IN THE MARIKANA COMMISSION OF INQUIRY (HELD IN CENTURION) AMCU’S HEADS OF ARGUMENT 2 Table of contents SECTION A – INTRODUCTION ....................................................................... 5 1. “Marikana” ................................................................................................ 5 2. The conduct of various parties .................................................................. 6 SECTION B – BACKGROUND TO THE STRIKE.............................................. 14 3. Introduction ............................................................................................. 14 4. Rock Drill Operators at Lonmin were grossly underpaid ....................... 14 5. NUM was losing touch with its members at Lonmin and losing their confidence................................................................................................ 15 6. The collective bargaining structures at Lonmin were of doubtful relevance in 2012 ..................................................................................... 16 7. The Implats Trigger Strike ...................................................................... 17 8. A Perfect Storm ....................................................................................... 20 9. The Lonmin RDOs’ demand in June 2012 .............................................. 22 The approach to Da Costa: an RDO issue independent of the unions .............................................................................................. 23 Lonmin anticipated the RDO demand yet failed to plan for it ....... 24 Lonmin negotiated over wages with its RDOs ............................... 25 SECTION C – AMCU ................................................................................... 29 10. Introduction ............................................................................................. 29 11. AMCU’s response on 10 August 2012 ................................................... 29 12. AMCU’s conduct on 13 August 2012 ..................................................... 33 13. AMCU’s conduct on 14 August 2012 ..................................................... 38 14. The SAFM interview on the morning of 15 August ............................... 40 15. The first meeting with General Mpembe ................................................ 45 16. Mr Mathunjwa’s address on 15 August 2012 ......................................... 53 17. The debriefing ......................................................................................... 61 3 18. AMCU’s conduct on the morning of 16 August 2012 ............................ 66 19. Lonmin reneged on the commitment ...................................................... 78 20. Mr Mathunjwa’s first address to the strikers ........................................... 83 21. Mr Mathunjwa’s final plea to SAPS and lonmin .................................... 93 22. Mr Mathunjwa’s second address to the strikers ...................................... 99 23. Mr X’s allegations against Mr Mathunjwa ........................................... 104 SECTION D – NUM ................................................................................... 111 24. Introduction ........................................................................................... 111 25. NUM’s attitude to the RDOs’ strike ..................................................... 112 26. The assault by the NUM officials on 11 August 2012 .......................... 122 27. The consequences of NUM’s attack ...................................................... 130 28. The conduct of NUM’s top officials ..................................................... 132 29. Mr Zokwana’s criticism of AMCU ....................................................... 135 30. Conclusion on NUM ............................................................................. 138 SECTION E – LONMIN ............................................................................... 140 31. Introduction ........................................................................................... 140 32. Lonmin refused to engage the strikers in violation of its own policy, and in any event, unreasonably .................................................................... 141 The march on 10 August 2012 ...................................................... 141 Lonmin’s policy ............................................................................ 148 Lonmin’s refusal to engage with the strikers was in any event unreasonable................................................................................. 152 33. Lonmin knew who the strikers were and what their demand was ........ 154 Lonmin Witnesses own evidence ................................................... 155 The interdict .................................................................................. 155 Placards on 10 August 2012 ......................................................... 157 34. Lonmin’s Campaign of Misinformation ............................................... 158 “Faceless” strikers” ..................................................................... 158 4 “Union rivalry” ............................................................................ 160 35. Lonmin sought to create the impression that Amcu was behind the strike ............................................................................................................... 164 36. Lonmin took the position that it would only engage with the strikers through NUM ........................................................................................ 169 37. Lonmin persisted in its refusal to engage with the strikers despite being implored to do so by SAPS and even after 10 people had lost their lives ............................................................................................................... 174 38. Lonmin wanted SAPS to break the strike and lobbied and colluded with saps to achieve this ................................................................................ 177 39. Conclusion ............................................................................................. 183 SECTION D – SAPS ................................................................................... 184 40. Introduction ........................................................................................... 184 41. Scene 1................................................................................................... 184 42. Scene 2................................................................................................... 193 43. Conclusion ............................................................................................. 195 SECTION G – CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 197 44. Introduction ........................................................................................... 197 45. No adverse finding against AMCU ....................................................... 197 46. NUM – Findings and Recommendations .............................................. 198 47. LONMIN – Findings and Recommendations ....................................... 200 48. SAPS – Findings and Recommendations .............................................. 202 5 Section A – Introduction 1. “MARIKANA” 1.1 Some call it a “massacre”, others a “tragedy.” It was, in our submission, undoubtedly both. Many simply use the term “Marikana” to encapsulate the horror and the shame of the events of 16 August 2012. 1.2 In order to understand how “Marikana” happened and to assess the responsibility of the various parties in relation thereto, it is crucial to understand how and why the strike happened. Since August 2012, a number of misconceptions regarding who was on strike and why the strike happened have taken hold – at least in the mind of the public. As we will demonstrate below, the most serious of these were the result of deliberate misrepresentations perpetrated by Lonmin. 1.3 The true facts pertaining to how and why the strike happened have now been established. We begin our heads of argument by setting them out. We do so in order to separate fact from fiction and in order to lay a proper foundation for our examination of the events of 9 to 16 August 2012 and our assessment of the responsibility of the various parties in relation thereto. 1.4 A number of key background facts must be highlighted. These are: 1.4.1 The fact that Rock Drill Operators (“RDOs”) at Lonmin were grossly underpaid and had been so for some years. 6 1.4.2 The fact that Lonmin had anticipated, as a result of the unprotected industrial action that had engulfed the Impala Platinum Mine (“Implats”) earlier that year, that its RDOs would demand a wage increase. 1.4.3 The fact that Lonmin regarded the wage demand by its RDOs, when it came, “as an RDO issue independent of the trade unions.” 1.4.4 The fact that Lonmin negotiated with its RDOs over their wage demand before the strike. 1.5 As we will demonstrate below, each of these facts has important implications for the events of 9 to 16 August 2012 and for how those events should be understood. 2. THE CONDUCT OF VARIOUS PARTIES 2.1 Having established the background facts, we will proceed to examine the conduct of the relevant parties in relation to the events of 9 to 16 August 2012. 2.2 AMCU’s primary interest in the Commission’s proceedings has been to present evidence and argument which addresses the Commission’s terms of reference relating to it. However, AMCU also has an interest