CHAPTER 1 .BRITAIN AND GREECE HIS volume is chiefly concerned with three short campaigns fought in T the Middle East in the spring and early summer of 1941 . In each of them a relatively large Australian contingent took part and in tw o of them an Australian commanded the main force in the field during a crucial phase . Never before had Australian political leaders been s o closely involved in decisions affecting the conduct of military operations , nor had Australian military leaders borne such heavy independent respon- sibility in the field. At every level, problems of enduring interest to smalle r partners in an alliance were encountered . To the Australian infantry these campaigns brought their first experience of large-scale mountain warfar e and of large-scale operations in which the enemy dominated the air . In March 1941 when this phase opened, the British armies in Afric a and the Greek army in Albania had inflicted a series of defeats on th e Italian army, but, except for some recent skirmishes with a few Germa n units newly arrived in Africa, and some commando raids in western Europe, there had been no contact between the British and German armies since June 1940. It was evident, however, that the German army would soon intervene both in North Africa and the Balkans, either i n pursuance of Hitler's own long-range plans or in support of Italy . When Italy had invaded Greece on 28th October 1940 she intende d a lightning campaign which would soon leave her master of th e southern Balkans and the Aegean. Instead, to the annoyance of her senior ally, she started a chain of events which was to make Greece briefly a battleground for the two main antagonists—Britain and Germany . An immediate Greek reaction to the Italian invasion had been to invoke a long-standing guarantee that Britain would support Greece if she wer e attacked without provocation . Promptly a British air force contingen t was flown to Athens, and soon four squadrons and part of another wer e operating from Greek airfields against the Italians in Albania . In November a weak British infantry brigade group was landed in Crete, and abou t 4,200 anti-aircraft gunners, air force ground staff and depot troops were sent to Athens. At that time the British Commonwealth stood alone against German y and her European satellites. Italy's attack on Greece made Greece an ally of Britain against Italy but not against Germany. In the last quarter of 1940 Britain had two main military pre-occupations—the defenc e of the British Isles against invasion by an otherwise unemployed German army, and the defence of the Middle East against the Italians . The Greeks then neither sought nor needed military reinforcements on a large scale . They promptly defeated the Italian thrust into Greek territory from Albania and themselves took the offensive, with immediate success . When January opened fourteen Greek divisions faced nineteen Italian 2 BRITAIN AND GREECE lan 1941 divisions on a front about 100 miles in length and from 20 to 30 mile s within the Albanian border . The Greeks had thus demonstrated that they could defend their territor y against the Italians ; but Germany was master of Hungary and Rumania, and should she march southward into Greece through Bulgaria Greec e would undoubtedly be overpowered. In January the Germans were known to have twelve divisions and a powerful air force in Rumania . Greece on the other hand had only four divisions left on the Bulgarian frontier , and one of these was due soon to move to Albania . This was the situation when on 6th January the British Foreign Minister, Mr Eden, informe d the Prime Minister, Mr Churchill, that a mass of information has come to us over the last few days from divers sources, all of which tends to show that Germany is pressing forward her preparations i n the Balkans with a view to an ultimate descent upon Greece . The date usually mentioned for such a descent is the beginning of March, but I feel confident tha t the Germans must be making every effort to antedate their move . Whether or not military operations are possible through Bulgaria against Salonika at this time of the year I am not qualified to say, but we may feel certain that Germany will see k to intervene by force to prevent complete Italian defeat in Albania .l A month earlier the British forces in North Africa had opened an offensive, driven the Italians out of Egypt, and on 3rd and 4th January had overcome the Italians' fortress of Bardia in eastern Cyrenaica . On the 8th the Chiefs of Staff , , in London decided that no ochria l effective resistance could be z pCyyp i ~,,, Monashq offered to a German invasion ;z::! , of Greece but, nevertheless, ' on the 10th, after con- sidering Eden's submission , Churchill and the Chief s of Staff decided that once their army in Cyrenaica had taken the fortress of Tobruk , which was then invested, ~ .~y all other operations in the Middle East must hav DeW[net DeWlriak cn e second place to sending the y'- M`-greatest possible help to the Greeks. Consequently General Wavell, Comman- der-in-Chief of the British army in the Middle East, and Air Chief Marshal Long - more, Commander-in-Chief of the British air forces there, went to Athens to Z0 .10$0 M I E 1 Quoted in Churchill, The Second World War, Vol III (1950), p. 13 . Jan1941 THE PROBLEM OF YUGOSLAVIA 3 offer to the Greek dictator, General Metaxas, a small immediate reinforce- ment—a squadron of infantry tanks, a regiment of cruiser tanks and some regiments of artillery.2 In informal discussion Wavell told the Greek leaders that, in addition to these units, two or three divisions could b e dispatched within two months .3 Metaxas declined these offers on the grounds that the contingent of artillery and armour would not effectively reinforce the Greek Army an d might provide the Germans with a pretext for attacking Greece ; he con- sidered that even two or three divisions would be quite inadequate to the task presented by a German invasion. General Papagos, the Greek Commander-in-Chief, said that to establish "a good defensive positio n and a reasonably strong front" on the Bulgarian frontier reinforcement by nine British divisions with suitable air support would be needed . He wrote later that he advised Metaxas in private that the limited aid which Britain was proposing to give to Greec e would not only fail to produce substantial military and political results in th e Balkans, but would also, from the more general allied point of view, be contrary t o the sound principles of strategy . In fact, the two or three divisions which i t was proposed to withdraw from the Army in Egypt to send to Greece would com e in more useful in Africa.4 After the Athens conference Wavell told the Chiefs of Staff in Londo n that he himself regarded the proposal to send a few units as "a dangerou s half-measure" . In a formal note sent to the British Government on 18th Januar y Metaxas said that he would agree to the disembarkation of a British force in Greece as soon as German troops entered Bulgaria . He informed the Yugoslav Government of his replies to Britain, and later told Papago s that he knew that the Yugoslav Government had passed the information on to Germany . Because of their uncertainty about the policy which Yugoslavia woul d follow if the German Army invaded Greece, Metaxas and Papagos face d a most difficult politico-military problem. If Yugoslavia joined Britain an d Greece against German attack, the port of Salonika should be hel d because this was the only effective means of supplying the Yugoslays ; in that case the Anglo-Greek force should hold the well-designed frontie r fortifications, named the Metaxas Line, with an eastern flank preferably on the Nestos River . If Yugoslavia remained truly neutral, a withdrawal from this line protecting Salonika to a shorter and stronger line on th e Vermion Range, through Edessa to Mount Olympus would be desirable . If Yugoslavia allowed German troops to pass through her territory, how- ever, they could outflank the Vermion passes by way of the Monastir Gap, and Papagos considered that, in that event, the best defensive lin e would be one through the Olympus passes, along the Aliakmon Rive r The units offered would have been equipped with 65 tanks, 12 heavy guns, 24 field guns, 40 anti - aircraft guns, and 24 anti-tank guns . 4 A. Papagos, The Battle of Greece 1940-41 (published in Greek in 1945 and in English translatio n in 1949), p . 313 . Papagos, p . 315 . 4 BRITAIN AND GREECE Jan 1941 and the Venetikos River and thence to a shortened front against th e Italians in Albania. 5 These three lines—the Doiran-Nestos position, em - bracing the Metaxas Line; the Vermion-Olympus line ; and a line along the Aliakmon—were to be frequently under discussion in the following weeks. Belgrade Sarajevo Y U G O S LAV I A .11 Kriva '1, mbngro • Palankao‘. koptje '*., . -sr+ o t1i Durazzo Doi an Tirana Monastir ,n•r •~ 'we Edessa mHra oValona ►• alonika (` samoUn . C 'e R. Larisa ` Lemno s ~o . AEGEAN Mytil c SEA Chios Aliakmon-Venetikos Line Doiran-Nestos Line .gal •••••••w•• lrermion-Olympus Lin e Albanian front •• International Boundary Main Railways Three days after receiving Metaxas ' note declining help the British Chiefs of Staff instructed Wavell and his fellow Commanders-in-Chief t o continue the advance in Cyrenaica as far as Benghazi .