Cover Page The handle https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3142394 holds various files of this Leiden University dissertation. Author: Niemann Peralta, P.V. Title: A comprehensive approach to the study of electoral reform: An analysis of Chile’s road to electoral reform (1989-2015) Issue Date: 2021-02-24 A Comprehensive Approach to the Study of Electoral Reform: An Analysis of Chile’s Road to Electoral Reform (1989-2015) Pamela Niemann Peralta A Comprehensive Approach to the Study of Electoral Reform: An Analysis of Chile’s Road to Electoral Reform (1989-2015) Proefschrift ter verkrijging van de graad van Doctor aan de Universiteit Leiden, op gezag van Rector Magnificus prof.dr.ir. H. Bijl, volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties te verdedigen op woensdag 24 februari 2021 klokke 11:15 uur door Pamela Valentina Niemann Peralta geboren te Valparaíso (Chili) in 1987 Promotores: Prof.dr. P. Silva Prof.dr. P. Navia (Universidad Diego Portales / New York University, NYU) Promotiecommissie: Prof.dr. E. Amann Mw.Prof.dr. R. Castiglioni (Universidad Diego Portales) Prof.dr. M.A. Moreno (Universidad Central de Chile) Table of Contents Index of Tables v Acronyms vi Acknowledgements VIIIviii Introduction 1 Chapter 1 A Comprehensive Approach to the Study of Electoral Reform: Assessing, Building and Broadening Traditional Approaches 22 1.1 The Value and Weight of History in Institutional Development: Historical Institutionalism, Institutional Change and Electoral Reform 23 1.2 Change and Continuity: The Two Possible Roads of Institutional Development 26 1.3 HI and Institutional Change: The Approach’s Conception of Type and Frequency of Change 27 1.4 Punctualist, Discontinuous or Disruptive Change: A Shock Associated Form of Institutional Change 29 1.4.1 Critical Junctures: Short Lived Windows of Institutional Change 30 1.4.2 Path Dependence: The Weight of Previous Choices in the Construction of New Institutional Arrangements 31 1.5 Incremental, Gradual or Cumulative Change: The Slow - Sometimes Invisible- Form of Institutional Change 33 1.6 HI’s Approach to Electoral Reform: How, When and Why Reforms Develop Over Time 35 1.7 RCI’s Conception of Institutional Change and Electoral Reform: Rational Actors and Calculated Choices 36 1.8 Electoral Institutions as Formal Constrains in Electoral Reform Research 39 1.8.1 Institutions: The Field of Action for Political Actors 41 1.8.1.1 Electoral Laws: The Formal Constraints for Political Actor Behaviour 41 1.8.1.2 Party, Party Leaders, and Coalitions: The Other Institutional Constraints for Individual Preference Formation and Behaviour 42 1.8.1.3 Non-Institutional Motivations and Constraints: Values, Ideology, Culture and Other Determinants of Legislator Preference and Behaviour Regarding Electoral Reform 46 1.9 An Overview of Existing Multi-Approach Frameworks in the Study of Electoral Reform 47 1.10 Electoral Reform Literature Review 50 I Chapter 2 Rethinking Electoral Reforms: Building Blocks for a More Comprehensive Understanding of Electoral Reform 58 2.1 Defining Electoral Reform: Ups and Downs of Previous and Current Conceptualization Approaches 59 2.1.1 Electoral Laws as the Object of Electoral Reform 61 2.1.2 Traditional Approaches to the Definition and Study of Major Reforms 64 2.1.3 Tracing the Development of the Concept of Electoral Reform: From Exclusively Major to Comprehensive Conceptualizations 67 2.1.3.1 The Founding Conceptualizations of Electoral Reform: Douglas Rae and Arendt Lijphart 67 2.1.3.2 Other Conceptualizations of Electoral Reform 69 2.1.3.3 Richard Katz and the Identification of Minor and Technical Reforms 71 2.1.4 Major Reforms: The ‘Big’ Type of Electoral Reforms 72 2.1.5 Minor and Technical Reforms: The Smaller, Less Visible Type of Electoral Reforms 73 2.1.5.1 Minor Reforms: Modifying Within the Electoral Formula 73 2.1.5.1 Technical Reforms: The Smallest Type of Electoral Reform 74 2.1.6 Moving Forward: A (more) Comprehensive Definition of Electoral Reform 75 2.2 Determinants of Electoral Reform: The Inherent and Contingent Causes of Electoral Reform 83 2.2.1 Electoral Reform Determinants in Light of the Theoretical Framework 84 2.2.2 Determinants of Electoral Reform: Insights from HI 85 2.2.2.1 Enabling Reforms: The Gradual Construction of the Inherent Conditions for Electoral Reform 86 2.2.3 Determinants of Electoral Reform: Insights from RCI 87 2.2.3.1 Improvement of Re-election Prospects: A Motive for Individual Legislators, Parties and Coalitions 91 2.2.3.2 Culture, Values, Experiences and Ideologies as Other Motivations for Legislators 95 2.2.3.3 Parties: Values and Ideology as Motives (For or Against Reform) 96 2.2.3.4 Coalitions and Non-Instrumental Motivations 96 Chapter 3 The Role of the Enabling Reforms: Modifying Chile’s Binominal System 99 3.1 The 1980 Constitution and the Construction of the Binominal Electoral System 100 II 3.1.1 The Military Regime’s Political Diagnosis and their Institutional Design 101 3.1.2 The Making of the 1980 Political Constitution and the Binominal Electoral System 102 3.1.2.1 The Ortúzar Commission 104 3.1.2.2 The Council of State Commission (1976–1990) 110 3.1.2.1 The Fernández Commission 114 3.1.2.4 The 1980 Political Constitution 115 3.2 The Binominal System 119 3.2.1 Constitutional Organic Law N° 18.700 120 3.2.2 Constitutional Organic Law N° 18.799 120 3.2.3 The 1988 National Plebiscite 121 3.3 The Enabling Process of the Binominal Electoral System Reform 123 3.3.1 The Enabling Reforms: The Gradual Development of the Inherent Conditions for Reform (1989-2014) 124 3.3.1.1 The 1989 Reforms 125 3.3.1.2 The 2005 Constitutional Reform 130 Chapter 4 The Last Stage of Reform: The Role of Contingency 137 4.1 Social Unrest and Conflict Within the Right-Wing Coalition: The “Alianza” and the Piñera Administration (2010–2014) 138 4.2 President Bachelet’s Government Program and First Year in Office: The Fruits of the Honeymoon Effect 145 4.2.1 The Reform: Presidential Message N° 076-362 148 4.3 The Reform Congress 151 4.3.1 The Senate 153 4.3.2 The Chamber of Deputies 154 4.4 The Parties and Coalitions of the Reform 155 4.4.1 The Pro-Reform Parties 155 4.4.2 The Anti-Reform Parties 161 4.4.3 The Pro-Reform Coalition 163 4.5 The Last Stage of Chile’s Electoral Reform Process 165 4.6 The New Electoral System 169 4.7 The Motives and Objectives Behind the Electoral Reform 170 4.7.1 Improvement of Legislator Re-election Prospects 177 III 4.7.2 Improvement of Party Seat-Share Prospects 178 4.7.3 The Coalition’s Prospects 180 Conclusion 183 References 198 Annex 214 Samenvatting 215 Curriculum Vitae 225 IV Index of Tables Table 1: Conceptualization of Minor Electoral Reforms 74 Table 2: Conceptualization of Technical Electoral Reforms 75 Table 3: Identified Dimensions of the Electoral Law 77 Table 4: Composition of the Chilean Senate by Political Coalition from 1990-2018 132 Table 5: Party Alignments in Congress (2014) 153 Table 6: Party Alignment Evolution in the Senate (2010-2014) 154 V Acronyms AMP: Amplitude/ Amplitud CA: Constitutional Acts CEP: Centro de Estudios Públicos CJ: Critical Junctures COL: Constitutional Organic Law / Ley Orgánica Constitucional COSENA: National Security Council / Consejo de Seguridad Nacional CPD: Concertation of Parties for Democracy / Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia D.L.: Decree Law GQ: Gender Quotas HI: Historical Institutionalism IC: Citizen Left / Izquierda Ciudadana LDP: Liberal Democratic Party M: Magnitude MAS: Broad Social Movement / Movimiento Amplio Social MD: District Magnitude MMP: Mixed Member Proportional MWC: Minimal Winning Coalition NM: New Majority / Nueva Mayoría PC: Communist Party/ Partido Comunista PDC: Christian Democrat Party / Partido Demócrata Cristiano PL: Liberal Party / Partido Liberal PPD: Party for Democracy / Partido Por La Democracia PR: Proportional Representation PRI: Independent Regionalist Party / Partido Regionalista Independiente PRSD: Radical Party / Partido Radical Social Demócrata PS: Socialist Party / Partido Socialista RCI: Rational Choice Institutionalism VI RN: Renovación Nacional SI: Sociological Institutionalism SMD: Single Member District SMP: Single Member Plurality SNTV: Single Non-Transferable Vote T.D.: Transitory Dispositions UDI: Independent Democratic Union / Unión Demócrata Independiente UP: Popular Unity / Unidad Popular VII Acknowledgements I would like to thank my supervisor, Prof. Patricio Silva for his guidance, interest and thoughtful critique of the project. He has given shape to this dissertation and contributed to polish it in its final stages with meticulous comments and suggestions. I would also like to express my gratitude to my co-supervisor, Prof. Patricio Navia who helped me make this dissertation possible and for challenging me to become a better researcher and academic. I could not have done this without the help and support of my close family and friends. I would like to thank my friend and colleague, Lisa Zanotti, who generously shared her experience and thoughts with me throughout this endeavour. I would also like to thank my friends, ‘las9’ and Paulina Dardel for providing comfort and drive during testing times. You helped me pull through when I did not see the way. I would like to thank my husband, Nicolás Díaz, for accompanying and encouraging me since day one. You sat with me every weekend for over two years. I was able to write this dissertation because you gave me the space, time, counsel and encouragement to do so. You always believed I could do it. To my family, Marce, Fran and Fede and especially Mom and Dad. Thank you for supporting me in every decision I make. It was in your house I sat with Nico and did most of my reading and writing.