Revista Mexicana de Estudios Canadienses (nueva época) Asociación Mexicana de Estudios sobre Canadá [email protected] ISSN (Versión impresa): 1405-8251 MÉXICO 2004 Lawrence Douglas Taylor Hansen GETTING OUT FROM UNDER THE ELEPHANT: AN ANALYSIS OF CANADIAN-U.S. RELATIONS DURING THE TRUDEAU PERIOD Revista Mexicana de Estudios Canadienses (nueva época), noviembre, número 008 Asociación Mexicana de Estudios sobre Canadá Culiacán, México pp. 59-77 Red de Revistas Científicas de América Latina y el Caribe, España y Portugal Universidad Autónoma del Estado de México http://redalyc.uaemex.mx GETTING OUT FROM UNDER THE ELEPHANT: AN ANALYSIS OF CANADIAN-U.S. RELATIONS DURING THE TRUDEAU PERIOD Lawrence Douglas Taylor Hansen Abstract The article deals with Canadian relations with the U.S. during the Trudeau period of government, from 1968 to 1984. It focuses on Trudeau’s efforts to alter Canada’s relationship with her powerful neighbor, particularly with regard to economic matters. It also considers the Trudeau government’s policy towards the U.S. in the light of the policies of previous governments, as well as Trudeau’s own personal views on nationalism and the Canadian identity. It concludes with an overall assessment as to the degree of success achieved by the Trudeau government’s efforts to chart a new and independent course for Canada. 59 INTRODUCTION n March 25, 1969, during an official visit to Washington, Prime OMinister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, in an attempt to inject some humour into his address to the Washington National Press Club, made the comment which has since become famous: ‘‘Living next to you is in some ways like sleeping with an elephant. No matter how friendly and even-tempered is the beast, one is affected by every twitch and grunt’’ (Head and Trudeau,1995:179). The remark constituted a succinct summary of what Trudeau perceived to be Canada’s position or situation in relation to the country’s powerful southern neighbour. Beginning in the 1970’s, the Trudeau government attempted to steer the country away from the more pronounced international profile it had assumed during the previous administration under prime minister Lester B. Pearson. Not only were measures taken to substantially reduce Canada’s role in NATO defense and global peacekeeping, but the government also explored various options for reducing Canada’s economic and trade dependence on the U.S. REVISTA MEXICANA DE ESTUDIOS CANADIENSES The objective of this paper is to analize relations between Canada and the U.S. during the Trudeau period of government (1968-1984). It examines the evolution of the government’s policy toward the U.S. in the light of the policies of previous administrations, as well as the prime minister’s own personal views on nationalism and relationships with the Americans. It focusses on the government’s attempts to alter Canada’s relationship with the U.S., particularly in the areas of economics and trade. It concludes with an assessment of the degree of success achieved by the Trudeau government in this regard, as well as its general impact on relations between the two countries. THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD UNDER DIEFENBAKER AND PEARSON At the time John G. Diefenbaker assumed power as Prime Minister in June 1957, he was already deeply critical of what he perceived of as too strong a link between the Liberals and American investment, which amounted to approximately seventy six percent of all foreign investment in Canada. Like his predecessor as Popular Council of Canada (PCC) leader George Drew, Diefenbaker attempted to strengthen Canadian trade with Great Britain 60 and other Commonwealth countries, as part of an effort to counterbalance U.S. economic domination of the Canadian economy. Diefenbaker felt the U.S. was pushing Great Britain into the Common Market to get rid of British trade preferences for Commonwealth countries; as a result, the latter would be forced to seek closer economic and trade contacts with the U.S. Great Britain’s move toward the Common Market was temporarily halted by the De Gaulle government’s veto in late January 1963 (Robinson, 1989; Newmen, 1963; Nash, 1963). However, long before Diefenbaker assumed power, the U.S. had become Canada’s principal trading partner. Once De Gaulle was gone (1968), Great Britain reapplied to enter the European Economic Community (EEC) and was ultimatedly approved. In the meantime, the proportion of Canada’s trade with Great Britain was steadily declining, while that with the U.S. was continually increasing. During the 1960’s, with the maturing of the postwar generation, Canadian-British ties in general were on the wane (Granatstein and Bothwell, 1990: 159-160, 337-339) Diefenbaker got along fairly well with Eisenhower, who was well into his second term when the Conservatives came into power. The two respected each other and became close friends. Eisenhower was sensitive to GETTING OUT FROM UNDER THE ELEPHANT Diefenbaker’s outlook and conciliatory in terms of resolving problems and disputes between the two countries. This establishment of a rapport between the two leaders was especially important to Diefenbaker, as he preferred a more personalized form of diplomacy (meeting with national leaders and other dignitaries of high standing) (Robinson, 1989: 118; Nash, 1963:54- 57, 62, 72). Like most Western heads of state of the period, Diefenbaker was anti- Communist. He also shared their concern about the apparent military threat that the Soviet Union and other communist countries posed for Canada. Given the fact that Canada stood astride the shortest air route between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, it lay in a strategically important area for war planners. It was believed necessary that Canada and the U.S. form a bilateral strategic defense organization to protect the U.S.’s vulnerable northern flank. It was due to this consideration that Diefenbaker precipitately signed the NORAD defense pact soon after taking office (Diefenbaker, 1976; Jockel, 1987: 3-4, 104-109). To a certain extent, the problems Diefenbaker had in dealing with the U.S. during this period derived from the advice of some of his key governmental advisors. Upon the sudden death of his first secretary of state for external affairs, Sidney Smith, he had appointed Howard Green, who 61 believed it vital to maintain the traditional ties with Great Britain and did not like the U.S. Green was apprehensive about U.S. military activities in Canada, especially in the north. He also favoured a ‘‘softer’’ approach in dealing with the Soviet bloc. He was also dedicated to promoting global disarmament and believed that ‘‘Canada’s main role in the world is to keep the big boys from rocking the boat’’. Green was seconded in this policy by his deputy minister, Norman Robertson. Both men played a critical role in influencing Diefenbaker’s delaying tactics regarding the acquisition of nuclear weapons (Diefenbaker, 1976; Robinson, 1989; Nash,1963). Eisenhower’s successor as president, John F. Kennedy, adopted a much more aggressive stance against the Soviet bloc, which led to some of the most acute crises of the Cold War period. Diefenbaker and Kennedy found it difficult from the beginning to establish a personal rapport; in fact, the relationship steadily deteriorated over time. Diefenbaker’s main complaints about Kennedy as far as personal matters went lay in what he perceived to be personal slights and lack of respect on Kennedy’s part. As time went by, Diefenbaker also became bothered by Kennedy’s growing popularity with Canadians. The president, who did not have much knowledge of Canada, REVISTA MEXICANA DE ESTUDIOS CANADIENSES or interest in its affairs, saw Diefenbaker as a stubborn, ‘‘boring’’ old fool and literally loathed him (Diefenbaker, 1976; Nash,1963). Kennedy felt more at ease with opposition leader Lester B. Pearson, whom he liked. Pearson had worked in Chicago as a young man and liked Americans; he had also played semi-professional baseball with the Maple Leafs of Guelph, Ontario, and was a devoted fan of the sport. He and Kennedy shared much the same outlook on world affairs. Kennedy would have preferred that Pearson had been prime minister during the initial period of his presidency. Even though Diefenbaker was prime minister, Kennedy met with Pearson in Washington on at least a couple of occasions to talk about foreign affairs issues. Although Pearson initially opposed nuclear arms for Canada, as opposition leader he soon reversed his opinion, which made him even more palatable for the White House as a possible alternative to Diefenbaker. The latter construed this as part of a plot to bring about his downfall.1 There were a number of additional irritants that made relations difficult during this period. Diefenbaker resisted U.S. efforts to have Canada join the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Alliance for Progress (AFP). Canada also carried on trade with communist China and Cuba. 62 Diefenbaker objected to Canadian wheat being used as a weapon against the Chinese. He also opposed the U.S. tactic of attempting to isolate Cuba from the rest of the Western Hemisphere. ‘‘We are not convinced,’’ he told a joint meeting of Canadian Members of Parliament and U.S. congressmen in Montreal, ‘‘that isolation is the best method of enabling the Cuban people eventually to free themselves.’’2 Diefenbaker looked upon Kennedy as a brash young man who, with his government’s adoption of a more aggressive Cold War stance, might end up dragging Canada and the other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries into a global conflict of disastrous proportions. He came to believe, especially after Kennedy’s visit to Ottawa in May 1961, that the latter’s government meant to push and manipulate Canada as part of its global defense plans.