Fine Discernment and the Priority of the Particular by JOSHUA JAMES JOHNSTON B.A., The University of Nevada, Reno, 2005 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Philosophy) THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver) October 2012 © Joshua James Johnston, 2012 Abstract Recent work at the intersection between ethics and aesthetics has focused on the interaction between ethical value and moral value. The philosophical work being done here arises from asking the interaction question: what is the interaction between moral and aesthetic judgment and value? Some questions are asked regarding the possible interaction between ethical de(merits) and aesthetic (de)merits; for instance, can an ethical flaw ever count as an aesthetic flaw in an artwork? While the work done here has paid off in interesting new positions and has also enlightened the long debate between the possible legitimacy of the ethical criticism of art, much of the work misses out on a more primary question. This dissertation, while at the intersection between ethics and aesthetics, will buck the interaction question in favour of the structural question: what, if any, structural features are shared between moral and aesthetic judgment? I believe there are three such structural similarities. The first is that ethical and aesthetic reasons share a common metaphysics: holism of reasons is true in both ethics and aesthetics. Ethical and aesthetic reasons are capable of changing their evaluative polarity across cases. The second similarity is that, given holism, the particular should be given priority when making appreciative moral and aesthetic judgments. Our appreciative judgments should be informed by the particulars of the case before us. Third, moral and aesthetic emotionism is true: ethical and aesthetic concepts are essentially related to the emotions. Given these three structural similarities, this dissertation argues that the skill of fine discernment is required in order to make appreciative judgments. Fine discernment makes good on the demand that the priority of the particular requires: in order to apprehend the ii evaluative property of the ethical situation or aesthetic object, we must discriminate and unify the discrete particulars into a coherent whole. iii Table of Contents Abstract ................................................................................................................................ii Table of Contents .................................................................................................................iv Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................v Dedication ..........................................................................................................................vii Chapter One: Introduction ...................................................................................................1 Chapter Two: Reasons in Aesthetics and Ethics ..................................................................8 2.1 Ethical Reasons ........................................................................................17 2.2 Aesthetics Reasons ..................................................................................30 Chapter Three: The Priority of the Particular ....................................................................46 3.1 The Priority of the Particular: Aesthetics .................................................52 3.2 The Priority of the Particular: Ethics .......................................................73 Chapter Four: Emotions and Appreciative Judgment ........................................................84 4.1 Moral Emotionism ...................................................................................84 4.2 Aesthetic Emotionism ..............................................................................95 4.3 On Emotions ..........................................................................................104 Chapter Five: Fine Discernment ......................................................................................111 5.1 The Need for Fine Discernment .............................................................111 5.2 Fine Discernment and the Priority of the Particular ..............................120 5.2.1 The Act of Discernment: Quests and Tasks ......................................121 5.2.2 Fine Discernment ..............................................................................127 5.2.3 The Need for Fine Discernment and the Particular ..........................131 5.3 Fine Discernment and the Emotions ......................................................137 5.4 Fine Discernment and Justification .......................................................147 Chapter Six: Conclusion ..................................................................................................155 Bibliography ......... ...........................................................................................................161 iv Acknowledgments My greatest sympathy goes out to my supervisor, Dominic McIver Lopes. Despite all my attempts, tryings, and shortcomings, his persistent good sense and encouragement has seen me through. I am greatly inspired by him: that he can do so much while also being counted on and delivering a helping hand is frankly amazing. His friendly, generous, and understanding demeanor has never been taken for granted. Whatever professional (and some personal) accomplishments credited to me are due to the support he has given. Matthew Bedke and Derek Matravers have played a significant role as well. The comments I have received from Matt have always been superb. He has always tried seeing the best in my work, and has crafted his comments to bring that out, and I thank him for that. Derek has been an inspiration on many fronts, both personally and professionally. I have learned much from him, and look forward to continue doing so. I owe an intellectual debt to the work of Jonathan Dancy and Frank Sibley. Their work has greatly shaped my own thinking and this dissertation. To this extent, I am thankful to Christopher Williams, my undergraduate advisor, for introducing me to their work and motivating me to pursue the philosophy of art. Chris is a man of fine discernment. Without the support of the members of the UBC Philosophy faculty this adventure would have been a lot less enjoyable. I would like to especially thank Paul Bartha, John Beatty, and Sylvia Berryman for their support through hard times. Of course, there are my fellow graduate students as well: friendships were made and will remain strong. I wish I could individually name all of you along with the particular ways you have influenced and helped me, but that would just take too much paper. However, a special debt of gratitude v goes to the late Brian Laetz. I learned much from him and his memory will always be cherished. I would also like to thank Nissa Bell. Her friendship, support, and encouragement of me has been tremendous, and I am very grateful for knowing her. Likewise, Rhonda Janzen has provided me with a great amount of help and has gone out of her way in doing so. I sincerely hope the eye twitches I have caused her are not permanent. Lastly, my family, particularly my parents, whose support of me throughout my life runs the gamut of all the possible ways in which support can be given. vi For Budders and Mother Dearest vii Chapter One: Introduction The first chapter of Art, Emotion and Ethics, Berys Gaut’s book on the intersection between moral and aesthetic judgment, begins with the “long debate,” and indeed, the issues involving art and morality have a long history. Plato, in book ten of The Republic, famously banishes the mimetic poets from his ideal city for fear that art morally damages and corrupts an audience. Even today some echo Plato’s thinking. Some artworks are criticized for being too morally outrageous and dangerous. After all, artists do seem quite happy to push the boundaries of what is morally acceptable in art. For example, Com&Com, a Swiss duo of dadaist–inspired artists, offered $10,000 dollars to a expectant couple if they would agree to name their baby “Dada.” David Wojnarowicz’s video work Fire in My Belly, which depicts ants crawling over a crucifix and assorted homosexual images and themes, was recently taken off view by the Smithsonian Institution as a result of pressure from members of the Catholic Church and some U.S. Congressmen. These are only two examples which show that the “long debate” is very much still alive and going. The issues revolving around art and morality have long gripped us and still do. That we are still in their grip is shown by work being done by philosophers. There is a lively debate currently at the intersection between moral and aesthetic value and judgment. Some of that debate concerns the question of whether or not censoring art is ever a moral good or morally required. This censorship debate harkens back to Plato and his concern for the moral character of the citizens living in his republic. However, much of the debate has focused on a different question: whether or not a moral defect in an artwork diminishes that artwork’s aesthetic value. This debate is concerned with the question of whether or not 1 ethical criticism is also a form of aesthetic criticism. Some philosophers think that the two spheres are distinct: that ethical