Maritime Malice in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines: The Asymmetric Maritime Threat at the Tri-Border Area Kenneth Yeo Yaoren, Rueben Ananthan Santhana Dass, & Jasminder Singh i Maritime Malice in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines: The Asymmetric Maritime Threat at the Tri-Border Area Kenneth Yeo Yaoren, Rueben Ananthan Santhana Dass, & Jasminder Singh ICCT Policy Brief April 2021 ii About ICCT The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT) is an independent think and do tank providing multidisciplinary policy advice and practical, solution-oriented implementation support on prevention and the rule of law, two vital pillars of effective counter- terrorism. ICCT’s work focuses on themes at the intersection of countering violent extremism and criminal justice sector responses, as well as human rights-related aspects of counterterrorism. The major project areas concern countering violent extremism, rule of law, foreign fighters, country and regional analysis, rehabilitation, civil society engagement and victims’ voices. Functioning as a nucleus within the international counter-terrorism network, ICCT connects experts, policymakers, civil society actors and practitioners from different fields by providing a platform for productive collaboration, practical analysis, and exchange of experiences and expertise, with the ultimate aim of identifying innovative and comprehensive approaches to preventing and countering terrorism. Licensing and Distribution ICCT publications are published in open access format and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial- NoDerivatives License, which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way. ICCT Policy Brief April 2021 DOI: 10.19165/2021.2.01 ISSN: 2468-0486 iiiiii Contents Introduction 1 Terrorist Centre of Gravity for Southeast Asia 2 The Trilateral Cooperative Arrangement (TCA) 3 The National Sovereignty and Counter-Terrorism Dilemma 5 The Youth Bulge and Radicalisation 7 Policy Recommendations 8 Asset Transparency and Accountability 8 Enhanced Patrols 8 Economic Development 9 Conclusion 10 Bibliography 11 iv Introduction Introduction Terrorism declined in 2020, partially due to travel restrictions imposed to curtail the spread of COVID-19.1 The imposition of border controls and global lockdowns has reduced the operational capability of terrorist groups.2 However, as countries are preparing to reopen their borders after developing and distributing the COVID-19 vaccines, transnational terrorism may resurface towards the latter half of 2021 once international borders reopen and lockdowns are lifted. In Southeast Asia, the Sulu-Celebes Sea has been the hotbed for crime, piracy, and terrorism.3 Otherwise known as the Tri-Border Area (TBA)4 fringed by Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, Islamist terrorists have exploited the porous borders to supplement conflict zones in Southeast Asia with foreign fighters. The Sulu-Celebes Sea connects Borneo and Sulawesi to Mindanao through a long chain of islands. Sabah and Davao Occidental’s vast coastlines create multiple entries and exit points to and from the mainland.5 Terrorist groups’ access to the seas is a threat multiplier, as it diversifies their avenues for fundraising and improves their survivability.6 The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) is one of three terrorist groups today that possesses maritime capabilities (the others are al- Shabaab from Somalia7 and Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jamaah from Mozambique.)8 ASG operates along the Sulu Archipelago, which connects Borneo Island to Mindanao. Notorious for its brutal kidnap-for-ransom (KFR) tactics, it has disrupted many seafarers’ lives and livelihoods.9 Hence, as governments prepare to reopen borders to resuscitate their economies, the authorities must re-examine their border security policies and practices in the TBA. The aim of this paper is to highlight the key maritime terrorism threats in the Sulu-Celebes Seas, the weaknesses of the Trilateral Cooperative Arrangement (TCA) – a trilateral treaty between Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines that was intended to address the threat in the region, – and provide key policy recommendations to mitigate the weaknesses in the TCA. To achieve this, the authors have structured the paper into five parts: the first two sections explore the threat of terrorism in the Sulu-Celebes Sea, and highlight the weaknesses of the Trilateral Cooperative Arrangement. In the third part, we consider the dilemma between sovereignty and counter- terrorism, followed by an exploration of the threat of radicalisation in the TBA region. The final part of the paper provides relevant and timely policy recommendations aimed at policymakers and practitioners in the area. 1 Kumar Ramakrishna, ‘The Global Threat Landscape in 2020’, Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 13, no. 1 (2021): 1–13. 2 Ibid., 8. 3 Senia Febrica, ‘Securing the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas from Maritime Terrorism: A Troublesome Cooperation?’, Perspectives on Terrorism 8, no. 3 (23 June 2014), http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/347. 4 Jasminder Singh and Muhammad Haziq bin Jani, ‘The Tri-Border Area: Jihadi Epicentre in Southeast Asia’, RSIS Commentaries, no. 186 (20 July 2016): 3. 5 Prashanth Parameswaran, ‘Confronting Threats in the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas: Opportunities and Challenges’, The Diplomat (blog), 10 June 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/06/confronting-threats-in-the-sulu-sulawesi-seas-opportunities-and-challenges/. 6 Kenneth Yeo, ‘Kidnapping in the Sulu Sea: Implications on Terrorism in the Philippines’, The Diplomat, 4 October 2019, https:// thediplomat.com/2019/10/kidnapping-in-the-sulu-sea-implications-on-terrorism-in-the-philippines/. 7 Currun Singh and Arjun Singh Bedi, ‘War on Piracy: The Conflation of Somali Piracy with Terrorism in Discourse, Tactic, and Law’, Security Dialogue 47, no. 5 (2016): 440–58. 8 Jan Gerber, ‘EXPLAINER | What’s behind the “ISIS” Attacks in Mozambique and How Does It Affect SA?’,News24 , 11 July 2020, https://www.news24.com/news24/southafrica/news/explainer-whats-behind-the-isis-attacks-in-mozambique-and-how-does-it- affect-sa-20200711. 9 Alexandra Amling et al., ‘Stable Seas: Sulu-Celebes Seas’, One Earth Future Foundation, February 2019, http://dx.doi.org/ OEF.2019.034. 1 Terrorist Centre of Gravity for Southeast Asia Terrorist Centre of Gravity for Southeast Asia The Sulu-Celebes Sea is notoriously known for the ASG’s Kidnapping for Ransom (KFR) tactics.10 The ASG began using KFR after the death of its leader Abdurajak Janjalani in 1998, which severed the financial link between ASG and Al-Qaeda.11 The subsequent Khadaffy Janjalani-led ASG exploited the weaknesses of the terrain and targeted seafarers and foreign tourists residing in the remote islands of Sulu.12 Today, coastal and maritime kidnapping continues to plague the seas due to the ASG’s asymmetric maritime capabilities.13 Besides KFR tactics, the ASG has exploited their asymmetric maritime capabilities to control the flow of terrorist militants, logistics, and funds.14 Hence, while ASG still conducts illicit activities on land, they can also rely on maritime alternatives, such as hijacking cargo ships to loot and rob from the crew. Figure 1: Incidents at the Sulu-Celebes Seas from 2014 to 2020 15 10 ‘IMB report: Sea kidnappings rise in 2016 despite plummeting global piracy’, ICC - International Chamber of Commerce (blog), 10 January 2017, https://iccwbo.org/media-wall/news-speeches/imb-report-sea-kidnappings-rise-2016-despite-plummeting-global- piracy/. 11 Stanford University, ‘Abu Sayyaf Group | Mapping Militant Organizations’, Mapping Militant Organizations, accessed 17 March 2018, http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/152. 12 McKenzie OBrien, ‘Fluctuations Between Crime and Terror: The Case of Abu Sayyaf’s Kidnapping Activities’, Terrorism and Political Violence 24 (1 April 2012): 320–36, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2011.648679. 13 Yeo, "Kidnapping in the Sulu Sea."; Asyura Salleh, ‘Covid-19 Accelerates Maritime Insecurity in the Asia–Pacific’, The Strategist, 27 July 2020, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/covid-19-accelerates-maritime-insecurity-in-the-asia-pacific/. 14 Kenneth Yeo, ‘Threats along the Sulu Sea: Exploring the Land-Sea Nexus’, Stable Seas (blog), 12 December 2019, https:// stableseas.org/maritime-terrorism/sulu-sea-threats. 15 Kenneth Yeo et al., ‘Southeast Asia Militant Atlas’, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies: International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, 2021, https://rsis.maps.arcgis.com/apps/webappviewer/index. html?id=fcadd7b610a944cba53fcd0195ff3d09. (Not published yet) 2 The Trilateral Cooperative Arrangement (TCA) The archipelagic terrain has improved the survivability of the ASG. Maritime enforcement agencies face problems locating ASG members as they island-hop to avoid arrest.16 ASG has also utilised the shallow waters and mangroves of the area to outmanoeuvre the authorities.17 Additionally, they often conduct their kidnappings and sea-jackings in small boats to evade detection from satellite systems and reduce visual exposure to aerial or naval patrols.18 The Sulu-Celebes Sea is also the gateway for terrorism into Mindanao. During the al-Qaeda (AQ) era of terrorism in the late 1990s - 2000s, its affiliate Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) had sent terrorists from Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore into Mindanao