Presidential Election in Egypt Final Report May–June 2012 Waging Peace. Fighting Disease. Building Hope. The Carter Center strives to relieve suffering by advancing peace and health worldwide; it seeks to prevent and resolve conflicts, enhance freedom and democracy, and protect and promote human rights worldwide. Presidential Election in Egypt Final Report May–June 2012 One Copenhill 453 Freedom Parkway Atlanta, GA 30307 (404) 420-5188 Fax (404) 420-5196 www.cartercenter.org The Carter Center The Carter Center Contents Executive Summary .........................2 The Media Environment and Postelection Developments ...................2 Access to the Electoral Process...............43 The Carter Center and the Presidential Election ...3 Participation of Women .....................45 Historical and Political Background ............6 Civil Society Organizations . 47 The Timing and the Role of the Regulatory Framework for CSOs .............47 Presidential Election in the Broader The Role of CSOs in Witnessing the Political Transition .........................6 Presidential Election .......................48 Political Maneuvering and the Candidate Additional Challenges Facing Domestic Nomination Process ........................9 CSOs in Witnessing the Election .............49 The First Round of the Presidential Out-of-Country Voting .....................51 Election: May 23–24, 2012 ..................9 Political Developments Between the Election Day ..............................52 First and Second Rounds of the Election ........11 Poll Opening ............................52 The Second Round of the Election: Polling and Voting Operations ...............53 June 16–17, 2012 ........................12 Closing .................................56 The Carter Center in Egypt .................14 Counting and Aggregation ...................58 Observation Methodology ...................14 Aggregation .............................59 Limitations on Witnessing the Announcement of Election Results ...........61 Presidential Election .......................16 Observing the Presidential Election ............17 Electoral Dispute Resolution.................64 Electoral Institutions and the Legal Conclusions and Recommendations . .67 Framework for the Presidential Election .......18 To the Government of Egypt ................67 Legal Framework .........................18 To the Presidential Election Commission. .69 Key Issues ..............................20 Appendix A: Acknowledgments . 75 Electoral System ..........................25 Appendix B: The Carter Center Election Management ......................25 Witnessing Delegation and Staff ..............77 Presidential Election Commission .............27 Appendix C: Terms and Abbreviations ........80 Voter Registration .........................29 Appendix D: Statements . 81 Voter Education ...........................32 Appendix E: Deployment Plans .............100 Candidates and Campaigns ..................34 Appendix F: Checklists . 101 Candidate Nomination .....................34 Appendix G: Letters of Permission ..........124 Regulatory Framework for Campaigning ........36 Security Environment During the Appendix H: Constitutional First-Round Campaign Period ...............37 Declaration Addendum ....................126 Campaigning During the Second Round ........38 The Carter Center at a Glance ..............129 Campaigning During the Silence Period ........40 Campaign Finance ........................40 The Carter Center Executive Summary gypt’s historic 2012 presidential election was in force at the time. Finally, the timeline for drafting the first time Egypt’s head of state would be a new constitution hung in the balance as the final Edirectly elected by the people in a competi- composition of the constituent assembly formed to tive election that included candidates representing draft it had not been resolved. diverse political platforms and where the outcome On June 17, shortly after the polls closed for was genuinely unknown. The presidential election the runoff phase of the election, the SCAF issued on May 23–24, 2012, and the runoff on June 16–17, a controversial addendum to the Constitutional 2012, also marked at least1 the fourth and fifth times, Declaration. In it, it granted to itself the legislative respectively, that Egyptians were called to the polls powers of the recently dissolved People’s Assembly — in little over a year. However, while there was con- as well as key powers previously held by the Egyptian siderable enthusiasm for the electoral process, it was president — and formalized the military council as marred by uncertainty about the broader transition a governing institution within the constitutional overseen by the Supreme Council of the Armed framework. Furthermore, the SCAF inserted itself Forces (SCAF). The paramount question in the lead- into the constitution drafting process by giving itself up to the election was whether this electoral process the powers to appoint a constituent assembly in the event the assembly was unable to fulfill its duties. It also gave itself veto power over content in a future-draft constitution. Following the June 17 constitutional addendum, Maurice Chammah The Carter Center continued to express grave concerns about the increasing ambiguity of the SCAF-led transition and the meaning and purpose of the presidential election within this context. Ultimately, the election produced Egypt’s first democratically elected civilian president, Mohamed Morsi — a significant milestone in the wake of the January 2011 popular uprising. It did not, however, Former Yemeni Prime Minister Abdul Karim Al-Eryani greets signal the conclusion to the transfer of power from voters standing in a queue during the runoff election on the military to an elected civilian government as June 16, 2012. previously promised by the military council. Postelection Developments would, in fact, result in a full transfer of power from On Aug. 12, after only 43 days in office, newly the military to a civilian-led government by June 30, elected President Morsi took a series of dramatic steps 2012, as the military council had indicated. that included replacing top members of the SCAF’s Another equally important question was the degree to which the powers of the new president would be balanced vis-á-vis other state institutions as they were 1 In some cases, Egyptians may have voted up to nine times in a little largely undefined in the Constitutional Declaration over a year as a result of runoff and rerun elections during election for the People’s Assembly and the Shura Council. 2 The Carter Center Presidential Election in Egypt senior leadership as well as replacing the June 17 The Carter Center and the constitutional addendum with a new addendum. Presidential Election President Morsi’s addendum effectively fully restored the executive office of the presidency, granted The Carter Center was present for both rounds of legislative powers to the president in the absence the presidential election. However, its mission to of a People’s Assembly, and allowed the president witness the election was limited in scope due to to appoint a new constituent assembly to draft a restrictions imposed on election witnesses by Egypt’s constitution should the current assembly be prevented electoral authorities. The Carter Center election from performing its duties. While these moves will witnessing mission in Egypt was accredited by the undoubtedly have a lasting impact on the future role Presidential Election Commission (PEC) on May 3, of the military in formal politics and Egypt’s struggle 2012. Accreditation badges, necessary for witnesses to produce a civilian-led government, they do not to observe the process, were provided on May 16, change the fundamental problem that has continued less than seven days before the first round of the to plague Egypt’s transition from the start: the lack of presidential election. In addition to the delayed issu- a constitution that protects fundamental rights and ance of accreditation badges, witnessing regulations ensures checks and balances of power. included a provision that witnessing missions could President Morsi has asked the Egyptian people to not issue statements prior to polling, and it imposed place their trust in him to deliver on the longer-term a 30-minute time restriction on witnesses’ presence goals of the popular uprising, which include building inside polling stations and prohibited witnessing the the foundation for genuinely democratic politics. It final aggregation of the results. is incumbent upon newly elected President Morsi to Due to these restrictions imposed upon election do everything in his power to move Egypt toward a witnesses by Egypt’s electoral authorities, the Center greater stability by laying this foundation. This can was unable to assess critical pre-election phases, be done by ensuring an inclusive and transparent including voter registration, candidate nomination, constitutional drafting process by a constituent assembly that enjoys popular legitimacy and is afforded the opportunity for full Deborah Hakes and complete debate and discourse on the content of the constitu- tion and Egypt’s political future. In addition, President Morsi must turn over legislative power to a democratically elected parliament as soon as possible. Finally, the success of the transition will require guaranteed respect for and protec- tion of the fundamental civil and political rights of all Egyptians by a democratically elected, civilian government.