The continuing debate on why Al Gore lost By Sheldon Appleton t took 36 days to decide the 2000 presidential election, but it’s be- Iginning to look like the scholarly controversy over why Al Gore lost may never end. Even the Democratic running mates have joined the argu- ment. When Joe Lieberman told the Democratic Leadership Council in Newsmakers New York this summer that the popu- list emphasis of the Gore campaign might have failed to attract indepen- dent swing voters, Gore replied in an op-ed piece in The New York Times that “Standing up for ‘the people ver- Fate or sus the powerful’ was the right choice in 2000.” Those who suggested oth- erwise, he added, were wrong both politically and in principle. Suicide? These quarrels about the past may prefigure the dialogue to come about what strategies—and therefore what candidates—the Democratic Party should embrace in the future, par- ticularly in 2004. Similarly, a close analysis of the outcomes of this year's congressional races will certainly color the strategic decisions of Demo- cratic candidates during the 2004 campaign. Nobody doubts that Gore could have won if he had run a better cam- paign—or, for that matter, that a better campaign by George W. Bush could have spared Bush the need to be rescued by a 5 to 4 decision of the Newsmakers US Supreme Court. A shift of less than two-thirds of 1% of the votes cast in New Hampshire would have Sheldon Appleton is distinguished professor of political science, Oakland University. 4 Public Perspective, November/December 2002 given Gore an electoral vote majority questions asked in past elections—and When that victory did not materialize, even without Florida, while a shift of can actually trace the changing views some of the modelers maintained that less than one-half of 1% each in Iowa, of individual respondents. But they the fault lay with the Gore campaign. New Mexico, Oregon and Wisconsin generally interview much smaller A number of those relying primarily could have provided Bush with a samples than the VNS, risk influenc- on surveys agreed, though a few were Florida-proof electoral college major- ing panelists’ later responses—due to scornful of modelers who blamed the ity. In an election that close, almost the experience of previous interviews candidate for not fitting their models. anything could have turned the out- and the expectations of future ones— In their book, The Perfect Tie, James come either way. In Palm Beach and are dependent on people’s claims Ceaser and Andrew Busch twitted the County, almost anything did! as to whether they have voted. “members of this Blame Al Gore (BAG) school... who... conclude that because The main focus of the controversy, Seventy-two percent of the 2000 NES the models are right, the candidate then, is not whether Gore made mis- sample, for instance, claimed to have must be wrong.” takes—neither candidate ran a per- cast a presidential ballot, while in fact fect campaign—but what those mis- only 51 to 53% of adult Americans In fact, however, a number of the takes were. actually voted. This means that per- modelers have tried to understand haps one-fifth of those whose voting why their predictions failed, and thus he first data available for analy- decisions were analyzed—and prob- have arrived at some appraisal of sis after the election were the ably a larger percentage of those whose Gore’s campaign performance. Larry Texit polls—especially the Voter votes were up for grabs during the Bartels and John Zaller, leading off a News Service (VNS) exit polls, whose campaign—never really voted at all. post-election symposium in PS: Po- role in network election-night calls of Of the almost 1,100 NES respondents litical Science and Politics, addressed winners was so controversial. As data who reported voting, just over 50% the question of economic measures, sources, exit polls have said they voted for Gore, just under suggesting that some of the gap be- the advantage that they 46% for Bush. (Some 49% of the VNS tween the predicted and actual vote are available quickly, might interview large enough have been samples to facilitate the due to the study of small sub- “These quarrels about the past may prefigure use in the groups of voters, elimi- models of nate the guesswork the dialogue to come about what strategies— change in about who actually and therefore what candidates—the Demo- Gross Do- voted, and probably mestic minimize non-re- cratic Party should embrace in the future.” sponse. However, they ask fewer questions than other polls, de- pend on recollection respondents said they voted for Gore, Product instead of Real Disposable about changes in vote 48% for Bush.) Income as a key indicator. An addi- intention, miss absentee- and non-vot- tional increment, they speculated, ers, and are subject to respondent se- ther bases for political scien- might have been due to the slowing of lection problems. tists’ appraisals of the cam- the economy in the fall—data un- Opaign have been models, available when the predictions were Later, scholars were able to use the which have been reasonably successful calculated. National Election Study (NES), run in predicting or explaining the out- by the University of Michigan. The comes of previous presidential elec- After testing the accuracy of 48 differ- NES has been the survey most fre- tions. Most of these models are based ent models, Bartels and Zaller saw no quently drawn upon by political scien- on the state of, or change in, economic need “to posit either unusual incom- tists over the past half century. indicators and on the incumbent petence on Gore’s part or unusual skill president’s approval ratings. Since both on Bush’s part.” Thomas Holbrook Panel studies like the NES ask a large of these were extraordinarily strong in put at least part of the blame for the number of carefully constructed ques- 2000, the models tended to predict a models’ failure on the fact that the tions—many of them identical with relatively easy victory for Gore. economic news voters reported hear- Public Perspective, November/December 2002 5 ing during the fall campaign was more tion a contest between two [I]t is not at all clear that Gore negative than the objective state of the individuals and their personal would have won handily had economy warranted. programs. he associated himself more closely with the president. In the same symposium, however, At least three other editors of compen- Whether or not Gore should James Campbell agreed that the slow- dia analyzing the election seemed to be faulted for not running on ing of economic growth may have been agree. According to Michael Nelson economic prosperity, it is clear a factor in the failure, but specifically (The Election of 2000), that his campaign decisions discounted the possibility that the were handicapped by his asso- strength of the economy was overesti- Gore lost [because] he dis- ciation with the impeached mated and continued to assert that tanced himself from both president.... It is unclear “Gore badly misplayed what appeared Clinton the president and whether he or his campaign to be a winning hand.” Clinton the person.... Gore could have done anything dif- went overboard.... [I]nstead of ferently to lay claim to the good s Campbell correct? Did Gore emphasizing the national pros- economy.… [S]omething misplay a winning hand? The first- perity that had marked the other than the economy de- Ipass reaction to the vice president’s Clinton-Gore years, [he] ran a cided the election this year. loss was to blame him for separating populist-style campaign... himself too much from Bill more appropriate for a candi- Before the election, Frank Newport in The Gallup Poll Monthly reported the results of a late October survey of likely voters, asking whether Gore’s “The first-pass reaction to Gore’s loss was to ties with Clinton made them feel more favorably or unfavorably toward him. blame him for separating himself too much “Unfavorably” was chosen by a three to one ratio—seven to one among from Bill Clinton.” independents. Moreover, 40% said that Clinton’s cam- paigning for Gore would make them less likely to vote for the Clinton and his record of eco- date challenging an opponent vice president, while only 17% would nomic prosperity, and for fail- in economic hard times.... be more likely to vote for him. And ing to make effective use of Clinton as several Gallup surveys taken between a campaigner. Gerald Pomper, who Larry Sabato (Overtime!) criticized January 1999 and August 2000 found has edited volumes assessing the past “the failure of Gore’s campaign to voters either evenly split or favoring seven presidential elections, offered in capitalize fully on the six consecutive Bush when asked which candidate The Election of 2000 a classic statement years of good economic times. This would better handle the economy. of what appears to remain the majority omission was the most puzzling short- position. Gore, he wrote, coming of Gore’s effort and indisput- n an unpublished paper, Stanford ably fatal to his presidential hopes.” researchers Sunshine Hillygus and did not properly exploit the ISimon Jackman assessed the cost advantages offered by his And Stephen Wayne and Clyde Wilcox to Gore of negative opinions of the administration’s economic (The Election of the Century) concluded president via a question asking respon- record.... In theoretical terms, that, “In retrospect, Gore’s decision to dents their “overall impression” of the vice president turned the distance himself from Clinton was self- Clinton.