David Benatar, Death, and the Harm in Existence BY MICHAEL DA SILVA Anti-natalism is the philosophical position opposing procreation. It has both local and global forms; “in its local form it applies only to particular people in certain instances, in its global form, to everyone.”1 Philosopher David Benatar, an expert in applied ethics presently of the University of Cape Town, is one of the leading proponents of global anti-natalism. While Benatar’s position was initially developed in journal articles,2 his 2006 book, Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence, is the most detailed account of his anti- natalist stance. It is also the leading argument for the inherent harm of existence; as its title suggests, it argues that coming into existence is always a harm. The consequences of this Utilitarian perspective are severe. Benatar argues against the moral permissibility of creating sentient beings and for a phased extinction of the human race. For Benatar, “[r]eproduction is never morally acceptable...[and s]ex can be morally acceptable only if it is not reproductive.3 Benatar’s position is extreme, but influential. While negation of his central theses would not justify unlimited procreational autonomy on its own, even limited ethical acceptance of procreation may require strong arguments against him. 1 Brake, E. & Millum, J. "Parenthood and Procreation", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL: <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/parenthood/>. 2 I.e., Benatar, D. “Why it is Better Never to Come into Existence”, American Philosophical Quarterly 34, (1997): 345–55. 3 Benatar, D. Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence. (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2006). 127. Valley Humanities Review Spring 2012 1 Benatar’s argument for the harm of existence rests on a series of assumptions about the taxonomy of harms (i.e., death is a harm) and the proper ethical perspective from which to judge given decisions (i.e., one cannot treat decisions about the creation of life the same way one treats decisions about the continuance of life). A charitable philosopher attempting to ground his controversial position in widely-held beliefs, he makes a number of concessions in his argument. This essay demonstrates how Benatar’s own concessions create room for the possibility that existence is not always a harm and identifies a possible logistical hurdle for his population ethics given i) this possibility and ii) his commitment to the life worth starting–life worth continuing distinction. This is not the first argument against the significance of the life worth starting—life worth continuing distinction.4 It is, however, one that initially meets Benatar on his own terms. The demonstration focuses primarily on Benatar’s first argument for the harm of existence and its consequent anti-natalism. It is not chiefly grounded in concerns about the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives,5 equivocation between “impersonal goodness and goodness for a Person”,6 the harm of the absence of goods no one can enjoy7 or the lack of grounding for a claim that “absent pains are always valuable”.8 It instead largely focuses on Benatar’s own concessions. In brief, it states: 1) there exists a condition where existence is 4 DeGrazia, D. “Is it wrong to impose the harms of human life? A reply to Benatar”, Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31(4), (2010): 317-331. 5 Brown, C. “Better Never to Have Been Believed: Benatar on the Harm of Existence”, Economics and Philosophy 27(1), (2011): 45-52. 6 Harman, E. “Critical Study: David Benatar. Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006)”, Nous 43(3), (2009): 776-785. 7 Smilansky, S. “Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence”, Philosophical Quarterly 58(232), (2008):569-571. 8 Kaposy, C. “Coming Into Existence: The Good, The Bad, and the Indifferent: David Benatar, Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming Into Existence. (Clarendon Press, 2006), Human Studies 32(1), 2006): 101-108. Valley Humanities Review Spring 2012 2 neither a benefit nor a harm, therefore, 2) given the possibility that a child’s existence is neither a benefit nor a harm, having a child is not morally impermissible due to the fact of existence alone, and, 3) once one exists, the ethical paradigm changes and lives that may not have been worth starting may continue on the basis of criteria in this new paradigm. Extinction is thus unlikely even where Benatar’s precepts are fully adopted. Furthermore, it is not clear that the life worth starting—life worth continuing divide is relevant if things are as bad as Benatar suggests in his second argument for the harm of existence. That argument relies on contingent facts about harm in existence that may demand the creation of a better world rather the permanent cessation of life creation. A Brief Overview of David Benatar’s Argument for the Harm of Existence Benatar’s two arguments for the harm of existence constitute the “heart” of his book.9 One is based on a fundamental asymmetry between the nature of the absence of pleasure and the nature of the absence of pain. The other stems from how bad he thinks lives are. The arguments are distinct, although the latter can also be understood as an extension of the former.10 According to Benatar, the former is his “best argument”.11 It identifies an asymmetry between (3) and (4) below: (1) the presence of pain is bad... 9 Benatar, supra note 3 at 13. 10 Ibid. at 60-61 11 Ibid. at 203. Valley Humanities Review Spring 2012 3 (2) the presence of pleasure is good... (3) the absence of pain is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone... (4) the absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is somebody for whom this absence is a deprivation.12 Where someone exists, there is both the bad of the presence of pain and the good of the presence of pleasure.13 Where no one exists, nothing bad happens and the good of the avoidance of pain is promoted; “only existers suffer harm”.14 For Benatar, “any suffering at all – would be sufficient to make coming into existence a harm”.15 The harm of existence is avoidable and pointless.16 It is always good to avoid harm when one can do so at no cost; it is accordingly always good not to come into existence.17 Exposure to worse harms is a worse moral offence. The sheer quantity of harm in existence thus animates Benatar’s second argument for the harm of existence. According to Benatar, “even the best lives are very bad”; some are worth continuing but none were worth starting in the first place.18 People tend to overrate the pleasure in their lives due to an assortment of Pollyannism, adaptation/habituation and a focus on comparative rather than actual self-assessments of well-being.19 One can reasonably assert that life is not as bad as Benatar makes out, but he says doing so would be wrong: “at least most lives are very bad”.20 12 Benatar, supra note 3 at 30. 13 Ibid. at 37-38. 14 Ibid. at 37-38; 29. 15 Ibid. at 206-207n6. 16 Ibid. at 5. 17 Ibid. at 205. 18 Ibid. at 61. 19 Ibid. at 65-68. 20 Ibid. at 94. Valley Humanities Review Spring 2012 4 Arguing from the Proper Perspective? Benatar’s argument raises the important question of which form of ethical analysis is appropriate for judging the decision-making about starting life. How should one frame the moral universe of the non-existent? “Lives worth living” and “lives worth starting” are distinct in Benatar’s thought.21 Decisions about the former can be made about potential future beings, while decisions about the latter must be made with reference to existent people.22 The threshold is higher for determining that a life is not worth continuing.23 It may be the case that a life would have been better if it did not exist in the first place, but this is no reason to end it now.24 Just as you may regret going to see a bad movie in the first place, but nonetheless stay to finish it, you may regret coming into existence but still desire to continue existing.25 This is not perfectly rational economic action, but may be reasonable. When answering the question of whether a life is worth starting only, one can only take a future oriented perspective, looking at the benefits and harms of bringing someone into existence. The lives of existent people are not appropriate comparators. Benatar does not initially wear his consequentialism on his sleeve, but eventually describes his arguments as broadly Utilitarian.26 Benatar’s anti-natalist argument weighs the (child’s) positives and negatives of the consequences of having a child against one another. Even if the positives outweigh the negatives, a wrong is committed if the consequent negatives 21 Benatar, supra note 3 at 22-28. 22 Ibid. at 22. 23 Ibid. at 23. 24 Ibid. at 24. 25 Ibid. at 15n23. 26 Ibid. at 88. Valley Humanities Review Spring 2012 5 reach a threshold of harm.27 On his construction (and perspective of reality), the negatives always outweigh the positives – the harm of existence is always greater than any pleasure one may experience and that pleasure is likely illusory in any case. In the realm of applied ethics, consequences are clearly important. Having a child will bring it into existence, regardless of how one frames the moral universe and this banal fact must be taken into account.