SECTION 6.5 PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR A POST-SADDAM HUSSEIN IRAQ, JANUARY TO MARCH 2003 Contents Introduction .................................................................................................................. 309 Second round of inter-agency talks, Washington, 22 January 2003 ............................ 309 Follow-up to the inter-agency talks .............................................................................. 326 The UK Common Document .................................................................................. 327 Post-conflict discussions with the French .............................................................. 330 UK military campaign objectives ............................................................................ 331 Mr Blair’s talks with President Bush, 31 January 2003 .......................................... 333 Official-level discussions with the US .................................................................... 340 DFID humanitarian contingency planning .............................................................. 343 Parliamentary discussion of post-conflict issues, 3 February 2003 ....................... 348 Creation of the Iraq Planning Unit ................................................................................ 350 Domestic contingency planning: the Stephens Group ........................................... 355 PJHQ planning seminar ......................................................................................... 357 Preparing for the UK’s “exemplary” role in the South ................................................... 360 Maintaining pressure on the US ............................................................................ 366 Revised UK military campaign objectives .............................................................. 372 Mr Blair’s meeting on humanitarian issues, 13 February 2003 ............................. 376 UN preparations ..................................................................................................... 381 The absence of a “winning concept” ...................................................................... 382 DFID contingency planning .................................................................................... 389 “Sectorisation” ........................................................................................................ 394 The post-conflict Rock Drill .................................................................................... 401 Seeking US agreement on the post-conflict role of the UN ......................................... 408 The potential for violence in the South .................................................................. 410 A UN “badge” for post-conflict Iraq ........................................................................ 418 The DIS Red Team ................................................................................................ 420 Obstacles to an “exemplary” UK effort ................................................................... 422 The ‘UK Vision for Phase IV’ .................................................................................. 434 307 The Report of the Iraq Inquiry UK commercial interests ........................................................................................ 439 The UK ‘Vision for Iraq and the Iraqi People’ ......................................................... 440 Growing pressure for Ministerial decisions .................................................................. 444 Mr Blair’s meeting on post-conflict issues, 6 March 2003 ...................................... 448 The UK plan for Phase IV ...................................................................................... 458 Treasury discussions with the IMF .................................................................. 463 DFID update on humanitarian assistance .............................................................. 464 DIS Red Team report on retaining the support of the Iraqi people ........................ 465 UK military and humanitarian co-ordination in the South ....................................... 468 Mr Straw’s statement to the House of Commons, 10 March 2003 .................. 471 DIS report: ‘Basra: Post Saddam Governance’ ............................................... 472 DFID’s Humanitarian Strategy and Immediate Assistance Plan ..................... 473 Extending the Oil-for-Food programme ................................................................. 478 Plans and preparations on the eve of the invasion ...................................................... 478 The UK military plan .............................................................................................. 486 UK objectives for post-conflict Iraq ........................................................................ 491 The Azores Summit, 16 March 2003 ..................................................................... 493 Post-Azores concerns ............................................................................................ 497 Parliamentary debate on Iraq, 18 March 2003 ...................................................... 507 Revised arrangements for Ministerial discussion of Iraq ....................................... 512 Mr Blair’s conversation with President Bush, 19 March 2003 ............................... 513 Prime Minister’s Questions, 19 March 2003 .......................................................... 513 Security Council debate on Iraq, 19 March 2003 ................................................... 514 Straw/Hoon joint minute to Mr Blair ....................................................................... 515 The invasion ................................................................................................................. 521 The role of the UN ................................................................................................. 524 MOD update on Phase IV planning ....................................................................... 527 Draft UK post-conflict objectives ............................................................................ 530 Mr Blair’s meeting with President Bush, Camp David, 26 and 27 March 2003 ..... 534 Witness comments ....................................................................................................... 540 Conclusions ................................................................................................................. 551 What was known on the eve of the invasion .......................................................... 551 The failure to plan or prepare for known risks ....................................................... 561 The planning process and decision-making .......................................................... 563 308 6.5 | Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to March 2003 Introduction 1. Sections 6.4 and 6.5 consider the UK’s planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq between late 2001 and March 2003. 2. The two parts address: • the development of UK post-conflict strategy and objectives; • planning and preparation to implement those objectives; • UK civilian and military planning machinery; • UK influence on US planning and preparation and the impact of US planning on the UK; and • Parliamentary interest in post-conflict planning and preparation. 3. The two parts do not consider: • military plans for the invasion, which are addressed in Sections 6.1 and 6.2; • intelligence on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or preparations for the post-invasion search for WMD, addressed in Section 4; • the financial and human resources available for post-conflict administration and reconstruction, addressed in Sections 13 and 15; and • the outcome in post-conflict Iraq, which is addressed in Sections 9 and 10. 4. This Section covers the 10 weeks between the decision to deploy UK forces and the first post-invasion meeting between Mr Blair and President Bush at Camp David on 26 and 27 March 2003. 5. The preceding period, from mid-2001 to Mr Blair’s decision on 17 January 2003 to deploy UK forces to support US military preparations, is addressed in Section 6.4. 6. Key findings for Sections 6.4 and 6.5 are listed at the start of Section 6.4. 7. The Inquiry’s conclusions relating to both parts are at the end of this Section. Second round of inter-agency talks, Washington, 22 January 2003 8. In the run-up to the second round of trilateral inter-agency talks on post- conflict issues in Washington on 22 January 2003, UK officials focused on how to influence US thinking on the post-conflict role of the UN. 9. Mr Peter Ricketts, FCO Political Director, predicted that discussion on the role of the UN would be “hard going”. The US was wedded to a prolonged US occupation and opposed to any substantial role for the UN. 10. The first round of US/UK/Australia inter-agency talks on post-conflict issues took place in Washington on 6 November 2002 and is described in Section 6.4. 309 The Report of the Iraq Inquiry 11. By the first week of January 2003, no date had been set for the second round.1 12. The FCO Iraq Morning Meeting on 7 January concluded that Sir David Manning, Mr Blair’s Foreign Policy Adviser and Head of the Cabinet Office Overseas and Defence Secretariat (OD Sec), should ask Dr Condoleezza Rice, President Bush’s National Security Advisor, to “unblock” the talks if US officials were unable to clear the way for a second round to take place in the