“A useful accessory to the infantry, but nothing more” Tanks at the Battle of Flers-Courcelette, September 1916 Andrew McEwen he Battle of Flers-Courcelette Fuller was similarly unkind about the Tstands out in the broader memory Abstract: The Battle of Flers- tanks’ initial performance. In his Tanks of the First World War due to one Courcelette is chiefly remembered in the Great War, Fuller wrote that the as the combat introduction of principal factor: the debut of the tanks. The prevailing historiography 15 September attack was “from the tank. The battle commenced on 15 maligns their performance as a point of view of tank operations, not September 1916 as a renewed attempt lacklustre debut of a weapon which a great success.”3 He, too, argued that by the general officer commanding held so much promise for offensive the silver lining in the tanks’ poor (GOC) the British Expeditionary warfare. However, unit war diaries showing at Flers-Courcelette was that and individual accounts of the battle Force (BEF) General Douglas Haig suggest that the tank assaults of 15 the battle served as a field test to hone to break through German lines on September 1916 were far from total tank tactics and design for future the Somme front. Flers-Courcelette failures. This paper thus re-examines deployment.4 One of the harshest shares many familiar attributes the role of tanks in the battle from verdicts on the tanks’ debut comes with other Great War engagements: the perspective of Canadian, British from the Canadian official history. and New Zealand infantry. It finds troops advancing across a shell- that, rather than disappointing Allied It commented that “on the whole… blasted landscape towards thick combatants, the tanks largely lived the armour in its initial action failed German defensive lines to capture up to their intended role of infantry to carry out the tasks assigned to it.” a few square kilometres of barren support. It acknowledged, however, that the territory at the cost of thousands “All Arms” co-ordination of tanks, of lives. The successful assault on September attack in Martin Gilbert’s artillery, infantry and aircraft was not Courcelette by the 2nd Canadian The Battle of the Somme (2006) is entitled yet familiar to BEF commanders.5 Division is typically regarded as “The arrival of the tanks: ‘We are An examination of the battle a victory in Canadian memory of feeling top dogs.’” Similarly, Robin from the infantry’s perspective the war. In contrast, British forces Prior and Trevor Wilson’s The Somme suggests a more nuanced outcome. attacking to the east did not achieve (2005) discusses Flers-Courcelette Despite the high hopes of General their intended breakthrough, and in a chapter entitled “Lumbering Haig and others for their effect on the the battle is viewed in the UK as Tanks: The Battle of 15 September.” battlefield, tanks were not expected a minor advance.1 The tanks’ first Such works are in agreement about to be decisive strategic weapons in combat deployment ultimately two principal conclusions: the attack their early operations. Rather, they overshadowed the hard infantry was not a stirring success, but it were intended to serve as tactical fighting of 15 September in the did showcase the potential for the accessories to the infantry assault. broader memory of the Great War. tank as an offensive weapon. The Infantry units were instructed prior Nearly all of the works that British official history discusses the to 15 September that tanks would discuss the Battle of Flers-Courcelette many shortcomings of the tank on be valuable in surmounting enemy highlight the debut of the tank as 15 September but concedes that the machine gun posts and strongpoints, the central feature of the battle. battle was a “valuable tryout” for the but were in no way to be depended For example, the chapter on the 15 possibilities of tank assaults.2 J.F.C. upon for the advance.6 Flers- © Canadian Military History, Volume 20, Number 4, Autumn 2011, pp.7-22. 7 Courcelette was not the harbinger of tank performance was often a massive joint offensive along the of fast, offensive armoured thrusts, narrowly linked to the fate of the foot inter-army boundary in the Picardy but of tactical support for infantry soldiers – low casualties counting as region in May-June.8 These plans attacks. success, and high casualties as failure. were disrupted by the German The Canadian Corps and British Inconsistencies and biases of both the drive towards Verdun in late XV Corps witnessed the greatest war diaries and personal accounts February which aimed to inflict range of tank performance at Flers- may be identified and balanced by such horrendous losses that the Courcelette and will serve as the reference to more broadly based French would be forced to sue for focal point of analysis for this paper. secondary sources, such as official peace and thereby isolate the BEF.9 Out of five corps at the battle, histories and analytical studies. Verdun descended into a savage these two experienced the most Although at Flers-Courcelette battle of attrition. The French suffered success with tanks and feature the most of the tanks suffered mechanical an estimated 115,000 casualties by best-documented analysis of tank breakdown or battle damage and May.10 operations on 15 September. failed to influence events, some tanks Desperate to alleviate the strain As tanks were designed from rendered valuable assistance to the on Verdun, French commander-in- the outset to support infantry attacks infantry in surmounting German chief General Joseph Joffre pressured across no-man’s-land, the yardstick strongpoints. Both eventualities were the British to continue with the for tank success should be based anticipated and prepared for by the planned offensive in Picardy, north upon how the infantry fared.7 Much attacking infantry units. This paper of the Somme River. Haig protested of the primary analysis for this paper will show that the tanks largely lived that his forces would not be ready will therefore rest upon infantry up to their intended tactical support for a major assault until 15 August. battalion war diaries which contain role at Flers-Courcelette. This was unacceptable to Joffre intelligence and after-action reports and he persuaded Haig to commit and offer candid examinations of Strategic Context to a 1 July start date.11 The carnage tank performance. A number of at Verdun meant that the French infantrymen from Flers-Courcelette, s the Great War entered its third contribution to the Somme offensive moreover, left eyewitness accounts Ayear in January 1916 both the would necessarily be decreased, but of the tanks’ performance, which Entente and Central Powers were Haig still maintained hopes for a supplement the war diaries with intent on smashing through enemy breakthrough on the Western Front. a human dimension of combat. lines and ending the stalemate on The British attack went in as These documents must be used with the Western Front. The British and scheduled in the morning of 1 July caution. An infantry unit’s evaluation French high commands agreed to 1916 and was met with horrific The battle of Flers-Courcelette saw the first use of tanks in battle. C.4 (Chablis), a Mark I (female) tank, assigned to support the 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade, was disabled early in the battle by a shell which disabled its track (see the damage at the rear of the tank). Canadian War Museum 19920085-460 Canadian War 8 Canadian War Museum 19920085-469 Canadian War Here, C.5 (Crème de Menthe), a Mark I tank traverses the Courcelette battlefield, September 1916. C.5 was a male variant armed with two naval 6-pounder guns and four Vickers machine guns. The female variant replaced the 6-pounders with two additional Vickers machine guns. The two-wheeled trailer pulled behind the tank was a steering tail used to help control the direction of the vehicle. slaughter. The combination of deep the east to Combles in the southwest.14 attack was scheduled to begin on 15 German entrenchments and dense This stretch of the German line September. barbed wire that survived the long represented their “Third Position,” British artillery bombardment, a stout network of trenches and The Tanks coupled with lack of surprise meant dugouts that were begun in February that the defenders were well- 1916. Haig hoped that breaking aig used every means at prepared. Over 19,000 British and through this position would finally Hhis disposal to increase the Empire soldiers were killed and some crack the German lines.15 possibility of success for this second 38,000 wounded on the first day of The primary drive of the major effort of the Somme offensive. the attack alone.12 Undeterred by the offensive was to be undertaken The centerpiece of the 15 September scale of the losses, Haig continued by General Sir Henry Rawlinson’s attack was to be roughly 50 rhombus- to push. By late August, roughly Fourth Army, which was tasked with shaped Mark I tanks. By the summer eight square kilometres of German- breaking through three primary lines of 1916 several companies of tanks held territory were captured at a of German defences and capturing were training in Great Britain under cost of 100,000 British casualties.13 the villages of Martinpuich, Flers and a shroud of secrecy. There were German strongholds such as those Gueudecourt on the first day. The two principal variants of the Mark at Thiepval and High Wood, and Canadian Corps of the neighbouring I: the male and female. Males were the Quadrilateral trench network Reserve Army would support this armed with four machine guns continued to elude capture even after drive by attacking Courcelette.