The Intellectual Roots of Reagan’s Strategy A Thesis Presented to the Faculty Of The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy By Francis Herbert Marlo In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Dissertation Director: Dr. Richard H. Shultz, Jr., Professor of International Politics, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy Dissertation Reader: Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy Dissertation Reader: Dr. Carnes Lord, Professor of Military and Naval Strategy, Naval War College April 2006 UMI Number: 3215382 Copyright 2006 by Marlo, Francis Herbert All rights reserved. UMI Microform 3215382 Copyright 2006 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company. All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest Information and Learning Company 300 North Zeeb Road P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 FRANCIS H. MARLO EDUCATION Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Boston, MA. Doctor of Philosophy. Expected Completion Date: May 2006. Dissertation Topic: The Intellectual Roots of Reagan’s Strategy. Areas of Concentration: International Security Studies, Political Systems and Theories, and the United States. Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Boston, MA. Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy. May 2000. Master’s Thesis Topic: WMD Proliferation and US Counterproliferation Strategy: A Strategic Assessment. Recipient of the John Moors Cabot Fellowship (1998-1999). Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, Washington, DC. Bachelor of Science in Foreign Service in Diplomacy and International Security (cum laude). May 1993. Certificate in European Area Studies. EMPLOYMENT EXPERIENCE Assistant for Counterproliferation Policy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy Washington, DC. January 2002-January 2005 • Worked with various elements of DoD and the interagency to develop and implement the current National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. • Served as the OSD Policy lead for improving US and allied defenses against the emerging non-traditional chemical agent threat. • Managed the activities of combatant commands, the Joint Staff, various Defense agencies and interagency participants in support of the senior-level US-UK counterproliferation relationship. • Developed and assisted in implementing several NATO-wide initiatives to improve the Alliance’s chemical and biological defense capabilities. Research Assistant, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy Medford, MA. August 1998- July 1999 • Conducted research for Dr. Richard Shultz on the history and status of numerous revolutionary and guerrilla movements. • Compiled detailed summaries of major writings on ethnic violence, terrorism and low-intensity warfare. National Security Analyst, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory Laurel, MD. August 1994-July 1998 ii • Led a combating terrorism study, focusing on the causes, nature, and future direction of international terrorism. • Co-chaired the Infosphere Seminar Project, which analyzed the impact of advanced information technology on US national security policy and military operations. • Created a research methodology for an Intelligence Community study on improving the Indications & Warnings process for biological terrorism. • Analyzed the impact of international terrorism and WMD proliferation on US foreign policy. PUBLICATIONS “WMD Terrorism and US Intelligence Collection” in Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 11 No. 3 (Autumn 1999). iii Abstract The purpose of this study is to develop a useful, accurate and complete definition of grand strategy, to apply that definition to the grand strategy of the Reagan administration, to identify the intellectual roots of this strategy and to explain how this strategy was developed and implemented. While current strategic thought captures much of the essence of grand strategy, existing definitions are inadequate. This study argues that grand strategy is the planned use of all available tools of statecraft to achieve first- order national goals based on a given understanding or belief regarding the nature of the international system. In applying this definition to the Reagan administration, it becomes clear that the administration pursued a radically different strategy for dealing with the Cold War. Among the key elements of this strategy was its focus on victory in, rather than management of, the Cold War, its ideological campaign against communism and its pursuit of the liberation of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself. Key to this strategy was the recognition that the Cold War was fundamentally a political struggle between two incompatible political systems and that, therefore, Western victory would require the political defeat of communism. A close examination demonstrates that each element of the Reagan strategy mirrors the thinking of important post-WWII conservative foreign policy strategists. The key individual in developing this strategy was Reagan himself. Contrary to much of the conventional wisdom, Reagan had very clear, well-thought out ideas about foreign policy and understood exactly what he wanted to accomplish. The oft-reported clashes among his advisors was, in virtually every case, over how to implement Reagan’s strategy, not what the strategy itself should be. This study concludes with some observations about the nature of grand strategy and the role of the individual statesman in the development of grand strategy. It argues that grand strategy cannot be thought of as a given, but rather flows from the national leader’s underlying beliefs, central goals and preferred tools. It posits that a greater emphasis on understanding these components of grand strategy will improve our understanding of international affairs. iv Acknowledgements This work would not have been possible without the support of my dissertation committee, in particular Richard H. Shultz, Jr., my dissertation chairman. His constant support, unfailing patience and insightful comments were absolutely critical to my success. It has been a genuine honor to have him as an advisor. I was incredibly fortunate to have Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. and Carnes Lord on my dissertation committee. These two brilliant men had a profound impact on me during my time at Fletcher. Their comments, suggestions and input have unquestionably strengthened this work. I would also like to thank Roberta Breen and Freda Kilgallen at Fletcher’s International Security Studies Program for their administrative support. This dissertation could never have been written without the generous assistance of a number of former Reagan administration officials. In particular, I would like to thank Caspar Weinberger, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Edwin Meese III, Richard V. Allen, Fred Iklé, Richard Perle, Roger Robinson, and Frank Gaffney for their insights into Reagan and the workings of his administration, as well as their patience in answering my occasionally misguided questions. No one can complete a task such as this one without external support. I have been blessed with a fantastic network of friends and family whose unquestioned encouragement and support made the long hours devoted to this work bearable. Most of all, I would like to thank my beautiful wife Karen, without whose love and support none of this would matter, and my two wonderful sons, Stephen and Alex. v Table of Contents ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................................ IV ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .........................................................................................................................V CHAPTER 1: DEFINING GRAND STRATEGY..................................................................................... 1 INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................................... 1 DEFINING GRAND STRATEGY.................................................................................................................... 5 Sun Tzu ................................................................................................................................................... 5 Carl von Clausewitz ............................................................................................................................... 8 B.H. Liddell Hart.................................................................................................................................. 12 André Beaufre....................................................................................................................................... 14 Edward Luttwak.................................................................................................................................... 16 Colin S. Gray........................................................................................................................................ 21 US Government .................................................................................................................................... 24 Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler.......................................................................................... 25 ELEMENTS OF GRAND STRATEGY..........................................................................................................