Naval War College Review Volume 73 Number 3 Summer 2020 Article 18 2020 The Final Act: The Helsinki Accords and the Transformation of the Cold War Nicholas Evan Sarantakes The U.S. Naval War College Michael Cotey Morgan Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review Recommended Citation Sarantakes, Nicholas Evan and Morgan, Michael Cotey (2020) "The Final Act: The Helsinki Accords and the Transformation of the Cold War," Naval War College Review: Vol. 73 : No. 3 , Article 18. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss3/18 This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Sarantakes and Morgan: The Final Act: The Helsinki Accords and the TransformationBOOK of theREVIEWS 159 less concerned with knowledge for its of U.S. hydrographers in accurately own sake—and at times more rough- charting these waters is nowhere more hewn than their academic counter- apparent than in a comparison of prewar parts—were not always welcomed charts of Guantánamo Bay with those by pure academics, and vice versa. created after the American victory. Smith details how a powerful connec- To Master the Boundless Sea also tion between the Navy’s ever-increasing acknowledges the Naval War College’s knowledge of the maritime environment role in the development of naval and seagoing commerce was forged hydrography and the evolution of the and strengthened from the beginning. nautical chart into not only an aid Time (and safety) was money to to war but also a critical component merchant captains and the owners for of campaign and battle planning. Of whom they worked. Matthew Fontaine particular note was the work of Captain Maury’s wind and current charts cut William McCarty Little in bringing war days or weeks from sailing times, and gaming to Newport. Whereas Mahan time saved was money earned. One articulated a strategic vision, McCarty of the book’s illustrations—a whaling Little’s wargaming charts mapped ways chart produced by the Navy and used of making that vision a strategic reality. extensively by the captains of Herman Smith fills a major niche in understand- Melville’s era—speaks to the cooperation ing the role of nautical charts, the people between the commercial and military and organizations that created them, spheres. And whaling was not the only and how they all advanced scientific industry to have such close ties to the understanding and a larger American Navy; as underwater cables began to identity. To Master the Boundless Sea knit together continents and colonies, is a superb work that will reward the the requirement to map the topography interested and discerning reader. of the deep ocean floor became more significant as the mechanisms RICHARD J. NORTON to achieve this goal advanced. As steam supplanted sail and Alfred Thayer Mahan’s strategic insights grew to dominate naval thinking, charts be- The Final Act: The Helsinki Accords and the came essential enablers of U.S. imperial Transformation of the Cold War, by Michael ambitions. Using the Spanish-American Cotey Morgan. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. War as a backdrop, Smith demonstrates Press, 2018. 424 pages. $35. how charts became tools of conquest. One of the bigger questions in history— Spanish charts of Cuba, Puerto Rico, right up there with why did the Roman and the Philippines were incomplete, Empire fall—is why did the Cold War and without accurate hydrographic end. This question becomes even more information American naval com- significant when one remembers that manders’ difficulties increased. After the United States and its allies defeated victory in the Spanish-American War, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact accurate charts were vital in selecting without a direct, military confrontation. the locations of future naval installations Other long-term strategic confrontations and coaling stations. The diligence Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020 1 160 NAVAL WARNaval COLLEGE War REVIEW College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 3, Art. 18 did not end so well. There are many ex- constitute an acknowledgment of the amples, but three will suffice: Athens ver- validity of the Soviet system. The United sus Sparta generated the Peloponnesian States agreed to this gathering because War, Rome versus Carthage produced the it had suffered significantly in the 1960s Punic Wars, and Britain versus Germany from the trauma of Vietnam, which resulted in World Wars I and II. As a raised questions at home and abroad result, the issues that Michael Morgan about the United States and its leader- explores in The Final Act are rather large. ship in world affairs. While the Soviets While historians will continue wrestling pushed for the conference, the smaller with the issue of why the Cold War states of Europe were the ones most ended, it is a testimony to the intellectual eager to take part. The gathering granted power that Morgan brings to bear that them a voice, and in Morgan’s narrative this book, in all likelihood, will remain they often play key roles—for instance, the book on the final act of the Helsinki in resolving diplomatic deadlocks. Accords for decades to come. Why? Both Americans also were important, but the depth and breadth of the research more in support than in the lead. are nothing less than astonishing. Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Morgan draws on material from fourteen Gerald R. Ford both saw the gathering’s archives in eight nations; this material, potential. Secretary of State Henry A. combined with published sources, is Kissinger, on the other hand, did not in nine different languages. There are believe in this diplomatic effort, and 103 pages of notes for 258 pages of text. the best thing that can be said about The writing also is quite impressive, his role is that he did not get in the way with sections reminiscent of Barbara W. of its progress. American diplomats Tuchman’s work; Morgan even invokes were good, and often bested their her book The Guns of August with a Soviet counterparts, but mainly because chapter entitled “The Pens of August.” Brezhnev wanted to reach an agreement With that point made, some sections read quickly, so he often compromised on as if a PhD dissertation committee wrote issues involving personal freedoms, and rewrote some paragraphs until all conflict resolution, and sovereignty, in the flavor was removed—which actually ways that ended up working against the might have been the case. Fortunately, long-term interests of the Communist these passages are not frequent. system. As Morgan notes (turning some What does Morgan do with these issues upside down), “Human rights strengths? The short answer: he looks at provided a weapon for fighting the Cold the accords of the Conference on Security War, not an escape from it” (p. 6). and Co-operation in Europe “in the The most intellectually impressive part of round,” examining the perspectives of the book is the epilogue. Morgan looks at powers large and small. After a series of the legacy of Helsinki on bringing about crises in the 1960s that raised questions the end of the Cold War. What gives this about the legitimacy of the Soviet Union, chapter power is that he uses the words Leonid I. Brezhnev pushed for the of the defeated. Using source after source conference, desiring Western European from the other side of the Iron Curtain, recognition of the post-1945 borders he shows how the final act changed in Eastern Europe—which also would Communist policies and behavior. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss3/18 2 Sarantakes and Morgan: The Final Act: The Helsinki Accords and the TransformationBOOK of theREVIEWS 161 Wars and conflicts end only when the and much, much, much stronger than defeated accept their loss, and this section those of the Soviets. Despite all the per- shows how new thinking developed suasive power of the epilogue, it comes in the capitals of the Warsaw Pact. up a bit short of convincing its readers, Even with all these points made, not even if Morgan is right . probably. everyone will accept Morgan’s arguments. In the end, though, most historians are The crisis of legitimacy in the 1960s lucky if they produce one book that certainly explains Soviet actions, but the endures; odds are that Morgan has done decade was not identical for the United that. Expect to see this book in print States. The constitutional legitimacy for five or six decades—it is that good. of the U.S. government and American NICHOLAS EVAN SARANTAKES leadership of its alliance were different OUR REVIEWERS Richard J. Norton is a professor of national security affairs at the College. His most recent publica- tions include articles in the Naval War College Review and Marine Corps University Journal. Dale C. Rielage is a senior civilian with the Naval Intelligence Activity, assigned as director for intelligence and information operations at U.S. Pacific Fleet. Angus Ross is a retired Royal Navy officer and professor of joint military operations at the College. He is a graduate of the College, received a second MA from Providence College, and is working on PhD studies, looking at naval transformation prior to the First World War. His recent published works include articles in this journal and others on the dilemma facing both the Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy in the wake of the dreadnought revolution.