Russia's State Armament Programme to 2020: a Quantitative Assessment of Implementation 2011-2015

Russia's State Armament Programme to 2020: a Quantitative Assessment of Implementation 2011-2015

At the end of 2010 then President Medvedev approved the State 2011–2015 implementation of assessment a quantitative 2020: to programme armament state Russia’s Armament Programme for Russia for the years 2011 to 2020. The aim of the programme was to increase the share of modern armaments held by the armed forces from 15 percent in 2010 to 70 per cent in 2020. Over the past five years the volume of new weapons procured has increased steadily. In 2014 the work of the defence industry began to be affected by the Ukraine crisis, while the performance of the economy began to deteriorate, putting pressure on state finances. It was decided to postpone for three years the approval of the successor state armament programme to 2025. Nevertheless, the implementation of the programme to date has secured a meaningful modernisation of the hardware of the Russian armed forces for the first time since the final years of the USSR. Russia’s state armament programme to 2020: a quantitative assessment Julian Cooper Julian of implementation 2011–2015 Julian Cooper FOI-R--4239--SE ISSN1650-1942 www.foi.se March 2016 Julian Cooper Russia’s state armament programme to 2020: a quantitative assessment of implementation 2011–2015 Bild/Cover: GettyImages.Yars RS-24 at the Victory parade in Moscow 9 May 2015. FOI-R--4239--SE Titel Rysslands statliga beväpningsprogram till 2020: en kvantitativ bedömning av genomförandet 2011–2015 Title Russia’s state armament programme to 2020: a quantitative assessment of implementation 2011–2015 Rapportnr/Report no FOI-R--4239--SE Månad/Month March Utgivningsår/Year 2016 Antal sidor/Pages 119 p ISSN 1650-1942 Kund/Customer Ministry of Defence Forskningsområde 8. Säkerhetspolitik FoT-område Projektnr/Project no A16101 Godkänd av/Approved by Lars Höstbeck Ansvarig avdelning Försvarsanalys Detta verk är skyddat enligt lagen (1960:729) om upphovsrätt till litterära och konstnärliga verk, vilket bl.a. innebär att citering är tillåten i enlighet med vad som anges i 22 § i nämnd lag. För att använda verket på ett sätt som inte medges direkt av svensk lag krävs särskild överenskommelse. This work is protected by the Swedish Act on Copyright in Literary and Artistic Works (1960:729). Citation is permitted in accordance with article 22 in said act. Any form of use that goes beyond what is permitted by Swedish copyright law, requires the written permission of FOI. FOI-R--4239--SE Sammanfattning Det statliga beväpningsprogrammet för perioden 2011–2020 antogs vid slutet av 2010 under president Dmitrij Mevedev. Programmet var mycket ambitiöst och innebar planerad anskaffning av vapen och annan militär materiel, forskning och utveckling (FoU) samt utveckling av nya system till ett värde av 20 biljoner rubel (eller USD 680 mrd vid dåvarande valutakurs). Syftet med programmet var att öka andelen moderna vapen inom de Väpnade Styrkorna från 15 procent 2010, till 30 procent 2015 och 70 procent 2020. Programmet har genomförts inom de årliga budgetfinansierade försvarsupphandlingarna och med hjälp av statligt garanterade krediter. Som en följd av detta växte försvarsindustrins produktion med 20 procent 2014, jämfört med 6 procent tre år tidigare. Volymen i anskaffningen har vuxit över perioden och införandet av ny materiel har varit särskilt påtaglig inom strategiska robottrupperna och flygstridskrafterna. Resultaten inom marin- och marksstridskrafterna är inte lika påtagliga. Under 2014 påverkades den ryska försvarsindustrin negativt av Rysslands invasion i Ukraina. Den kris som följde ledde till att det försvarsindustriella samarbetet med Ukraina bröts, med uteblivna leveranser från den ukrainska försvarsindustrin som följd. Sanktionerna från Nato- och EU-länder och har också försvårat försvarsindustrins verksamhet liksom den kraftiga nedgången i ekonomin som satt press på statsfinanserna. Det kommande beväpningsprogrammet för 2016–2025 har därför senarelagts med tre år. Icke desto mindre så har beväpningsprogrammet 2011–2020 inneburit en väsentlig modernisering av de ryska Väpnade Styrkornas utrustning för första gången sedan Sovjetunionens sammanbrott. Nyckelord: Ryssland, beväpning, materielanskaffning, FoU, försvarsindustri, försvarsbudget, militärutgifter, Ukraina, sanktioner, utvecklingsprogram. 3 FOI-R--4239--SE Summary At the end of 2010 then President Medvedev signed an order approving the State Armament Programme for Russia for the years 2011 to 2020. This was a highly ambitious document setting out plans for the procurement of weapons and other military equipment, plus research and development for the creation of new systems, to a total value of over 20 trillion roubles, or US$680 billion at the exchange rate of the day. The aim of the programme was to increase the share of modern armaments held by the armed forces from 15 per cent in 2010 to 30 per cent in 2015 and 70 per cent in 2020. The programme has been implemented through the budget-funded annual state defence order supplemented by state- guaranteed credits. By 2014 the military output of the defence industry was growing at an annual rate of over 20 percent, compared with 6 percent three years earlier. The volume of new weapons procured steadily increased, the rate of renewal being particularly strong in the strategic missile forces and the air force, but not as impressive in the navy and ground forces. In 2014 the work of the defence industry began to be affected by the Ukraine crisis, with a breakdown of military-related deliveries from Ukraine and the imposition of sanctions by NATO and European Union member countries. The performance of the economy began to deteriorate, putting pressure on state finances. It was decided to postpone for three years the approval of the successor state armament programme, 2016–2025. Nevertheless, the implementation of the programme to date has secured a meaningful modernisation of the hardware of the Russian armed forces for the first time since the final years of the USSR. Keywords: Russia, armaments, procurement, R&D, defence industry, defence budget, military expenditure, Ukraine, sanctions, development programmes. FOI-R--4239--SE Preface This report provides an overview of the implementation of the Russian state armament programme to 2020 as the end of its first five years approaches. It is an empirical study designed to present data that is not readily accessible to analysts. The author is very grateful to FOI for its offer to publish the report and thanks Carolina Vendil Pallin for her consistent support and Susanne Oxenstierna and Tomas Malmlӧf for their helpful advice and support in securing its publication. Birmingham December 2015 Julian Cooper OBE Emeritus Professor of Russian Economic Studies Centre for Russian, European and Eurasian Studies University of Birmingham 5 FOI-R--4239--SE FOI-R--4239--SE Acronyms AO Joint stock company (aktsionernoe obshchestvo) Bn billion FSB Federal Security Service FSO Federal Guard Service FTsP Federal Targeted Programme (Federalnaia tselevaia programma) GDP Gross domestic product GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System (Russian navigation satellite system) GOZ State Defence Order (Gosudarstevennyi oboronnyi zakaz) GPV State Armament Programme (Gosudarstvennaia programma vooruzheniia) ICBM Intercontinental ballistic missile MIT Ministry of Industry and Trade MOD Ministry of Defence MED Ministry of Economic Development MEWS Missile early warning system MLRS Multiple launch rocket system MOF Ministry of Finance NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization OPK Defence-industrial complex (oboronno-promyshlennyi kompleks) PAK FA Fifth generation fighter (Perspektivnyi aviatsionnyi kompleks frontovoi aviatsii) PAK DP Advanced long-range bomber (Perspektivnyi aviatsionnyi kompleks dalnei aviatsii) r. Rouble R&D Research and development Rosstat Russian Federal Agency for Statistics RVSN Strategic missile forces (Raketnye voiska strategicheskogo naznacheniia) SLBM Submarine launched strategic missile SV Ground forces (Sukhoputnye voiska) SVR Foreign Intelligence Service trn trillion (billion x 10) TsKB Central design bureau (Tsentralno konstruktorskoe biuro) TsNII Central research institute (Tsentralnyi nauchno-issledovatelskii institut) TS VPK TS VPK Information Agency, Moscow (Teleinformatsionnaia set voenno-promyshlennnogo kompleksa) UAV Unmanned aerial vehicle 7 FOI-R--4239--SE VDV Parachute troops (Vozdushno-desantnye voiska) VKO Aerospace Defence Forces (Voisk vozdushno-kosmicheskii oborony) VKS Aerospace Forces (Vozdushno-kosmicheskie sily) VPK Military-Industrial Commission (Voenno-promyshlennaia komissiia pri Presidenta Rossiiskogo Federatsii) VMF Navy (Voenno-morskoi flot) VVS Air force (Voenno-vozdushnye sily) VV(S)T Armaments, military (and special) equipment (vooruzhenie, voennaia (i spetsialnaia) tekhnika). 8 FOI-R--4239--SE Table of Contents 1 Introduction 11 2 State Armament Programme to 2020: principal features 13 2.1 Volume of funding ........................................................................... 13 2.2 Background to the volume of funding .............................................. 14 2.3 Performance indicators of GPV-2020 ............................................. 15 2.4 Structure of funding of GPV-2020 ................................................... 20 2.5 Fulfilment of annual state defence order ......................................... 23 3 The defence industry and the state defence order 25 3.1 Classified support programmes for GPV-2020 ............................... 28 3.2 A new state programme .................................................................

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