Wittgenstein’s Conception of the Autonomy of Language and its Implications for Natural Kinds George Wrisley [email protected] NOTICE TO BORROWERS In presenting this thesis as partial fulfillment of the requirements for an advanced degree from Georgia State University, I agree that the library of the university will make it available for inspection and circulation in accordance with its regulations governing materials of this type. I agree that permission to quote from, to copy from, or to publish from this thesis may be granted by the author, by the professor under whose direction it was written, or by the Dean of the College of Arts & Sciences. Such quoting, copying or publishing must be solely for scholarly purposes and must not involve potential financial gain. 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The author of this dissertation is The director of this dissertation is George Wrisley Dr. Grant Luckhardt 8081 Henderson Court Department of Philosophy Alpharetta, GA 30004 College of Arts & Sciences Wittgenstein’s Conception of the Autonomy of Language And its Implications for Natural Kinds A Thesis Presented in Partial Fulfillment of Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in the College of Arts and Sciences Georgia State University 2002 by George Wrisley Committee: ______________________________ Dr. Grant Luckhardt, Chair ______________________________ Dr. Robert Arrington, Member ______________________________ Dr. Steve Rieber, Member ______________________________ Date _____________________________ Dr. George Rainbolt Department Chair ii CONTENTS List of Abbreviations iv Introduction 1 Chapter 1. Grammar 3 I. Grammatical Elements 4 (A) Particular Statements, Propositions, and Remarks 4 (B) Mathematical Propositions 8 (C) Ostensive Definitions 9 II. Empirical vs. Grammatical 12 III. Grammar and Language as Systems 19 IV. The Indeterminacy of Grammar in the Application of Concepts 25 V. Following the Rules of Grammar 27 VI. Two Conceptions of Grammar 34 2. Autonomy of Language 42 Five Ways that Grammar is Arbitrary and Language Autonomous 1. Grammar Determines Meaning 42 2. Grammar is Unverifiable 44 3. Grammar is Neither Right Nor Wrong 49 4. Grammar is not Justified by Bringing About Certain Effects 63 iii 5. Grammar is not Determined by Goals or Aims 66 3. Kripke and Natural Kinds 70 4. Wittgenstein and Kripke 82 1. Essence is not Discovered by Science 82 2. The Necessity that Kripke Points to is not Metaphysical 92 3. The Description of a Natural Kind Does not Fix the Reference 95 5. Survey of Implications 107 Works Cited 111 iv Abbreviations AWL Wittgenstein’s Lectures, Cambridge 1932-35, ed. Alice Ambrose. Rowman and Littlefield, Totowa, 1979. BB The Blue and Brown Books, Ludwig Wittgenstein. Harper Torchbooks. Basil Blackwell, 1958. BT The Big Typescript, Ludwig Wittgenstein. The Bergen Electronic Edition. The Wittgenstein Trustees. Oxford University Press, University of Bergen, 2000. CD The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Robert Audi. Cambridge University Press, 1995. CFL This Complicated Form of Life: Essays on Wittgenstein, Newton Garver. Open Court, 1994. CM A Companion to Metaphysics, ed. Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa. Blackwell Publishers, 1995. INS Insight and Illusion, P.M.S. Hacker. Revised Edition. Oxford University Press, 1986. LFM Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics: Cambridge 1939, Ludwig Wittgenstein. Ed. Cora Diamond. University of Chicago Press edition, 1989. LG Langenscheidts Großwörterbuch: Deutsch als Fremdsprache. Ed. Dr. Dieter Götz, et al. Langenscheidt, 1998. LTR Language, Thought, and Reality; Selected Writings, Benjamin Lee Whorf. Ed. John B. Carroll. [Cambridge] Technology Press of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1956. LW Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Ludwig Wittgenstein. Vol I, ed. G.H. von Wright and H. Nyman. Trans. C. G. Luckhardt and M.A.E. Aue. Blackwell, 1982. MFN Mathematics for the Nonmathematician, Morris Kline. Dover Publications, Inc., 1967. NN Naming and Necessity, Saul Kripke. Harvard University Press, 1980. OC On Certainty, Ludwig Wittgenstein. Ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von v Wright. Trans. Denis Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe. Harper Torchbooks. Blackwell, 1969. PG Philosophical Grammar, Ludwig Wittgenstein. Ed. Rush Rhees. Trans. Anthony Kenny. University of California Press Berkeley and Los Angeles. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1974. PI Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein. Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. Reissued German-English Edition. Blackwell Publishers, 1998 PO Philosophical Occasions: 1912-1951, Ludwig Wittgenstein. Ed. James Klagge and Alfred Nordmann. Hackett Publishing Company, 1993. RC Remarks on Color, Ludwig Wittgenstein. Ed. G.E.M. Anscombe. Trans. Linda L. McAlister and Margarete Schättle. University of California Press, 1978. RFM Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Ludwig Wittgenstein. Ed. G.H. von Wright, R. Rhees, and G.E.M. Anscombe. Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. Revised Edition. The MIT Press, 1996. RGN Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar, and Necessity, G.P. Baker and P.M.S. Hacker. Basil Blackwell, 1995. RPP I Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology I, Ludwig Wittgenstein. Ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright. Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. The University of Chicago Press. Basil Blackwell, 1980. WD A Wittgenstein Dictionary, Hans-Johann Glock. The Blackwell Philosopher Dictionaries. Blackwell Publishers, 1996. WP Wittgenstein’s Place in Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy, P.M.S. Hacker. Blackwell Publishers, 1996. Z Zettel, Ludwig Wittgenstein. Ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright. Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. University of California Press. Basil Blackwell, 1967. 1 Introduction Wittgenstein writes: “Do not believe that you have the concept of colour within you because you look at a coloured object—however you look” (Zettel [Z] §332). To show that this is true, to understand why it is true, and to investigate the implications of its truth for natural kind terms will be, in essence, the aim of this thesis. In truly understanding this remark and grasping its implications, one needs to understand what Wittgenstein means by the term ‘grammar’ and what he means by saying that grammar is arbitrary and language autonomous. The autonomy of language is a direct implication of Wittgenstein’s latter conception of meaning. In direct contrast to his early philosophy, Wittgenstein asserts that the meaning of a term is not an object for which the term stands. The meaning of the color term ‘red’ is neither an instance of red in the world, nor the sum of all red colored things. Rather, a red object may be used as a sample to explain the meaning of the term ‘red’—as part of the explanation of how the term ‘red’ is used. This reflects Wittgenstein’s conception that the meaning of a term is what is given by an explanation of its meaning. Such an explanation gives the rules for the use of the term, i.e., grammatical rules. This conception of meaning comes into direct conflict with Saul Kripke’s conception of natural kinds and how natural kind terms refer—what we mean by natural kind terms. For Kripke, the true meaning, as determined by the essence, of a natural kind is to be discovered by scientific investigation. This essence is then true of the kind in all possible worlds, i.e., it is necessarily metaphysically true. Pace Kripke, Wittgenstein 2 holds that the meaning of a sign, symbol, word, term, etc., is not to be discovered by scientific investigation; rather, we will get at the meaning of a sign, symbol, word, term, etc. through an investigation of the multifarious uses we make of it. Such an investigation involves an exposition of grammatical rules—rules that govern the use of the term and determine its meaning. We can generally say that since, for Wittgenstein, what a word means is determined by the use made of it, words have the meanings that we give to them. Therefore, grammar is arbitrary and language autonomous. A fortiori, meaning is antecedent to scientific investigation, and necessity will be internal to a particular system of language, of meaning. What exactly is meant by claiming that grammar is arbitrary and language autonomous is not so simply said. Understanding what Wittgenstein could have meant by this claim will require a good deal of work.1 I will first explicate Wittgenstein’s conception of grammar and then present his arguments for why and how grammar is arbitrary. Next, I will more briefly explain the main points of Kripke’s understanding of proper names, rigid designation, and natural kinds. With both Wittgenstein and Kripke’s views presented, I will argue that Kripke is fundamentally mistaken about natural kinds, especially in regard to rigid designation and meaning. Finally, I will briefly survey further implications of the autonomy of language. 1 I say ‘this claim’ because the one follows from the other. The arbitrariness of grammar implies the autonomy of language and the autonomy of language implies the arbitrariness of grammar. Given this, I will use the two terms interchangeably throughout this work. 3 One Grammar In this first chapter, we will examine Ludwig Wittgenstein’s conception of grammar that is found in his later work. This will be in preparation