................................................................................. 61 CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................................................................................... 63 Copyright CSIS, all rights reserved. All further dissemination and reproduction must be done with the written permission of CSIS. Cordesman: Iraqi Force Development 8/23/2006 Page 4 The Acceleration and Effects of Sectarian Violence in Summer 2006 By the end of June 2006, the rising level of casualties