FEDERATION of ofAAMERICANMERICANSCIENTISTSSCIENTISTS Missions for Nuclear Weapons after the Cold War Ivan Oelrich Occasional Paper No. 3 January 2005 About the Federation of American Scientists For almost sixty years, the Federation of American Scientists and our members have played a critical role both in identifying opportunities and risks resulting from advances in science and technology. Our efforts are focused on research and advocacy on science and policy issues to ensure that advances in science and technology make America more secure, our economy more sustainable, and our society more just. The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) was founded in 1945 by Manhattan Project scientists who recognized that atomic weapons had irreversibly changed the role of scientists in national affairs. 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Holdren Herbert F. York * David H. Hubel * Jerome Karle * Nobel Laureate Carl Kaysen Missions for Nuclear Weapons after the Cold War Ivan Oelrich Occasional Paper No. 3 January 2005 Acknowledgements In support of this study, the Federation of American Scientists asked a dis- tinguished group of experts to provide advice and comments. This panel was made up of Charlie Curtis, Steve Fetter, Leon Fuerth, Rose Gottemoeller, Michael Levi, Jan Lodal, Michael May, and Jim Steinberg. This report benefit- ed enormously from their thoughtful discussions, during meetings at the Federa- tion and from their comments on earlier drafts. While I am sure no panel mem- ber agrees with every point made in this study, I hope each can see their ideas reflected here. I would also like to thank Henry Kelly, the President of the Fed- eration for his comments and support and Jaime Yassif for assistance with the research, organizing the panel meetings, and providing summary narratives of each meeting. Finally, I want to thank the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and the Ploughshares Fund for their generous support that made this work possible. Ivan Oelrich Director, Strategic Security Program, FAS November 2004 TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary . 1 Section 1: Background & Approach … . 9 The post-Cold War nuclear environment. 12 Table 1 United States Nuclear Warhead Inventory. 13 Defining Nuclear Missions. 15 Table 2 Nuclear Weapons Missions. 16 Evaluation Criteria . 17 Section 2: Nuclear Mission Evaluations . 21 Mission 1: Retaliation for nuclear attack against homeland Mission 2: Retaliation for nuclear attack against allies . 21 Mission 3: Retaliate for CBW attack against homeland Mission 4: Retaliate for CBW attack against allies Mission 5: Retaliate for CBW use in military theater. 29 Mission 6: Deploying weapons capable of attacking enemy nuclear weapons to discourage their development Mission 7: Deploying weapons capable of attacking enemy CBW weapons to discourage their development . 33 Mission 8: Damage-limitation attacks against nuclear weapons in military theater Mission 9: Damage-limitation attacks against CB weapons in military theater . 36 Mission 10: Damage limitation attacks against Russian/Chinese central systems . 41 iv | Federation of American Scientists Mission 11: Retaliate for regional conventional attacks. 45 Mission 12: Overawe potential rivals . 46 Mission 13: Provide virtual power . 49 Mission 14: Fight regional wars . 49 Mission 15: War termination . 51 Section 3: Conclusions . 53 Appendix: Nuclear "Usability" and the Likelihood of Use . 57 Figure A1 The “More is Less” Curve . 58 Endnotes . 63 Executive Summary uclear weapons are instruments of immense military and political power. Their existence affected every aspect of the Cold War. The Nappropriate roles of nuclear weapons are less clear now that the Cold War is over and much of the current U.S. nuclear force posture is extrapolated from the past. In spite of the great changes in the strategic environment, the United States and Russia still maintain arsenals of over seven thousand nuclear weapons, most with explosive force equivalent to hundreds of thousands of tons of TNT, and most ready to launch within minutes. During the Cold War, the nuclear arsenals of both the United States and the Soviet Union allowed for substantial overkill and redundancy. Thus, even large quantitative reductions in intercontinental strategic weapons do not have comparable qualitative ef- fects. Even when the United States and Russia move to the two thousand or so weapons envisioned by the SORT or Moscow Treaty, the U.S. nuclear force structure will be a scaled down version of its Cold War arsenal. In addition the United States, and probably Russia, are exploring new missions for nuclear weapons. This study sets out to evaluate today's nuclear missions. The range of mis- sions for nuclear weapons is being eroded from two sides. First, changes in the strategic environment, including the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the ris- ing conventional dominance of the United States, and the growing non-state threat have reduced the number of missions that might warrant weapons of such enormous power. The stakes involved during the Cold War were for each su- perpower's survival; for the West, nuclear weapons helped compensate for per- ceived conventional weaknesses. Nuclear doctrines evolved at a time when So- 2 | Federation of American Scientists viet tank armies were poised west of Berlin. But today, America's conventional superiority stands the Cold War strategic balance on its head. Introduction of nuclear weapons into conflicts around the world will work to the disadvantage of the United States. Second, on-going advances in U.S. non-nuclear technology allow conven- tional weapons to supplant nuclear weapons in those missions that remain. Dur- ing the Cold War, nuclear explosives were developed for use in torpedoes, depth charges, demolition charges, air-to-air rockets and surface-to-air missiles, and for small-unit fire support. One by one, advances in modern sensor-guided mu- nitions have made nuclear weapons obsolete for each of these missions. Per- haps the current emphasis on nuclear attack of deep and very hard targets comes about because it is the last mission, aside from destroying cities, for which nu- clear weapons are not obviously displaced by conventional alternatives. This is not to say that nuclear weapons are not potentially extremely useful for some other militaries. The Chinese military, for example, might be viewed as at the technological level of the U.S. military in the 1960s when tactical nu- clear capabilities were at their peak. Indeed, the Chinese might have difficulty sinking an American