Remote Controlled Restraint The Effect of Remote Warfighting Technology on Crisis Escalation Erik Lin-Greenberg Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 2019 © 2019 Erik Lin-Greenberg All rights reserved ABSTRACT Remote Controlled Restraint: The Effect of Remote Warfighting Technology on Crisis Escalation Erik Lin-Greenberg How do technologies that remove warfighters from the front lines affect the frequency and intensity of military confrontations between states? Many scholars and policymakers fear that weapons that reduce the risks and costs of war – in blood and treasure – will lead states to resort to force more frequently during crises, destabilizing the international security environment. These concerns have featured prominently in debates surrounding the proliferation and use of remote warfighting technologies, such as drones. This project sets out to evaluate whether and how drones affect crisis escalation. Specifically, do drones allow decisionmakers to deploy military forces more frequently during interstate crises? Once deployed, how do these systems affect escalation dynamics? I argue that drones can help control escalation, raising questions about scholarly theories that suggest the world is more dangerous and less stable when technology makes conflict cheaper and less risky. At the core of this project is a theory of technology-enabled escalation control. The central argument is that technologies like drones that remove friendly forces from the battlefield may lead states to use force more frequently, but decrease the likelihood of escalation when used in lieu of inhabited platforms. More specifically, these technologies lower the political barriers to initiating military operations during crises, primarily by eliminating the risk of friendly force casualties and the associated domestic political consequences for launching military operations. At the same time, removing personnel from harm’s way may reduce demand for escalatory reprisals after remotely operated systems are lost to hostile action. Drones can also help to mitigate escalatory spirals by collecting intelligence that overcomes information asymmetries that often contribute to armed conflict, helping facilitate more measured decision-making and tailored targeting of enemy forces. By more fully considering how technology affects escalatory dynamics after the initial use of force, technology-enabled escalation control theory advances our understanding of the link between technology and conflict. I test the theory using a multi-method approach that combines case studies with original experiments embedded in surveys fielded on public and military samples. The dissertation also introduces a new research method for international relations research: experimental manipulations embedded in wargames with military participants. In Chapter 1 and 2, I define the concept of crisis escalation and review the literature that examines the effect of technology on escalation and conflict dynamics. I then introduce the theory of technology-enabled escalation control and outline four mechanisms that undergird the theory – increased initiation, tempered/tailored targeting, restrained retaliation, and amplified aggression. Each of these hypothesized mechanisms describes ways in which emerging technologies can prevent crises from escalating into broader or more intense conflicts. Chapter 3 describes each component of the multi-method research design that I use to test the theory in Chapters 4 through 7. Chapter 4 uses experiments embedded in surveys and wargames to assess whether and how drones allow states to more frequently initiate military operations. Chapter 5 tests whether drones enable decisionmakers to control escalation by restraining retaliation after attacks on a state’s drones. Chapter 6 and 7 test the theory in the context of U.S drone use during the Cold War and Israeli drone use from the 1960s through late-2010s. The findings of these empirical tests provide strong support for technology-enabled escalation control. In Chapter 8, I conclude with a summary of the analysis and test the generalizability of the theory beyond the state use of drones. I find that tenets of technology-enabled escalation control explain escalation dynamics associated with U.S. cyber operations against North Korea and Hezbollah’s use of drones against Israel and during the Syrian Civil War. The chapter also maps out pathways for future research and identifies policy implications. My findings suggest the growing proliferation of drones will increase the frequency of military confrontations during crises, yet these confrontations are unlikely to escalate. Even though drones may help control escalation, clearer doctrine, rules of engagement, and international agreements to govern their use will help to further avoid crisis escalation and conflict. Table of Contents List of Figures and Tables ii Acknowledgments iii 1 Introduction 1 2 Technology-Enabled Escalation Control 32 3 Research Design 75 4 Increasing Initiation 102 5 Controlling Escalation 136 6 U.S. Aerial Reconnaissance During the Cold War 178 7 Israeli Drone Use During the Campaigns Between Wars 238 8 Conclusion 263 References 296 Appendices Appendix A: Interview Subjects 316 Appendix B: Wargame Vignettes 318 Appendix C: Wargame Participants and Treatment Schedule 325 Appendix D: Main Survey Instrument (Public Sample) 326 Appendix E: Follow Up Survey Instrument (Public Sample) 332 Appendix F: Main Survey Instrument (Military Sample) 336 Appendix G: Respondent Demographics 341 Appendix H: Balance Tables and Regression Analysis 344 i List of Tables and Figures Tables Table 2.1: Summary of Hypotheses 72 Table 4.1: Support for Initiating Military Operations (Experiment 1, Military Sample) 107 Table 4.2: Support for Initiating Military Operations (Experiment 1, Public Sample) 109 Table 4.3: Qualitative Justifications (Experiment 1, Military Sample) 110 Table 4.4: Qualitative Justifications (Experiment 1, Public Sample) 113 Table 4.5: Treatment Table (Experiment 2, Public Sample) 116 Table 4.6: Mean Approval for Deploying Forces by Force Type (Experiment 2, Public Sample) 118 Table 4.7: Approval for Deploying Forces by Force Type, Proportion (Experiment 2, Public Sample) 119 Table 4.8: Qualitative Justifications by Treatment (Experiment 2, Public Sample) 121 Table 4.9: Initial Deployment of Force, Wargame Team Outcomes 125 Table 5.1: Mean Response Level to Shootdown (Military Sample) 141 Table 5.2: Response to Shootdown, Percentages (Military Sample) 141 Table 5.3: Qualitative Justifications for Response to Shootdown (Military Sample) 142 Table 5.4: Experimental Design (Public Sample) 147 Table 5.5: Mean Response to Shootdown (Public Sample) 149 Table 5.6: Response to Shootdown, Percentage (Public Sample) 149 Table 5.7: Qualitative Justifications for Response to Shootdown (Public Sample) 152 Table 5.8: Mean Response to Intruder (Military Sample) 154 Table 5.9: Response to Intruder, Percentage (Military Sample) 154 Table 5.10: Qualitative Justifications for Response to Intruder (Military Sample) 156 Table 5.11: Mean Response to Intruder (Public Sample) 157 Table 5.12: Response to Intruder, Percentage (Public Sample) 157 Table 5.13: Qualitative Justifications for Response to Intruder (Public Sample) 158 Table 5.14: Summary of Findings – Response to Shootdown Wargame 160 Table 5.15: Summary of Findings – Response to Intruder Wargame 168 Figures Figure 2.1: Technology-Enabled Escalation Control as a Decision Tree 73 Figure 4.1: Mean Approval for Deploying Forces by Force Type (Public Sample) 118 Figure 5.1: Mean Response to Shootdown by Treatment (Public Sample) 148 ii Acknowledgments Shortly after graduating from college, I arrived at Beale Air Force Base, just north of Sacramento, California, as a newly minted lieutenant. During my time there, I had the humbling opportunity to work with a team of Airmen responsible for analyzing information gathered by America’s fleet of reconnaissance aircraft – including remotely piloted aircraft operating above battlefields in Afghanistan and Iraq. Little did I know that my experiences at Beale would shape the trajectory of my research. I am immensely grateful to have had the opportunity to serve alongside such a dedicated team. At Columbia I benefitted from an incredible group of mentors, colleagues, and friends. I am particularly indebted to several faculty members who offered intellectual stimulation and professional mentorship. Richard Betts, Robert Jervis, Jeffrey Lax, and Tonya Putnam helped me think more deeply about the empirical and theoretical implications of my project, provided meticulous comments on my typically less than meticulous drafts, kept me on schedule, prevented me from deviating too far off course, and offered reassurance each time I thought the project was on a downward spiral. Tonya, in particular, did far more than what was expected of a committee member. She set an example for advising and mentorship that I can only hope to one day achieve. I am also grateful to Séverine Autesserre who took me on as a research assistant early in my graduate student career and showed me the ropes on research and grant writing processes, both of which helped facilitate this project. Stephen Biddle and Sarah Kreps served as outside committee members for the dissertation defense and provided incredibly insightful feedback. My Columbia colleagues were equally generous with their