ForsvarsstlUdiell" 5/1988 Between «russophobia» and «bridge~buUding» The Norwegian Government and the Soviet Union 1940 - 1945 Si/en G. Holtsmark [nsmult for fors\'arsstudier (IFS) 'l'ollbugt 10, 0152 Oslo 1, Norgc INSTITUlT FOR FORSVARSSTUDIER - IFS - ltidIigcrc Forsvarshistorisk forsk­ ningsscnler) er en faglig uavhengig institusjon som driver forskning mcd et sanllidshi~~ torisk pt!rspekliv innellfor onm'idene norsk forsvars- og sikkerhelspolitikk, Sovjctstud­ ier og stralegiske studicr. IFS er administrativt tilknyttet Forsvarcts hogskole, og virk­ .somhclen star under tilsyn av Radet for forsvarssmdicr med representasjoll fra Forsva­ rcts overkommando, Forsvarsdcpartcmen(cr, Forsvarets h~igsko!c og Univcrsitetet i Oslo. Forskllillgs~jcf: professor Ola\' Ris/e. FORSVARSSTUDIER tar sikle pii a v:.ere et forum for forskningsarbeider inncnfor institusjonens arbeidsomriider. Dc synspunkter SOIll kommer ti! uttrykk i Forsvarsstu­ dicr star for forfattcrens egen regning. Hel eHer dclvis gjengivelsc av innholdet kan hare skje med forfattercns samtykke. Redaktl;r: RolfTamllcs. INSTlTUlT FOR FORSVARSSTUDIER - IFS - NORWEGIAN INSTITUTE FOR DEFENCE STUDIES (formerly Forsvarshistorisk forskningssenter - Research Centre for Defence History) conducts independent research from a contemporary history pers­ pective on defence and security issues, Soviet studies, and strategic stuciit!s. IFS is administratively attached to the National Defence College. and its activities arc super­ vised by the Council for Defence Studies, composed of representatives from the Defence Command. the Ministry of Defence. the National Defence College, and the University of Oslo. Director: Professor Olm' RiSI(!, D. Phi!. (Oxon). FORSV ARSSTUDIER M Defence Studies ~ aims to provide a forum for research papers within the fields of activity of the Norwegian Institute for Defence Sludie~. The view­ points expressed arc those of the authors. The author's pemlission is required for any reproduction, wholly or in part, of the conlents. EdllOr: Roll Tamlles. Sals: Euro Sats AIS. Trykk: Euro Trykk AIS. Distrilmcrr gjellllOlII ForSVarl!lS OI'erkom­ mwuio Distribll.\jollsst'l1trafell. /SSN 0333-2470 Contents Page Introduction 5 Not Yet Allies 8 Norwegian-Smoie! relatioll.l" hefore the Secolld World !Var 8 Will the Sm'iet Union intervene? The campaign ill Norway 1940 10 The Soviet Union ill Norwegian foreigll policy during [he summer 1940 13 The Sm'tel Unioll ill Norwegian foreign policy, November 1940 - 22/1d June 1941 16 Cooperation and Alliance, June 1941 - May 1944 21 The Norwegiall response lO the German allack 011 fhe Soviet Unio/l 21 Diplomatic relatiolls resumed 22 Fillland: Nordic versus allied solidarity 23 Norwegiall-SOI'iet militarJ' cooperation 24 Civil cooperation: Norwegian tollllage to the Sm'iel Unioll? 29 Agreement 011 jurisdictioll alld cil'ii alfairs 32 Norwegian troops to 'he SOl'iel Union? March 1944 35 The Soviet Union in Norwegian Foreign Policy, June 1941 - May 1944 37 Towards a policy of "hridge-building"? 37 COl/tinued preferellce for regiol/al agreements? 39 "The principal features 0/ Nonvay'J foreign policy" 41 Elements o//riction ill Nonw!gian-Sm'iet rela/ions 43 Norway. the SOI'icl Union and regional arrangements ill Europe 45 Norway, the Slwiet Union and future Nordic cooperation 47 Towards the Liberation of Norway 48 Military cooperatiol/ colllillued 48 AbalJdoning the Atlal/tic policy? 55 Conclusion 60 Introduction In his book Gr£'at Power Politics Qlld Norwegian Fon!igll Policy. A Study of Norway's Foreign Re/aLions November 1940 - February 19.f8. I\'ils Marten Udgaard has described the evolution of the Norwegian government's foreign policy during the second world war as developing from "total political commit­ ment to the Atlantic Great Powers early in the war; to a policy of non­ alignment and accommodation to Soviet interests at the close of the war".1 According la Udgaard, this process revealed itself as "a continuous - though reluctant - re-orientation towards the Soviet Union, closely following the rise in Soviet power and influence".2 Udgaard sees it as a development closely connected with the evolution of relations between the great powers. He identifies two main determinants of Norwegian foreign policy during the war. On the one hand, there is the influence on Norwegian foreign policy of the evolving British and American policy towards the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the Norwegian government had to adjust its policy to the situation created by the steadily increasing role of the Soviet Union as the dominant single power facing Norway in the North. The question presents itself whether Udgaard's model is adequate and credible as a characterization of Norwegian foreign policy during the war years. And if this is the case, how did this policy reveal itself in the day-to­ day affairs of Norway's relations with the great powers? How did Norwegian policy-makers go about operationalizing their declaratory foreign policy? The question also rises about the character of the forces motivating the govern­ ment's foreign policy in the period under review. Did the politicians in charge of Norway's foreign relations at any stage intend to place Norway in a middle position between East and West? Or was Norway, as Udgaard's qualification cited above suggests, only reluctnntly forced into a position of apparent "accomodation to Soviet interests"? The underlying purpose of this study is to examine Norway's policy towards the Soviet Union during the war in light of the generalizations suggested by Udgaard. I will try to give a tentative answer to the questions asked above as far as the Norwegian policy towards the Soviet Union is concerned. The general aim, however, as the title suggests, is to give a comprehensive presentation of the Norwegian government's policy towards the Soviet Union from the German attack on Norway in April 1940 to the capitu­ lation of the German forces and the subsequent return of the government to Norway in the spring of 1945. Jt should be noted that I have deliberately chosen to offer more attention to topics which have been the object of only limited treatment by earlier researchers in the field, while for instance the now well-known story of president RooseveJt's free port scheme for Northern Norway, as well as the far more important Spilzbergen question in 1944/45, have only been given limited treatment. In addition, based on this more or less chronologically organized description of the Norwegian policy towards the Soviet Union, an attempt will be made to assess the influence of the Soviet Union on the Norwegian government's overall foreign policy during the war. 5 The main current in Norwegian foreign policy from about 1944 to Norway's emrance into NATO in 1949 is conventionally described as the policy of "bridge-building".3 Continuing the line of argument presente,d above, we will look for the operational content of this policy in the period of its formulation during the latter half of the war. Did the Norwegian government, as Udgaard suggests, really view Norway "as occupying an intermediate position between East and West,,?4 By pointing to the fact that the Norwegian government continued to involve Norway in a multitude of cooperative ventures with the western powers, particularly with regard to military matters, Udgaard himself warns against drawing too far-reaching conclusions about the meaning and the scope of the policy of ~bridge-building". Towards the end of the war Norway was, according to Udgaard, "in the process of being woven into the fabric of incipient western co-operation which was to develop fully in the post-war period".s In view of the fairly obvious fact that the Norwegian government's policy towards the Soviet Union ",'ill occupy a central position in all attempts to describe and evaluate the changes in ils main foreign policy line during the period under review, a discussion of the development of the relations between the government-in-exile and the Soviet Union during these crucial years should constitute a contribution to a better understanding of this general topic as well. Udgaard's main points have not, of course, been left unchallenged. The contributions of Olav Riste, who in books and articles has delivered strong arguments in favour of a re-evaluation of some of Nils Morten Udgaard's major points and conclusions. merit special attention.6 According to Riste, a descrip­ tion of twentieth century Norwegian foreign and security policy requires a two-level analysis. One the onc hand, there is the declared policy line. i.e. "[he public, official declarations and various kinds of acts which together constitute the nalion's official policy in mallers of security". On the other hand there is the no less important unofficial level: "the substructural realities, the often implicit preconditions",7 As a logical outcome of tbis line of thought Riste tends to place a greater stress on the continuity of the basic features of, or prereQui~itc~ for, Norwegian foreign policy. According to his alternative approach, "the Atlantic Ocean policy". which was introduced by the Norwegian minister of foreign affairs Tryg"e lieS in 1940 and further developed during 1941, should be viewed in many respects as a mere formalization of the implicit precondition fo!' Norway's foreign policy since the independence in 1905: namely the belief that the Atlantic great powers, then Great Britain, would stand ready to help Norway if it was faced with a threat from Germany or Russia. Riste continues his argument by stating that the shift during the war years from "Atlantic Ocean policy" towards a policy of "bridge-buildingH as the declared policy of the government did not signify that the Norwegians gave up their belief in the Atlantic powers as the ultimate guarantors of the integrity and security of Norway. The. redirection of the official line of policy towards a loosening of the formal ties to lhe western powers during the latter half of the period under review is not in dispute.