Near Failure at Nagasaki The first atomic mission was executed perfectly. On the second one, almost everything went wrong. By John T. Correll iroshima lay in ruins. for Japan to continue, but no one knew the evening of Aug. 8, it was loaded Eighty thousand people how long that would take. The invasion aboard the B-29 that would deliver it. had been killed instantly plan called for the commitment of a Thus began the chain of events that and two-thirds of the US force of 1,865,000. Another year would culminate in the detonation city destroyed by the of war plus an invasion of Japan prob- of the atomic bomb at Nagasaki the Hatomic bomb dropped ably meant US casualties in the range next day. by the B-29 Enola Gay on Aug. 6, of a quarter million and similar losses Whereas Hiroshima was a perfectly 1945. For Japan, the war had been lost for the Japanese. executed operation, almost nothing went for some time. Since the beginning of The alternative was to drop another right on the second atomic mission, and the year, American B-29s had been atomic bomb. A second bomb was in it came close to failure. This mission systematically demolishing Japan’s place at North Field on Tinian in the drew less attention, both in news at the urban areas and industrial centers with Mariana Islands, home base of the time and by historians later, than did incendiary bombs. 509th Composite Group, which had the bombing of Hiroshima. The main The military regime refused to ac- flown the Hiroshima mission. No other problems with the Nagasaki operation cept defeat. Japan still had five million atomic bombs were yet available, but have been known since 1945, but the troops, 10,000 airplanes—more than the United States wanted the Japanese extent of difficulties and the discord half of them configured for suicide to believe there was an unlimited supply. among participants were not fully dis- missions—and a seven-month supply The mission was planned for Aug. 11 closed until the 1990s. of aviation fuel. The United States but a forecast for bad weather moved The pilot in command for Nagasaki resumed the firebombing missions and it up to Aug. 9. The bomb, called “Fat was Maj. Charles W. Sweeney, 25, continued planning for an invasion of Man,” was stored under tight security chosen for the assignment by the 509th Japanese home islands. and controlled conditions in an air- commander, Col. Paul W. Tibbets Jr., Sooner or later, the bombing and naval conditioned hut with a rubberized who had flown the Hiroshima mission interdiction would make it impossible floor to prevent accidental sparks. On himself. Sweeney was commander of 60 AIR FORCE Magazine / July 2011 Bockscar en route to Japan, carrying Fat Man, the nuclear bomb that would be dropped on Nagasaki. Near Failure at Nagasaki USAF photo the 393rd Bomb Squadron. He had and drop the bomb. The Great Artiste was servation/photo airplane, inelegantly been on the Hiroshima mission, fly- still rigged with the instrument package named Big Stink. According to Swee- ing the instrument plane, The Great it carried at Hiroshima, so Sweeney ney, Hopkins had a noncooperative Artiste, which measured the effects of and Capt. Frederick C. Bock switched attitude, possibly because the mission the detonation. Over Hiroshima, he was airplanes. Sweeney and his crew took commander was his junior. He walked 30 feet off the right wing of Tibbets’ Bockscar and Bock and his crew flew away from Sweeney’s reminder about plane, the Enola Gay. Sweeney had The Great Artiste, which would again the rendezvous plan, saying, “I know drawn that assignment because Tibbets serve as the instrument plane. how to make a rendezvous.” intended him to fly the next mission, if To avoid identification as atomic There were two weather airplanes. there was one, and wanted him to have bomb aircraft, the six B-29s bore the Enola Gay, flown by Capt. George the step-by-step experience. triangle N tail marking of the 44th Bomb Marquardt, would go ahead to report The primary target for the next mis- Group instead of the forward arrow of conditions from the primary target, sion was not Nagasaki. It was Kokura, the 509th. None of the mission aircraft Kokura, and Laggin’ Dragon, flown about 95 miles southwest of Hiroshima, had their names painted on the nose. by Capt. Charles F. McKnight, would where one of the largest arsenals in This led to confusion for William L. scout the weather at Nagasaki. Capt. Japan was located, surrounded by urban Laurence of the New York Times, who Ralph Taylor would position the sixth industrial structures. Nagasaki was the was authorized to go along and write a B-29, Full House, at Iwo Jima as a secondary target, to be struck only if first-person account. He thought Swee- backup aircraft. circumstances ruled out the attack on ney was still flying The Great Artiste Three mission specialists augmented Kokura. and so reported in his article. In fact, Sweeney’s regular crew on Bockscar: a Laurence himself was aboard The Great radar countermeasures officer and two The Aircraft Artiste, which was flown by Bock. weaponeers with special knowledge Six B-29s were allocated to the mis- Lt. Col. James I. Hopkins Jr., the and understanding of the atomic bomb. sion. Sweeney would fly the lead aircraft group operations officer, flew the ob- The senior weaponeer was Navy Cmdr. AIR FORCE Magazine / July 2011 61 replaced them with red arming plugs. The bomb was ready to go. The original plan had been for the three aircraft to reassemble over Iwo Jima, which had been the rendezvous for the Hiroshima mission. On Aug. 9, a typhoon was gathering momentum around Iwo Jima so the rendezvous point was Yakushima, a small island off the coast of Kyushu. “Because of bad weather at lower altitudes and our proximity to the Japanese mainland, the rendezvous would be at 30,000 feet instead of 8,000 as on the Hiro- shima mission,” Sweeney said, which consumed additional fuel. MIssed Rendezvous The Great Artiste was at the ren- dezvous point but Big Stink was not. Bockscar and crew (note the missing nose art). Capt. Kermit Beahan (wearing The orders from Tibbets were explicit. glasses), whom many believe saved the mission from failure, stands next to Maj. Make a single 360-degree circle of the Charles Sweeney (dark shirt), the pilot and mission commander. rendezvous area, then proceed. “My orders were to wait 15 minutes and Frederick L. Ashworth, who had man- Complications then leave for the target, but the mission aged the field testing of the atomic The crews briefed shortly before brief also called for three airplanes to bomb at Los Alamos, N.M. midnight, had their pre-mission break- proceed to the target,” Sweeney said. A Sweeney had no previous combat fast at the mess hall and were driven message from Marquardt in the Enola experience, but Ashworth had com- out to their airplanes at 1 a.m. The Gay said the weather at Kokura was clear manded a squadron of Grumman TBF first big problem came when flight for bombing, but Sweeney circled the Avengers at Guadalcanal. In the after- engineer MSgt. John D. Kuharek rendezvous for 45 minutes. Unknown math of the mission it would be said, notified Sweeney that the fuel in the to Sweeney, who was maintaining radio notably by Tibbets, that Sweeney had reserve tank in Bockscar’s rear bomb silence, Hopkins in Big Stink was circling deferred too much to Ashworth. bay bladder was not pumping. Of 7,250 at 39,000 feet, 9,000 feet higher than he “The job of Ashworth was to arm gallons of fuel aboard, 600 gallons was supposed to be. the bomb, assure its readiness to be were in the reserve tank. Sweeney “When only one plane showed up, I dropped, and, ultimately, make the ‘no climbed out of the aircraft and went to told Sweeney that I wanted to be sure drop’ call if something went wrong with talk with Tibbets, who was watching that we had the instrument-carrying the detonating system,” Tibbets said. from the ramp. aircraft with us,” Ashworth said. “Why “Those tasks defined the realm of his Tibbets told Sweeney he did not Sweeney didn’t tell me that the instru- authority aboard Bockscar.” need the fuel in the bladder, it was ment aircraft was already with us, I It is sometimes argued that Sweeney only there to balance the weight of don’t know.” In later years, Tibbets and Ashworth were in “joint command.” the bomb in the forward bomb bay, said Sweeney’s delay may have been That is wrong. Sweeney was clearly but if Sweeney disagreed, he had the due to pressure from Ashworth, a point the mission commander. Ashworth’s authority as commander to cancel the that Ashworth vigorously denied. authority covered decisions about mission. Sweeney decided to go. Tib- Sweeney said, “When Hopkins the bomb because of his specialized bets pointed out that he was off to a failed to make the rendezvous and knowledge. Influence was another mat- late start and that he should not linger couldn’t find us, for some inexplicable ter, and Ashworth exerted a powerful at the rendezvous point if the escort reason he broke radio silence and ra- influence on Sweeney. aircraft did not show up. dioed back to Tinian, ‘Has Sweeney Fat Man was loaded into Bockscar’s Bockscar roared down the runway aborted?’ The message got garbled bomb bay at 10 p.m.